BURMESE EXILES RALLY AROUND VOTE NO, BUT STRATEGY LACKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMESE EXILES RALLY AROUND VOTE NO, BUT STRATEGY LACKING

REF: CHIANG MAI 43

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
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Summary
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1. (C) Though opposition to Burma's draft constitution and a
"vote no" campaign have unprecedentedly united Burmese exile
groups in Thailand, the exiles have so far failed to plan
strategically for the post-referendum political environment.
The exiles have outlined three scenarios for what will happen
after the May referendum, but none appear based on the realities
on the ground in Burma. They have also developed a
"transitional plan" for post-referendum governance, but they
appear not to have coordinated it with activists inside.
Separately, a public debate broadcast into Burma from Thailand
provided analysis of the referendum and constitution, but did
not conclude with any joint calls to action. Unless the exile
groups share information about their networks with each other
and focus on helping Burma progress toward democracy, rather
than preoccupy themselves with ensuring their own survival and
the pecking order in the community, the Burmese exiles are
unlikely to have a significant impact on the political process
inside the country either now or in the near future. End
Summary.

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An Assessment of the Exiles' Past
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2. (C) Over the past two-plus decades, the Burmese diaspora in
Thailand has been unable to work together as a collective force
for change in Burma. Though individual members of certain
groups, such as the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners, the Political Defiance Committee, and the Ethnic
Nationalities Council, have contact with activists inside Burma,
the Thailand-based exiles have been unwilling to constructively
pool their efforts and share information about their networks
with each other. These groups have often competed against each
other for limited funding from numerous donors and have not been
as welcoming to participation by activists who have fled to the
Thai border more recently, most notably in the wake of the
crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in 2007. Without
sponsorship by an exile group, those activists who reach
Thailand are often left to fend for themselves, potentially
facing harassment by Thai authorities and possible deportation.
(Note: Many of the exile groups have built relationships with
Thai authorities that enable them to avoid deportation by
intervening either with the Thai police or intelligence offices.
Their contacts also usually warn the exiles ahead of time when
their residences/offices will be searched.)

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Not a Problem: We Can Overcome
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3. (C) Despite the cliquey nature of the exile community,
several groups have begun to work together in a more cohesive
manner. They include the Forum for Democracy in Burma, Ethnic
Nationalities Council, Political Defiance Committee, Woman's
League of Burma, National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma, National Council of the Union of Burma, Nationalities
Youth Forum, and the Student Youth Council of Burma. Under the
umbrella of the Strategic Coordinating Committee (SCC),which
has been in existence since 2001 though largely dormant for much
of that time, they are actively discussing policy issues, and
they have agreed to jointly submit proposals requesting funding
for their activities.


4. (C) In addition to the SCC, which is the main planning
mechanism, the same groups are also working together in the
Committee for Mass Movement (CMM),which has been in existence
since 2006. The CMM is designed to be the main action-oriented
body carrying out the SCC's decisions. It is composed of two
committees -- a 16-person coordination committee, and a
nine-person committee specifically charged with managing
activities regarding the May constitutional referendum.
According to Edie Bowles, a consultant working for USAID, this
latter committee has devised plans to monitor voting on
referendum day in 50 townships, but is in need of technical
assistance if it is to succeed. She pointed out in an April 9
meeting that its members have had limited or no exposure to
elections and balloting. Though they want to develop guidelines
for voting, they do not have the knowledge to do so, and would
have difficulty disseminating them inside Burma even if they
could compile them. (Comment: Though Bowles opined that the
CMM's plans for voter monitoring are coordinated with the Ethnic
Nationalities Council's, the latter's plans are very different
and much more ambitious--see reftel. Bowles specifically said
the CMM does not plan to do exit polling as the ENC does.)

