Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CHISINAU933
2008-09-17 06:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV TAKES INITIATIVE BUT

Tags:  PBTS PREL RU MD 
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000933 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL AND CLASSIFIED BY ADDED)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PBTS PREL RU MD
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV TAKES INITIATIVE BUT
TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT ONLY IN 5-PLUS-2
CLASSIFIED BY P/E CHIEF DARIA FANE FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000933

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL AND CLASSIFIED BY ADDED)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PBTS PREL RU MD
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV TAKES INITIATIVE BUT
TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT ONLY IN 5-PLUS-2
CLASSIFIED BY P/E CHIEF DARIA FANE FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (SBU) Summary: While a formal 5-plus-2 meeting is now planned for
early October, Russian President Medvedev has been pursuing his own
initiatives with both Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and
Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov. Medvedev has secured an agreement
that left- and right-bank leaders will meet together with Russia to
discuss a resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. It appears that,
additionally, Voronin and Smirnov will meet bilaterally before that.
Seemingly as a result of Russian pressure, Transnistrian leader
Smirnov announced the lifting of Tiraspol's moratorium on contacts
with Chisinau. The result of this movement has been some cooling of
tensions, positive signals from both Moscow and Tiraspol, and hopes
for upcoming talks, though observers are concerned about Russian
terms for a settlement. The GOM continues to reiterate its
commitment to sign an agreement only in the 5-plus-2 context, and not
separately with Russia. End summary.

2. (SBU) Russian President Medvedev met in Sochi with Moldovan
President Voronin on August 25, and with Transnistrian leader Smirnov
on September 3. Following these two meetings, Russian press releases
reported that both Voronin and Smirnov had separately agreed to hold
a trilateral meeting with Medvedev. Several positive outcomes
followed: Smirnov announced a lifting of his ban on contacts with
Chisinau, and Medvedev, noting twice in the last week his optimism
regarding a solution, confirmed Russian support for Voronin's efforts
to settle the conflict. In a September 9 interview in the Russian
press (Nezavisamaya Gazeta),Transnistrian Acting "Foreign Minister"
Yastrebchak confirmed that prior to a possible trilateral meeting
Smirnov and Voronin would likely meet in late September or early
October.


3. (SBU) According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant (which has
often been used by the Kremlin to float trial balloons),Voronin and
Smirnov now plan to meet to agree upon basic principles of a possible
settlement. This newspaper article suggested that a joint
declaration containing these principles could be signed by the two
leaders in the presence of Medvedev and then submitted to the
five-plus-two for approval. However, in order to allay concerns that
Russia could try to replace the 5-plus-2 talks with a separate
trilateral format, the Government of Moldova has underlined its
intention not to sign any bilateral agreements with Russia. During a
visit to Brussels on September 10 Foreign Minister Stratan declared
that Moldova would negotiate only within the 5-plus-2 context. GOM
officials have assured us that President Voronin would not sign a
separate agreement. Similarly, Transnistrian negotiator Yastrebchak
opined in the press that the international 5-plus-2 format would
remain the forum for discussions in order to avoid the 2003 "Kozak
situation."


4. (C) Comment: With its new-found political strength, Russia will
press its long-standing claim to a leading role in the Transnistrian
settlement process. We agree with EU Special Representative Kalman
Miszei and other European diplomatic colleagues in Chisinau that
Russia may try to push for a Kozak agreement that includes the
stationing of Russian forces in Moldova, an element which President
Voronin has categorically rejected. Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov's August 26 comments on using Kozak principles for a TN
resolution show continued Russian interest in a settlement based on
Russian desires. While Lavrov talked about Kozak, however, Medvedev
raised no objections to Moldova's "package" of documents for a TN
settlement for a TN settlement, a package which did not provide for
the continued presence of Russian troops. Minister for Reintegration
Vasile Sova speculated that Russia may want to project a more
positive and constructive image as peacemaker after Russian
intervention in Georgia. Russia may try to convince Moldova that a
Transnistrian settlement is possible if Moldova pledges it's
neutrality, renouncing NATO membership and not behaving like Georgia.



5. (C) Comment continued: It is significant, in this context, that
Medvedev's praise for Voronin has not been matched by praise for
Smirnov, the one person to whom Russia can dictate terms. Smirnov's
prompt retraction of his moratorium on contacts with Chisinau
officials and announcement of readiness to continue
confidence-building measures following his meeting with Medvedev
illustrates the power of Russian pressure on the Transnistrian
leader. Of all the players in the negotiations process, Smirnov has
the least to gain from a settlement which would permanently dash the
notion of Transnistrian independence.

CHAUDHRY