TRANSNISTRIAN BORDER GUARDS REFUSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 001084

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS MD
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIAN BORDER GUARDS REFUSE
PRESIDENT VORONIN

Classified By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On November 3, Minister for
Reintegration Vasile Sova convened the Ambassador to
inform him about an incident that had taken place
earlier that morning. Transnistrian "border" guards
had denied President Voronin access to his home
village of Corjova, a central-government-controlled
town located in Transnistria. As a result, it was
not clear whether or not the Voronin-Smirnov meeting
planned for November 6 would take place. Though
informal talks in Odessa were scheduled for November
7-8, a new shadow now hung over the prospects for a
formal 5-plus-2 round by the end of November. It
was not clear whether Transnistrian "President" Igor
Smirnov had prevented the President's travel on his
own initiative or under instructions from Moscow.
Sova asked that the U.S. Delegation to OSCE in
Vienna support a statement at the Permanent Council
meeting next week noting the difficulties that this
incident would pose for the 5-plus-2 process. End
summary.

President Voronin Refused Access to Home Village
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2. (C) In a November 3 meeting, Minister for
Reintegration Sova said that President Voronin had
personally asked him to inform the American
Ambassador about the events which had taken place
earlier in the day. The President had planned to
take part in a ceremony in his native village of
Corjova, in honor of rebuilding the church (which
had been demolished by the Communist Government in
the 1960s). The village of Corjova is situated on
the left bank of the Dniester but is controlled by
Chisinau. Transnistrian border guards refused
access to President Voronin, who was accompanied by
his wife and the Orthodox Church Metropolitan
Vladimir.


3. (C) In light of the meeting between Presidents
Voronin and Smirnov proposed for November 6 and the
upcoming 5-plus-2 session in Odessa November 7-8,
Sova speculated that the goal of this incident had
been to complicate the settlement process, and raise
a cloud over the resumption of 5-plus-2 talks in
late November.

GOM Notified Transnistrian Authorities in Advance
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4. (C) Sova reviewed the steps the GOM had taken to
inform the Transnistrian authorities of the
President's travel and assure unimpeded passage. On
October 29 the GOM had sent a letter to Tiraspol
requesting assistance in organizing the November 3
church dedication event, and the November 6 meeting
of Voronin and Smirnov. This letter had included
detailed information about the names of those
traveling for the November 3 ceremony, including the
time of arrival and departure, and information about
the cars.


5. (C) On October 30-31 Smirnov was in Moscow,
accompanied by Transnistrian "Foreign Minister"
Vladimir Yastrebchak. Sova had spoken with Russian
Special Ambassador Nesterushkin on November 1 and
confirmed that these planned events had been
discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin.
Reportedly, Karasin had suggested that both events
should take place as scheduled, and on November 1
Smirnov returned to Tiraspol.


6. (C) On the evening of November 1 Chisinau
received confirmation from Tiraspol for the November
6 meeting. However, Chisinau officials received no
response with respect to the November 3 church
ceremony. Sova made a second call to Russian
Security Council Deputy Zubakov. On November 2 Sova
received a response from Transnistrian "Minister for
State Security" Antiufeev that one of the names on
the list, Chairman of the Dubasari District Chair
Polichinski, was under criminal investigation in
Transnistria and suggested that he be excluded from
the group traveling with the President. In order to
avoid any problems, Sova reported, the GOM removed
Polichinski from the list.

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7. (C) Despite these preparations, on the morning of
November 3, when the President's car arrived at the
Dubasari checkpoint, the guards told the President
they had no permission to let him in. Sova called
Antiufeev, whose deputy confirmed that there was no
permission from Smirnov to allow Voronin to cross.
Voronin, his wife and the Metropolitan returned to
Chisinau.

Will November 6 Meeting Take Place?
--------------


8. (C) Back in Chisinau, Voronin called a cabinet
meeting. The President and his advisors formally
decided to avoid any steps which could aggravate the
situation. President Voronin understood that this
incident was designed to humiliate him. According
to Sova, the President was calm and believed that
this was not a local initiative. However, this
incident cast a shadow on the possibilities for
Voronin and Smirnov to meet on November 6. It was
not certain whether that meeting would take place.
Sova promised to inform us by the afternoon of
November 5 whether Chisinau officials planned to go
forward.


9. (C) Sova noted that the Transnistrian letter
confirming the November 6 meeting had contained an
odd element. The Transnistrian side had proposed
that the meeting take place in the presence of the
media. Sova said he was not opposed in principle,
but that no serious discussions could take place in
the presence of the mass media.

Was Smirnov Exercising Free Will? Or Russia's Will?
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10. (C) However, pondered Sova, it was not yet
clear, what this incident meant, and who was behind
it. Was Smirnov acting on his own, asked Sova, or,
was he fulfilling Russian instructions? Sova noted
that Antiufeev had assured him several times that
Moscow had said that travel to the ceremony would be
acceptable. Antiufeev had told Sova that he
expected no problems and was only waiting for
Smirnov's permission. Such permission never came.


11. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had posed the
question of Smirnov's free will to President
Voronin. Voronin had responded that Smirnov did
what Moscow told him to do. Now, we had a situation
where Moscow had reassured various players that all
should transpire without problem, and yet the
Transnistrians had done the opposite. Transnistrian
officials also failed to participate in the October
7-8 meeting of 5-plus-2 in Vienna, which also raised
the question of whether Smirnov acted on his own or
under Russian orders. Sova responded that he was
100 percent sure that the decision not to attend in
Vienna was not taken in Tiraspol.

Would Smirnov Jeopardize 150 Million USD?
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12. (C) Sova noted that the goal of Smirnov's trip
to Moscow had been to request 150 million USD
assistance for Transnistria. Sova thus believed
that had Russian officials recommended to Smirnov
that nothing go wrong for President Voronin's
travel, then Smirnov would have followed
instructions. Sova believed that when Smirnov
received clear instructions from Moscow he followed
them to the letter, but that whenever the
instructions were not so clear, he took his own
initiative. It was possible, speculated Sova that
Smirnov might have taken this initiative if he had
been refused the financial assistance he requested.

Request USG Support for OSCE Statement in Vienna
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13. (C) Sova had one final request. He noted that
Presidential Advisor Sergiu Stati would meet with
OSCE Ambassador Philip Remler to brief him on the
Corjova events. Stati planned to ask Remler to
inform the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna of these
developments at its meeting next Thursday, and to

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let delegates know that this incident did not
provide a positive atmosphere for moving forward on
a Transnistria settlement. Sova asked that the U.S.
delegation support this message.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Recently, a pattern has emerged: whenever
progress is accelerating, an incident takes place to
create a stumbling block. Following the Corjova
incident, it is not clear whether the Voronin-
Smirnov meeting scheduled for November 6 will take
place. At any rate, it is clear that a shadow hangs
over the process which may succeed in derailing both
the informal 5-plus-2 discussions in Odessa November
7-8 and the formal round of talks planned for late
November. Those who seek to derail the process can
always find an easy pretext.

CHAUDHRY