MINISTER OF REINTEGRATION ON 3 PLUS 2 MEETING, OSTROVSKY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000602

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL RS MD
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF REINTEGRATION ON 3 PLUS 2 MEETING, OSTROVSKY
VISIT

REF: KEIDERLING E-MAIL 06/04/08

Classified by: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Kirby met with Minister of Reintegration
Vasile Sova on May 29 to review progress on confidence-building
measures. Sova shared details about his meeting with Russian Duma
deputy Aleksei Ostrovsky. Sova stressed that the 5 plus 2 format was
the only way to resolve the Transnistrian conflict in a lasting
manner. End Summary.

3 plus 2 in Helsinki
--------------


2. (C) Sova supported the upcoming 3 plus 2 (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE
plus the EU and U.S.) meeting in Helsinki and hoped the 3 plus 2
would energize the confidence-building measures (CBM) working groups
(WGs). Sova said the WGs were barely functioning, notwithstanding
various letters and calls from Chisinau to Tiraspol. He thought
Tiraspol authorities were dragging their feet because of a lack of
pressure or lack of focus from Moscow. Sova also opined that
Tiraspol was trying to establish bilateral discussions about projects
with the 5 plus 2 partners, at the expense of making progress on the
working groups. Sova asked the U.S. to support discussing
confidence-building projects in the working groups. CBMs would be
needed for the long run, he noted, implying that the long run could
extend beyond next year's elections. In the meantime, he pointed
out, the population needed practical solutions from the working
groups. Sova added that Transnistrian working-level officials
consistently showed an interest in the health, agricultural and
humanitarian WGs.


3. (C) Sova concluded that he did not have the feeling that Moscow
was actively trying to convince Tiraspol officials to participate in
the CBM WGs, at least not as actively as Russia was before the
Voronin-Smirnov meeting in April. Without pressure from Moscow, Sova
believed, Transnistrian efforts would slow. Sova thought that the
Transnistrians would block WG efforts until at least mid-June. Sova
was less optimistic during the meeting about the likely success of
the WGs and of finding a road to settlement this year.

Ostrovsky in Moldova
--------------


4. (C) Sova gave us a very complete read-out of his conversation last
week in Chisinau with Russian State Duma deputy Ostrovsky. Ostrovsky
heads the Duma's Committee for CIS Affairs. Ostrovsky met with
President Voronin, other Chisinau officials and Tiraspol authorities.
In Sova's opinion, Ostrovsky seemed to be assessing whether progress
was really being made in Moldova before the June informal CIS
meeting.


5. (C) Ostrovsky told Sova that Transnistria was important to Russia
for national security reasons and for its connection to the other
frozen conflicts. Ostrovsky said that he felt Georgia wanted to
resolve the conflicts by force, while Moldova sought a peaceful,
political resolution. Ostrovsky said Russia supported a single state
in Moldova, with Transnistria as part of that state. However, he
asked Sova to think carefully about how strongly Chisinau wanted a
unitary state. (Note: The difference between "single" and "unitary"
seems to be that, in the Russian understanding, "single" would allow
for a federation of two parts. End note.) Sova explained to
Ostrovsky that the Moldovan constitution required both a neutral and
unitary state and that Chisinau was ready to offer Transnistria broad
authority to run its own affairs.


6. (C) According to Sova, Ostrovsky asked about Moldova's recently
approved dual-nationality law that does not allow high-ranking
officials to hold two citizenships. Sova explained to Ostrovsky that
for now the law would not be changed, but that, after the
Transnnistria conflict was resolved, the law could be modified.
Ostrovsky also asked about the 2005 Moldovan law which binds the
government to certain policies and approaches to the Transnistria
settlement. Sova replied that the law couldn't be changed; it
contained basic principles and served to guide the government's
approach to resolving the Transnistria conflict. He added, however,
that as a guide the law provided some flexibility on the shape of
Transnistria's final status within Moldova.


7. (C) When asked about guarantees, Sova explained to Ostrovsky that
the GOM was looking at the issue of providing Transnistria the option
of choosing independence if Moldova lost its sovereignty (i.e., if
Moldova became a part of Romania). Ostrovsky told Sova that he
didn't see Smirnov as a person who wanted to resolve the conflict.


8. (C) Sova assessed his meeting with Ostrovsky as positive and
constructive. Sova thought that Ostrovsky understood the Moldovan
position on neutrality, a unitary state, guarantees, and the
importance to Chisinau of the 5 plus 2 format for resolving the
Transnistria conflict.

A Russian Side Deal on Transnistria
--------------


9. (C) When the Ambassador asked about possible Russian efforts to
resolve the Transnistria conflict on its own, Sova was emphatic that
the 5 plus 2 format was the only road to a final resolution. He
allowed that Russia might be able to help frame a final settlement,
but said any proposed settlement must be approved by the 5 plus 2.
Sova said he knew President Voronin's firm position: no separate
signatures; no separate guarantees; 5 plus 2 as the only instrument
for a final settlement to the Transnistria conflict.


10. (C) Ambassador Kirby repeated the U.S. position: we want a
democratic Moldova that can function as a state and that respects
human rights and that has no foreign troops on its territory. The
U.S., he added, can play a valuable role in supporting a final
Transnistria agreement.

KIRBY