GOM TO IGNORE TRANSNISTRIAN ANNOUNCEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000825

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS RS MD
SUBJECT: GOM TO IGNORE TRANSNISTRIAN ANNOUNCEMENT
OF SEVERED TIES OVER GEORGIA CRISIS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kelly A.
Keiderling for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Transnistrian "Foreign
Ministry" issued a declaration August 12
announcing that it would sever links with the
Moldovan government until Chisinau issued a
decisive statement condemning Georgian
"aggression" against South Ossetia. Minister
Sova told Embassy that the GOM plans to ignore
this statement and remained focused on
maintaining progress on confidence-building
measures and political talks. Sova hopes for a
3-plus-2 meeting by the end of August in order to
discuss the package and make preparations for an
immediate 5-plus-2 afterwards. End Summary.

Transnistria Severs Ties with Moldova
--------------


2. (U) On August 12 the Transnistrian "Foreign
Ministry" issued a declaration announcing a
moratorium on any contacts between Tiraspol and
Chisinau authorities until the Moldovan
leadership issued a decisive condemnation of
"Georgian aggression against South Ossetia."
Referring to the GOM refusal to allow a meeting
of the humanitarian working group at the Russian
Embassy on August 8, the declaration also
demanded "equal treatment of all conflict
mediators and observers," in light of the meeting
on transportation issues (i.e. MCC roads) that
was held at the U.S. Embassy earlier in the week.
"President" Smirnov signed a decree proclaiming a
day of mourning for the victims of Georgia's
aggression against South Ossetia, and justifying
Russian actions as being within the framework of
its peacekeeping mandate. Smirnov appointed
"Minister of Security" Antiufeev as his Special
Envoy for liaison with the state power bodies of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

GOM to Ignore TN Statement, Keep 5-plus-2 Going
-------------- --


3. (C) In an August 13 meeting, Minister for
Reintegration Vasile Sova informed Charge and
Pol/Econ Chief that the GOM planned to ignore the
Transnistrian statement, as any emotional
response could lead to escalating negative
exchanges. Instead, Moldova's goal was to
continue the activities of the working groups and
try to get the 5-plus-2 to move forward on a
political settlement. Sova said he had met
earlier that day with each of the 3-plus-2
members for consultation on the GOM's intended
approach and received full support from all.
Sova reported that Russian Ambassador Kouzmin had
concurred with the idea that, if the GOM did
nothing, the Transnistrian outburst would most
likely quiet down in a week or so.


4. (C) Charge welcomed a mature non-emotional GOM
response and promised to inform Washington. She
noted that, in light of the GOM approach, Embassy
would suggest that the USG also follow this
approach and ignore the statement.


5. (C) Sova spoke about the possibility of
holding a 3-plus-2 meeting by the end of August
(or very early in September) in order to discuss
the package and make preparations for an
immediate 5-plus-2 afterwards. Sova said that
the next step would be a Smirnov meeting in
Moscow, in which he hoped Medvedev would convince
the Transnistrian leader of the need for a
settlement. He told us that Transnistrian Acting
"Foreign Minister" Yastrebchak was currently in
Moscow, on a trip that Sova hoped was aimed at
preparing for a Smirnov visit there. Sova said
that no date had been set yet for a Voronin trip
to Moscow, but that Voronin was declining the
Russian invitation to attend the traditional
horse races in September, as he preferred a
separate meeting with Medvedev. After a Voronin
meeting with the Russian President, a 3-plus-2
meeting could then take place, Sova thought.
Sova continued to express hopes that a prompt
agreement on the package document would allow
time to bring the issue to the Moldovan

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Parliament by November. He stressed the GOM
position that a final settlement to the
Transnistrian conflict was possible only within
the framework of the 5-plus-2.

Comment: Politicizing a Humanitarian Tragedy
--------------


6. (C) The past few months have witnessed some
very positive momentum in confidence-building,
which Transnistria now appears ready to jettison
in order to help whitewash Russian actions in
Georgia. Smirnov may feel that currying Russian
favor will strengthen his hand at this juncture
in the process. This posture allows him to
portray himself as the valiant war leader
defending the interests of beleaguered people, a
role in which he has excelled. We believe that
actors in Moscow are behind the Transnistrian
decision to create this artificial linkage
between Moldova and the Georgia crisis. However,
the Russian Ambassador's comments viewing the
Transnistrian approach as a temporary outburst
suggest the possibility of poor coordination on
the Russian side.


7. (C) By remaining focused on its own
negotiating goals and refusing to take the
Transnistrian bait, the GOM is trying to limit
the negative spillover from the Georgian crisis.
Embassy plans to parallel the GOM approach by
ignoring the Transnistrian declaration. We will
continue current projects in Transnistria,
distributing emergency flood assistance,
delivering Operation Provide Hope medical
equipment, soliciting Transnistrian applicants
for the Cochran program, arranging a seminar on
Avian Flu in September, and beginning technical
assessment on Transnistrian roads envisioned for
reconstruction under the MCC Compact Program. We
hope the Transnistrians will continue with
business as usual if we all ignore their
temperamental overreaction.

KEIDERLING