SOVA: READY FOR NEXT STEPS AFTER VORONIN'S MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000071

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS OSCE RU UK MD
SUBJECT: SOVA: READY FOR NEXT STEPS AFTER VORONIN'S MEETING
WITH PUTIN


Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Apparently, no major Transnistria (TN)
initiatives flowed from the January 21-22 Putin-Voronin talks
in Moscow. Minister Sova recently talked twice with
Transnistrian "Foreign Minister" Litskai, who confidentially
warned Sova that Smirnov or his inner circle may stage a
provocation to take back central government-controlled
villages near Dubasari. Litskai told Sova that he would
welcome TN participation in working groups, but Smirnov had
prohibited such cooperation. End Summary.

Russian Says No Transnistrian Breakthrough
--------------


2. (C) Russian Ambassador to Moldova Valeriy Kouzmin hosted
an informal get-together at his home on January 23 to review
the Putin-Voronin Moscow meetings. Invites included all of
the 5 2 parties as well as the Belarussian, British, French
and Hungarian Ambassadors. Kouzmin explained that we had no
firm details of the Putin-Voronin meeting which took place as
only four were in the meeting. (Yuri Zubakov for the
Russians and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration Andrei Stratan for the Moldovans were the only
two who joined the presidents.) However, Kouzmin said he was
certain that Putin gave Voronin no/no framework or document
that would move a Transnistria settlement forward.


3. (C) During the dinner, Litskai and Sova spoke one-on-one.
In addition, the 5 2 parties (Ukrainian Ambassador Serghiy
Prizhkov, EU Special Representative Kalman Mizsei, OSCE Chief
of Mission Philip Remler, Ambassador Kouzmin, Ambassador
Kirby, Litskai and Sova) talked about the future of
settlement talks. All agreed on the need to keep talks
moving, building on the momentum started in Odessa in October

2007. While neither Litskai nor Sova thought that much would
come immediately from talks -- be they formal or informal --
they would provide some assistance to any parallel talks.
Remler took the task of calling the Finns (as OSCE Chairman)
to move the date of the next 3 2 meeting from late April to
mid-late February.

The West Would Not Guarantee MD's Neutrality
--------------

4. (C) On January 24, Ambassador Kirby met with Minister for
Reintegration Sova to see if he knew more about the summit
than did Kouzmin. Sova said he did not know the details of
Voronin's private conversation with Putin, but pointed to the
Kommersant newspaper article describing Moscow's position.
Sova said his experience had shown that one should not
underestimate Kommersant's accuracy. Russian Ambassador
Kouzmin earlier had downplayed the Kommersant article.


5. (C) One of the Russian conditions for a TN settlement
cited in the Kommersant article was an internationally
binding agreement signed by Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the
U.S. to guarantee Moldova's permanent neutrality. The
Ambassador explained to Sova that the 1955 Austrian State
Treaty and the Zimbabwean Lancaster House Agreement provided
international guarantees under various conditions, but that
those conditions did not apply to Moldova. Moldova could
undertake not to change certain constitutional provisions for
a specified period, perhaps 10 or 15 years. Demilitarization
and the creation of a gendarmerie might be a serious step
towards reassuring Russia on neutrality. Regarding Russia's
fear of possible Moldovan membership in NATO, the Ambassador
noted that Moldova was not ready for NATO nor was NATO ready
for Moldova. However, we would like Moldova to continue to
contribute to international peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions through NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

Litskai and Sova Discuss Possible Provocation,
Working Groups, Railroad
-------------- -


6. (C) In the last two weeks Sova met with Litskai twice
under Russian aegis. Litskai shared with Sova his concern
that Smirnov's actions were increasingly unpredictable as
Smirnov feared losing power. Litskai alerted Sova that he
feared TN security forces might try to take control of
Chisinau-controlled villages in the security zone around
Dubasari. Litskai told Sova that Smirnov's inner circle had
been discussing such a plan to put pressure on Chisinau,
suggesting that Russian peacekeeping forces in the security
zone might permit such a move. Litskai planned to travel to
Moscow this week to ascertain whether this idea was a local
initiative or ordered by Moscow. According to Sova, Litskai
said that Shevchuk also planned to visit Moscow soon.
Litskai noted that he did not want any security provocations,
and discussed with Sova ways to prevent such incidents.

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7. (C) Sova said he and Litskai had also discussed Voronin's
proposal for working groups. Litskai said he would be
willing to cooperate, but Smirnov had prohibited
participation. Sova noted that the working group on
demilitarization would require bringing together Moldovan and
Transnistrian military experts, perhaps with the
participation of Russian, European and American specialists.


8. (C) Sova told us that a third key issue he discussed with
Litskai was TN's railroad initiative, which, Sova said, was
structured such that Chisinau authorities could not accept
it. Sova stated that Chisinau would not allow two separate
railroad companies to exist in Moldova though the central
government was willing to compromise on sharing railroad
revenues and profits. He noted that during Kalman Mizsei's
recent visit to Tiraspol, Shevchuk had also presented the
same plan to reinstate railroad traffic to the EU.

Ukrainian Help on Transnistria is Key
--------------


9. (C) Sova suggested that Transnistria would be included on
the agenda when Ukrainian President Yushchenko visits Moscow
on February 23. Sova complained that the Ukrainians had been
too passive on TN and were more interested in resolving other
issues in Ukrainian-Moldovan relations. Sova insisted that
these issues (property, border demarcation, a hydro-electric
dam, railroads and Giurgiulesti port) be resolved as a
package. The Ambassador agreed that by keeping them as a
package it allowed Moldova to show flexibility. He also
encouraged Sova to conclude a deal with Ukraine to (1) show
that Moldova could have good relations with at least one
neighbor and (2) so that Ukraine might become more disposed
to taking a more dynamic and constructive role in the TN
settlement process.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Only Voronin knows the contents of his closed-door
meeting with Putin. The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with
Voronin to discuss the meeting. Chisinau is buzzing with
speculation about Russia's current position on TN settlement.
Litskai's comments to Sova indicate surprising frankness and
willingness to criticize Smirnov directly to the Chisinau
side. Litskai's willingness to have TN participate in
working groups and discussions of demilitarization suggest
that Smirnov is the main obstacle to confidence-building
talks. The unanswered questions are, to what extend does
Smirnov represent Moscow's position and what interests in
Moscow does he represent. We should capitalize on the
momentum generated by Finnish FM Kanerva's January visit to
have the OSCE call for 3 2 talks in mid-February and 5 2
meetings soon thereafter.
KIRBY