Anti-Russian Christian Democrat Leader Also Critical of

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000105

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/UMB, DRL/AE

E.O. 12958: Decl 02/03/18
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KDEM MD
SUBJECT: Anti-Russian Christian Democrat Leader Also Critical of
Romania

REFS: Chisinau 0071

Classified by CDA Kelly Keiderling under 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 1 meeting with Ambassador Kirby,
Christian Democrat (PPCD) leader Iurie Rosca sought assurances that
the USG would not "guarantee" Moldovan neutrality. The Ambassador
explained that the U.S. was not in a position to guarantee the
neutrality of another sovereign nation. In discussing Transnistria,
Rosca reflexively rejected the possibility of any fair solution as
long as Voronin was President and the Russians were involved. While
culturally and linguistically pro-Romanian, he strongly criticized
Romania's failure to sign the border treaty, and presented himself as
a true patriot supporting Moldovan independence. End summary.


2. (C) Rosca showed visible relief when the Ambassador stated that
the USG would not "guarantee" Moldova's neutrality as part of a
Transnistria settlement. Dismissing the analogy to post-WWII
Austria, the Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. had no military or
legal claim over Moldova's sovereignty. Moldova could, he said, bind
itself to limited-term neutrality, but that was Moldova's choice to
make. Russian statements about western "guarantees" of Moldova's
neutrality, the Ambassador concluded, were best seen as a distraction
from more important issues. The Ambassador further noted, to Rosca's
rather chagrined acceptance, that Moldova was completely unready for
NATO membership.


3. (C) Rosca was adamant that Russia had to withdraw its troops
before a final agreement, and that Moldova should not conclude an
agreement on Transnistria while the pro-Russian Voronin was in power.
Regarding ownership guarantees for Transnistrian/Russian businesses,
Rosca replied that Moldova could offer solid reassurances only after
the 2009 elections. When asked about 5 + 2 talks, Rosca replied that
they could be effective after the "1 + 1" (Voronin and Putin) talks
came to an end.


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that a sustainable solution to the
Transnistria conflict would require the support of other concerned
parties (i.e., parliamentarians and political party leaders). Rosca
expressed strong support for the U.S. approach to treaty negotiations
(which included senators from both parties),and noted that Voronin
would need a three-quarters (76 of 101 members) parliamentary vote to
confirm a settlement. He also accepted that an inclusive approach
was necessary to spread political credit (and risk of blame) across
the Moldovan political spectrum.


5. (C) However, when asked whether he would support a Voronin effort
to include other political leaders in the settlement process, he
replied: "Probably. But not now. Only after 2009. When we have a
President with a normal patriotic attitude." Further, Rosca
acknowledged that the Communist Party would have to be included in
such a broad-front approach even if it lost its parliamentary
majority after the 2009 elections. Even with Voronin out of the
picture, Rosca noted that Russian intransigence could derail any hope
of non-Communist parties accepting a deal.


6. (C) For all his antipathy to Voronin and the Russians, Rosca
showed no compensatory pro-Romanian reflexes. In fact, he strongly
criticized Romania's failure to sign the basic border treaty, noting
that the Russians were exploiting the failure in order to prevent a
Transnistrian solution. (Note: Transnistrian leaders interpret any
Romanian "weakness" on Moldovan sovereignty as part of Romanian
hegemonic designs on Moldova and Transnistria. End note.) Rosca
stated that he would try to persuade Romanian Prime Minister Basescu
to do the right thing and sign the border treaty immediately. Rosca
said that Basescu's reluctance to sign arose from political pressures
in Romania, ignorance in the Prime Minister's Democratic Party (PD),
and from the failure of the Romanian Ambassador to Moldova to keep
his government informed. The worst effect of Romania's failure to
sign, Rosca concluded, was that it allowed Voronin to portray Romania
as the enemy.


7. (C) Comment: At every turn of the conversation, Rosca showed his
visceral opposition to Voronin and Russia. Even Rosca's criticism of
Romania was ultimately based on the fact that it assisted Voronin.
As one who could play a key role in formulating Moldova's approach to
a Transnistrian settlement after the 2009 elections, Rosca displayed
the antipathy to compromise and all-parties inclusion that retards
the development of consensual democracy in the country.

Keiderling