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Yes, But...
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5. (C) Bowles opined that she sees a renewed energy among the
groups in the SCC and CMM, and a willingness to work together in
ways they never did previously. Other contacts share her
assessment, noting that the vast majority have agreed that a
"vote no" campaign is the best option to oppose the referendum,
and is certainly preferable to a boycott. That said, the
Thailand-based exiles, aside from the ENC, appear to have failed
to come up with coherent strategies to pursue their objectives,
and Bowles assessed that many will advocate a boycott of the
2010 elections. They view participating in new elections as
de-legitimizing the 1990 elections, she noted -- a step many of
them are not willing to take. (Note: Many MPs elected in 1990
are either in prison, dead, no longer politically active, or
have resettled in other countries.)


6. (C) Bowles told us the SCC met on April 6 and agreed on
three possible scenarios that could play out after the
referendum. According to the first one, the constitution is not
approved via the referendum, the regime does not recognize that
it has lost, and the exile groups call for a mass uprising. In
the second one, voters do not approve the constitution, the
regime recognizes it has lost, and the exile groups call for the
formation of an interim government. According to Bowles, the
SCC and CMM have a plan for the establishment of a unity interim
government. However, when asked if that plan had been
coordinated with activists inside, she opined that it had not.
The third scenario appears to be a contingency plan in the event
that neither of the first two scenarios plays out. According to
it, if vote no is unsuccessful, the National League for
Democracy will call for the 1990 Parliament to be seated with
the support of the SCC. (Comment: If this final scenario plays
out, the SCC alliance is unlikely to stick together since the
ethnic groups have much more to be gained by running in the 2010
election, in which they could contest seats, than they do by
supporting calls for the 1990 Parliament, many of whose members
are no longer in Burma, to be seated.)

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Public debate Highlights Flaws of Constitution
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7. (C) Despite the flaws in their strategic planning, the
Thailand-based exiles did successfully come together to
broadcast analysis of the constitution and referendum process
inside Burma. Organized by the Democratic Voice of Burma, the
April 3 discussion drew approximately 75 participants.
Organizations represented on the discussion panel included the
Irrawaddy, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma,
National Council of the Union of Burma, Woman's League of Burma,
Ethnic Nationalities Council, and Members of Parliament Union.
Panelists discussed the weaknesses of the 104 Principles, the
draft constitution, the National Convention, and the referendum
process. Various issues were tabled, including the role of the
media, the views of ethnic minority groups on the referendum,
and how to sell "vote no" to Burmese who are not politically
active or savvy. Most importantly, the Democratic Voice of
Burma broadcast the event into the country on television.
Though we cannot assess the number of TV viewers that actually
watched the program, the Democratic Voice of Burma estimates
that 1-2 million people inside the country have access to its TV
broadcasts.

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Comment
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8. (C) Though the fact that the exile groups in Thailand have
united behind "vote no" is positive, their ability to plan
strategically and realistically for the long-term, and to truly
coordinate with each other and with activists inside is
disappointing. Though some exile groups do have good contacts
inside the country, these relationships are largely based on
trust among certain individuals, and do not extend to
organizations as a whole. Furthermore, exile groups are
generally not willing to share their contacts inside Burma with
each other.


9. (C) Activists inside continue to inform Embassy Rangoon they
have received very little financial support from border groups
and Burmese exiles since the assistance networks these groups
had established were disrupted last September. Some groups that
have told us they are getting money through to the activists
inside include The Democratic Voice of Burma and a Danish
company called International Media Services that are providing
equipment to stringers (the USG does not fund International
Media Services). Embassy Rangoon also confirmed that some funds

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sent from Thailand to Burma by Bo Kyi of the Assistance
Association for Political Prisoners are supporting current and
former political prisoners and their families. Aung Myo Tint, a
member of Generation 88 who has since fled to Thailand, also
told Consulate Chiang Mai that after the demonstrations last
August-September, the group received money from across the
border to establish safe havens and purchase phones. Despite
this financial and in-kind support, until the exile groups begin
truly working with activists inside in a comprehensive and
organized manner, they are unlikely to have a major impact on
the course of political events in Burma either now or in the
near future.


10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon.
MORROW