THE WORLD ACCORDING TO SMIRNOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000466

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID MD
SUBJECT: THE WORLD ACCORDING TO SMIRNOV

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kelly Keiderling for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Transnistrian (TN) "president" Igor Smirnov took
advantage of the April 30 meeting, the first with an American
Ambassador to Moldova since 2001, to declaim Transnistria's
Russianness and separateness from Moldova, to expound on
Transnistrians' distrust of Moldovan President Voronin, and to accept
grandly USG assistance to TN as long as it were not delivered through
Moldova. Smirnov and his "foreign minister" expected nothing of
substance to come of the working-group discussions with Chisinau
officials, postulating that Voronin's working-group initiatives were
merely pre-electoral posturing. Smirnov seemed a creature of a
parallel, Alice-in-Wonderland world, in which he received little
input about the realities of the 21st century. End summary.

Smirnov's Parallel World
--------------

2. (C) Transnistrian "foreign minister" Valery Litskai, deputy
"foreign minister" Sergey Simonenko, a translator, a cameraman, a
photographer and three notetakers accompanied Smirnov during his
meeting with Ambassador Kirby and DCM Keiderling. Smirnov took the
stage for most of the two-hour, one-sided presentation--the
undisputed king of his court surrounded by courtiers long-accustomed
to doing his bidding. Smirnov began by welcoming the
"representatives from the Great Power" and explaining the history of
Transnistria and the conflict. He had had luck during the Snegur and
Lucinschi administrations in Chisinau, he noted, and then the
negotiations stopped in 2001. (Note: Smirnov probably meant he had
gained concessions and benefits for TN from Chisinau authorities
during the 1990s. End note.) The Transnistrians had received
nothing from Voronin, Smirnov complained. Smirnov asked rhetorically
why Transnistria should engage in conversations with Chisinau.
Voronin was untrustworthy, unpredictable and merely deceiving the
international community with his confidence-building initiatives.
The Kozak Memorandum of 2003 failed thanks to the United States,
Smirnov continued, so now the Transnistrians had proposed an
agreement to Voronin which didn't infringe on TN sovereignty.


3. (C) Smirnov gassed on about the importance of the 2006 referendum
on independence held in Transnistria, not allowing the Ambassador to
get a word in. A new generation of Transnistrians had grown up
during the conflict who knew nothing about Moldova, Russia or the
U.S., he explained. TN leaders wanted to hear directly from
Transnistrians what they wanted and it was clear from the referendum
that "the people" wanted independence and close relations with
Russia, Smirnov claimed. Transnistria was, after all, historically
Russian; it had a Russian educational system and a Russian system of
government. It would be as natural for Transnistria to be the 51st
state of the United States as it would be for TN to be a part of
Moldova, Smirnov posited.

Transnistrians' Distrust of Voronin and Chisinau
-------------- ---

4. (C) Smirnov's distrust of President Voronin was evident throughout
his declamation. Chisinau stole from the Transnistrians, and
Transnistrians paid taxes to the Chisinau government and bribes to
Chisinau officials, Smirnov complained. If that was democracy, he
argued, Transnistrians didn't want any part of it. Smirnov wanted to
know what guarantees Transnistria would have for any agreement signed
with Chisinau. He concluded that TN needed an army because of the
dangers and threats from the other side of the Dniester River.


5. (C) Litskai stressed the issue of distrust. Voronin wanted a
unitary state, even though former U.S. Ambassador Perina and OSCE
Ambassador to Moldova Hill had supported federation as a solution to
the TN conflict. "We're at a dead end," Litskai stated, since a
unitary state was a non-starter for TN. Moldova hadn't fulfilled any
of the 70 agreements signed by the two sides, Litskai complained, so
what guarantees would there be for any new agreement, Litskai asked.
Chisinau only wanted to dictate terms, Litskai continued; it wasn't
serious about real negotiations. The working-group mechanism to
build confidence had no possibility of success, Litskai said. TN was
only participating in the working groups because of pressure from the
international community. In any case, TN would not sign any
documents that were not guaranteed by the international community.
Litskai concluded, with Smirnov nodding sagely beside him, that
Voronin had proposed the confidence-building measures merely as a
public relations stunt in advance of the 2009 national elections.
The Transnistrians thought that Voronin would suggest in September
that the two sides sign a declaration instead, by which time it would
be too late for the Transnistrians to participate in the 2009
elections. (Note: The logic behind this statement is that TN
participation in the elections would require a super-majority vote in
the Moldovan Parliament to change Moldovan laws, an impossible
political goal during the electoral season. End note.)

