MOLDOVA OPPOSES RECOGNITION OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000872

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS MD
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA OPPOSES RECOGNITION OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kelly A. Keiderling for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)

Ref: STATE 91894


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary: In an August 28 meeting Minister for Reintegration
Vasile Sova stressed categorically that Moldova would not recognize
South Ossetia or Abkhazia. President Voronin emerged from his
August 25 meeting with Medvedev believing that the Russian president
understood that a peaceful solution to the Transnistrian (TN)
conflict was needed. Sova assured us that Moldova had not and would
not agree to a Kozak-like agreement, and underscored Moldova's
commitment only to a resolution based upon Moldova's 2005 law
regarding Transnistria's future status. He requested that the USG
review once again the documents of the Moldovan settlement package
and provide any written commentary by late September. End Summary.

Moldova Opposes Recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia
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3. (C) In an August 28 meeting with Minister for Reintegration Vasile
Sova, Charge d'Affaires delivered reftel talking points. Minister
Sova told Charge that Moldova categorically opposed recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Such recognition would directly affect
Moldova's own situation with Transnistria. (Note: The GOM issued a
statement on August 29 "considering that international recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not lead to stabilizing the
situation." This carefully worded statement reflects Moldova's
difficult balancing act: opposing the use of force to resolve
conflicts, refusing to recognize the independence of separatist
regions, and being careful not to irritate Russia, which Moldova
needs for a TN settlement. End note.)

Voronin Believes Medvedev Wants TN Resolution
--------------


4. (C) Sova said that though he had accompanied President Voronin to
Sochi, Voronin had met with Medvedev one-on-one. Based upon what
Voronin had told him, Sova reported that the meeting had gone well.
Voronin was satisfied that Medvedev supported a final resolution of
the Transnistrian conflict. When Voronin asked Medvedev whether
Russia had "fundamental objections" to Moldova's package, Sova
reported that Medvedev said no, though more details and a mechanism
had to be worked out.


5. (C) Sova underscored that Voronin and Medvedev had not/not agreed
to a Kozak-2 resolution of Transnistria. Irritated by the
international community's suspicions of his motives, Voronin told
Sova to inform everyone who asked at the August 27 national-day
reception that he had not agreed to any Kozak proposal. Sova
cautioned us not to suspect Voronin of being involved in secret deals
with the Russians. Sova reaffirmed Moldova's commitment instead to a
settlement in conformity with the 2005 law. While noting that the
2005 law had some points in common with Kozak, Sova said that the key
differences were that the 2005 law did not allow a Russian military
presence for 20 years, nor a bicameral parliament, nor veto power for
Transnistria.


6. (C) Sova said that the 2005 law received extensive support from
the political parties and hence any agreement based upon it would
have broad domestic support. He said that the law provided the basic
principles for a settlement (i.e, Transnistria as a territorial
structure within Moldova that could have its own constitution and
parliament),though further details would need to be spelled out.
The GOM's package of documents for a TN settlement contained
additional details on issues such as a banking system and currency.

Moldova Will Not Rush
--------------


7. (C) Sova stressed that the GOM would not rush to settlement. It
was more important that the results be "correct and acceptable," than
that a settlement be achieved quickly. (Comment: We note that this
idea about not rushing represents a significant shift from Sova's
prior statements, in which he spoke repeatedly about trying to get an
accord resolved in time for the elections. On August 27, President
Voronin, too, said the GOM would seek a resolution to Transnistria
until the end of this year, then would pause during the campaign
season and restart after the elections. End Comment.)

Action Request: Please Review Package Documents
-------------- ---


8. (C) Sova noted that the package document had already been
presented to all the 3-plus-2 participants. The U.S. and EU had
responded in writing, but the other members had not. Sova seeks
written responses from all 3-plus-2 parties by late September. Sova
asked the USG to review the package again, and respond in writing
with any additional comments or recommendations.

CHISINAU 00000872 002 OF 002



Comment
--------------


9. (C) It seems Russia has established a two-track policy:
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia while
encouraging a peaceful resolution in Transnistria. Voronin and his
advisors believe that Russia still intends to work toward a
resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, though their more cautious
selves recognize that a final resolution may still take a few years
to reach. In a separate conversation, Sova mused that Russia may
want to resolve Transnistria to "rehabilitate" its image
internationally. We're not so sanguine.

KEIDERLING