MOLDOVA VIGILANT FOR RUSSIAN TRAPS, SAYS REINTEGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000979

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: Declassify 09/30/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID PINR MD RS
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA VIGILANT FOR RUSSIAN TRAPS, SAYS REINTEGATION
MINISTER

REFS: A. Chisinau 971 B. Chisinau 958 C. Chisinau 762

Classified by CDA Kelly Keiderling under 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In his first meeting with Minister for Reintegration
Vasile Sova, Ambassador Chaudhry found broad agreement on the basic
issues: removing foreign troops from Moldovan territory, reforming
the peacekeeping force, continuing confidence-building measures
(CBMs),increasing EU participation and including any Transnistria
settlement in the 5-plus-2 format. Sova thanked the USG for
including Transnistria in its economic and social assistance to
Moldova. The Ambassador cautioned against analogies to the Caucasus,
and encouraged Moldova to be active in protecting its interests.
Sova said that he had booked his ticket for 5-plus-2 talks in Vienna
on October 7 and 8, but was concerned about Russia's failure to
clarify its stand on issues, and about the Transnistrian leadership's
avoidance of bilateral meetings. End summary.


2. (C) Sova began with thanks to the U.S. for consistent support,
and stated his hope that Russia's position would be made clearer at
the 5-plus-2. He declared that security issues, particularly the
presence of foreign troops on Moldovan soil and Transnistrian support
for paramilitary units, posed the greatest danger to stability. He
regretted that Moldovan peacekeeping recommendations, such as an
increased OSCE presence in the Joint Control Commission, had been
turned down. He noted that, in the absence of OSCE observers,
provocations could not be ruled out. He also expressed his concerns
about the Transnistrian leadership's "dreams" of independence, and
about parallels to fighting in Georgia and South Ossetia.


3. (C) Sova also noted that President Voronin's invitation to meet
Transnistrian "president" Smirnov remained valid (Ref B),and
expressed his hope that Transnistria would behave seriously and not
propose meetings two hours in advance. He alluded to the fact that
the two-hour deadline had seriously "provoked" Voronin. (Note: On
September 25, Voronin stated to the media that "the Transnistrian
regime, with which we have to find a compromise, is like a waste dump
that for many years has been stinking on the territory of our state."
End note.)


4. (C) On a more optimistic note, Sova stated that U.S. assistance to
both sides of the Dniester had done a great deal to calm the fears of
left-bank residents. (Note: Sova was probably thinking of the
delivery of 20 truckloads of Operation Provide Hope medical supplies
and assistance to Transnistrian hospitals. End note.) He noted that
Moldova had no deadlines, and was not going to try to rush a solution
before Moldova's spring 2009 parliamentary elections. He said that
Moldova would be presenting its case for greater EU involvement at
the meetings of EU foreign ministers (October 13) and heads of state
(October 15). He declared that Moldova would be vigilant against any
attempts by Russia to trap Moldova (Ref A).


5. (C) Ambassador Chaudhry noted that he agreed with almost all of
the Moldovan position, except for Sova's worries about Georgian
parallels and Transnistrian dreams of independence. "Those dreams
will remain dreams," the Ambassador said. He stressed USG support
for Moldova's territorial integrity, and praised Moldova's patience
and watchfulness. He encouraged bilateral negotiations insofar as
they contributed to the 5-plus-2 process. He said that the presence
of Russian troops on Moldovan soil was unhelpful, but that who should
replace them, and when, remained negotiable. He said, to Sova's
evident pleasure, that DAS David Merkel would attend the 5-plus-2
talks. Both Sova and the Ambassador dismissed media rumors that the
Kozak Plan would be revived.


4. (C) Comment: Sova has been on the job for 16 years, and has seen
many ups and downs in the negotiating process. His patience, evident
in his no-deadline approach, was matched by an active and watchful
desire to protect Moldova's interests. Like him, we hope that the
upcoming 5-plus-2 will reveal a less opaque and more cooperative
Russian approach. We also hope that the desire for a peace-making
legacy can overcome hindrances caused by the mercurial personalities
and mutual testiness of Voronin and Smirnov. End comment.

Keiderling