Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CHIANGMAI65
2008-04-30 07:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

KACHIN STATE: A SNAPSHOT OF REFERENDUM ACTIVITIES

Tags:  PHUM PGOV BM TH 
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PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHTRO RUEHVC
DE RUEHCHI #0065/01 1210734
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 300734Z APR 08
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0745
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0046
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0028
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0046
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0016
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0014
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0004
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0001
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0001
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0801
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000065 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL, IO AND EAP
NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/25/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: KACHIN STATE: A SNAPSHOT OF REFERENDUM ACTIVITIES

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 63

B. CHIANG MAI 43

CHIANG MAI 00000065 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

-------------
Summary
--------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DRL, IO AND EAP
NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/25/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: KACHIN STATE: A SNAPSHOT OF REFERENDUM ACTIVITIES

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 63

B. CHIANG MAI 43

CHIANG MAI 00000065 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Kachin National Organization (KNO) contacts in Thailand
told us that, despite KNO efforts to mount a "vote no" campaign
in Burma's upcoming constitutional referendum, they nonetheless
expect most Kachin voters to check the "yes" box. Many would do
so out of fear, our interlocutors asserted, as they described
the coercive tactics the regime is employing to secure "yes"
votes. They also passed us a document they claim was written by
the regime that details voting procedures at polling stations.
From this we can draw some conclusions about ways the regime
could determine how individuals vote, despite its public
assurances the referendum will be free and fair. End Summary.

--------------
Vote No Versus Boycott
--------------


2. (C) On April 25, we met with Hkamhpa Sadan-, General
Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Kachin National

SIPDIS
Organization, and Maran Zau, in charge of the KNO's "vote no"
efforts inside Burma for the May 10 constitutional referendum.
(Note: Though the Kachin National Organization is an exile group
based in Chiang Mai, it still has links with the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO),which operates inside Burma.
Though these links do not include policy coordination at the
organizations' top levels, our KNO contacts told us the
connections between their youth groups are strong.) Kachin
State has a population of some 1.2 million, slightly more than
two percent of Burma's total population of approximately 55
million. Since no census has been conducted since the 1980s, we
cannot reliably estimate how many of the State's residents might
be eligible to vote in the upcoming referendum.


3. (C) Hkamhpa Sadan, who had just returned from Laiza on the
Burma-China border, where the KIO has an office, told us the KNO
continues to encourage Kachin to vote no in the upcoming
referendum. Posters, leaflets, and t-shirts carrying the vote

no message have been posted and distributed, mostly by students,
religious leaders, and lawyers, he said. This information
tracks with various media reports, and with information obtained
from the Chiang Mai-based Human Rights Education Institute for
Burma, which told us late last month in a meeting with a
USAID/OTI visitor that some of its trainees were involved in
putting up posters at universities in Kachin State.


4. (C) On voting day, Hkamhpa Sadan said the KNO will have
undercover observers posted at polling stations, but did not
elaborate on how many. He also shared that some of these
observers would participate in a seminar in Thailand held April
26-29 to provide tips on how to document abuses on voting day.
The discussions would also serve to exchange views on how to
respond to the expected announcement of the constitution's
approval sometime after the completion of the May 10 vote, he
added.


5. (C) While the Kachin Independence Organization has not yet
taken a clear public position, Hkamhpa Sadan asserted the KIO
supported a boycott of the May 10 referendum, because the regime
did not adhere to the demands it tabled while participating in
the National Convention. Hkamhpa Sadan opined that a KIO
boycott would not be very effective, however. He speculated
that only 10 percent of eligible voters in Kachin State would
respect a boycott. When asked why, he underscored the efficacy
of the regime's coercive tactics. He pointed out that only 10
percent of Kachin are either KIO members or have family in the
organization, and opined that this portion of the population
could afford to boycott because the KIO would protect it from
reprisals exacted by the regime. The other 90 percent of Kachin
were not so fortunate, he observed dejectedly.


CHIANG MAI 00000065 002.2 OF 002


-------------- --------------
No Constitution, No Land, No Household
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Hkamhpa Sadan emphasized that Ohn Myint, the regime's
regional commander overseeing Kachin State, was well-known for
his brutality. In fact, he speculated that while not probable,
many Kachin might vote against the constitution because they see
the referendum as a chance to vote either for or against the
military, and hence an opportunity to voice their approval or
disapproval of him. Ohn Myint and the regime have ordered the
Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA - the regime's
mass-member mobilization organization) to tell eligible voters
that failure to participate and vote yes will result in denial
of future deeds to land or approval of household registry
documents. Hkamhpa Sadan said he believes the regime can
enforce this, because it will know whether each individual voter
votes in favor of or against the constitution.


7. (C) When asked if he knows how the regime will gather this
information, Hkamhpa Sadan shared with us what he claimed was a
regime-authored document he recently obtained while in Laiza.
The document provides some detail about voting procedures and
the lay-out of polling stations. According to the document,
upon entering the station, voters will have to show their
identity cards and sign the registry. They will then receive a
ballot and go to the voting booth to make their selections.
Once finished, they reportedly would have to sign the ballot and
show it to the station supervisor before placing it in the
ballot box. Ostensibly, the station supervisor needs to see
each ballot in order to compare the signature on it to that on
the voter's ID card and the signature on the voter registry.
While reviewing the signature, the supervisor will of course
have no trouble noting which box the voter has checked. This
scenario, Hkamhpa Sadan observed, makes voting no extremely
difficult.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) The coercive tactics Hkamhpa Sadan outlined and the
purported document he shared with us revealed widespread belief
of the regime's intent to manipulate the vote and ensure its
constitution is approved by hook or by crook. Embassy Rangoon
notes that the KNO has little to no presence inside Burma and
would likely face difficulties in effectively monitoring voting.
The criminalization of criticism of the proposed constitution
and the lack of information about the document already reflects
a seriously flawed process. To the degree that the allegations
of further manipulation reported by Thai-based exiles prove
accurate, the USG and broader international community will be in
a stronger position to challenge the credibility of the entire
process. Underlining these abuses and tactics in discussions
with other governments will enhance our contention that this
referendum is a sham, and perhaps even influence the responses
of countries in the region to the Burmese regime's ongoing
perversion of the democratic process.


9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon.
MORROW