Smirnov Deigns to Accept USG Assistance
--------------

6. (C) The Ambassador explained that the USG sought a better
understanding of TN and searched for ways to provide modest USG

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assistance to make Transnistrians' lives better. When Ambassador
Kirby described USG assistance in TN, Smirnov grandly accepted
assistance in the humanitarian and economic spheres, as long as the
assistance went directly to TN and not through Chisinau. We didn't
ask the U.S. for drought assistance, Smirnov noted further. The U.S.
had offered the seeds to TN. Since agricultural producers needed to
pay back loans, TN leadership had decided to allow USG seed
distribution as an aid to the agricultural workers. (Note: Smirnov
was making the point that Transnistria was not seeking charity and
was not dependent on the kindness of the U.S. or other donors, even
if it had accepted such assistance. End note.)


7. (C) Smirnov wondered about the terms of the road-building
component of the proposal for a Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) Compact, which includes renovation of two major highways
through TN. The Ambassador explained that the roads would be built
by whichever company won the international tender for the project and
noted that TN would have to reopen a bridge across the Dniester River
(the Gura Bicului Bridge) for the MCC roads project. Smirnov's
response typified the grandstanding and bluster of his speech: the
Moldovans attacked us across the bridges and therefore he had blown
them up. If the U.S. guaranteed that Chisinau would not attack TN by
using the bridge, then Smirnov would consider allowing it to be
opened.

Attracting Foreign Investment to a Non-state
--------------

8. (C) Betraying his limited understanding of the world beyond the
rabbit hole, Smirnov told the Ambassador to ask American investors
how TN could be more attractive to them. Smirnov knew the theory
behind a welcoming investment climate and ticked off TN benefits for
investors: skilled TN workers, capacity to expand production,
privileges for foreign investors and a mutual investment protocol
signed with Chisinau. However, Smirnov did not connect such local
benefits for investors to broader, structural requirements such as
the existence of a real state, transparent governmental institutions
and adherence to international legal norms.

Litskai Complains about Lack of Political Plan
-------------- -

9. (C) An hour and a half into the conversation, Smirnov excused
himself and left Litskai to continue. Litskai followed Smirnov's
approach and took his turn to lecture us. He grumbled that no plan
was on the negotiating table after the Kozak Memorandum and the faded
Yushenko Plan-and why wouldn't the U.S. give TN Chisinau's package of
proposals developed last year? We responded that the package wasn't
ours to share.


10. (C) Litskai stated his preference for a Luxembourg model (two
languages, two ethnic groups),and then mentioned various other
models that could work for TN, such as the Federated States of
Micronesia, Northern Ireland and "euro-regions" such as the lower
Danube or Tyrolean region. He noted that he had already begun to
work with the EU ("our neighbor," he called it) through EU Special
Negotiator Kalman Miszei and had asked Miszei to help Transnistrians
look for European models. Meanwhile, the Transnistrians would begin
to apply EU laws and standards in Transnistria.

Comment: The Queen of Hearts and the White Rabbit
-------------- --------------

11. (C) Smirnov seems to have created his own world, a little like
the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, in which he rules
absolutely and receives little input from the real world. He knows
the old Soviet Union, current-day Russia and little else. In such a
hermetic world, it isn't absurd for Smirnov to suggest that
Transnistria has a beneficial investment climate for American
investors. Smirnov is a charismatic leader, a natural politician.
He has considerable oratorical skills and an easy air of confidence.
One could understand how he could sway an isolated population to
understand the world his way. His lecture to us included banter
about hobbies and humor, but also a pointed question about
U.S.-donated seeds "infecting" TN crops with the "Colorado bug," and
the inadequacy of the U.S. model for Transnistria. The Ambassador's
sharp retort about the health of the donated seeds and our
take-it-or-leave it approach to U.S. assistance shows that Smirnov's
charisma extends only to his population.


12. (C) If Smirnov is the Queen of Hearts, Litskai could fulfill the
role of the White Rabbit: long-suffering, put-upon and ever-busy,
his comb-over drooping to his glasses on occasion. He's smart, too,
and has done his homework. He kept his place during Smirnov's
posturing speech to us, speaking only when his "president" allowed
him the floor and expanding upon the points that Smirnov had already
made.


13. (C) Moldovan Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova said on May 1
that the Transnistrians had made a decision to change to a
"multi-vector" approach, diversifying their foreign relations away
from a narrow focus on Russia. Our April 30 conversation with
Smirnov may be the beginning of such a Transnistrian effort. We can
use that opening to persuade the Transnistrians, as unrealistic as

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their behavior may appear to be, that the working groups hold some
promise of mutual benefit and to urge them to the 5 plus 2
negotiating table.

KEIDERLING