ETHNIC GROUPS TO OPPOSE REFERRENDUM, CONDUCT EXIT POLL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/11/2018
TAGS: PHUM KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: ETHNIC GROUPS TO OPPOSE REFERRENDUM, CONDUCT EXIT POLL

REF: RANGOON 181

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Ethnic exile groups based in Thailand are encouraging
their contacts inside Burma to reject the draft Constitution in
the upcoming referendum. Though they have next to no funding
available, they are organizing ethnic youth, ceasefire, and
other political groups in Burma's seven ethnic states, and they
plan to conduct exit polls on voting day. Separately, they are
striving for better coordination among exile groups, including
exchanging information about different networks inside Burma,
and consulting on political strategies in an effort to overcome
some of the divisiveness that has long plagued these groups.
They claim to be coordinating with 88 Generation members, and
may warrant future consideration of USG financial support. End
Summary.

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Say No and Tell the World
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2. (C) Burmese ethnic exile groups based in the region are
gearing up to oppose the upcoming constitutional referendum,
according to Lian Sakhong, Secretary General of the Ethnic
Nationalities Council (an umbrella organization of ethnic exile
groups). They realize that they cannot conduct a high-profile
public campaign opposing the draft constitution, so they are
working with contacts inside Burma to encourage a "no" vote by
word of mouth, he told us in a March 11 meeting. This effort is
focused on four groups of actors inside the country: members of
the 88 Generation in ethnic areas; the Ethnic Youth
Nationalities Group and other ethnic youth groups; ceasefire
groups in ethnic areas; and the United Nationalities Alliance (a
grouping of ethnic-based political parties).


3. (C) The main focus of this effort, Lian Sakhong told us, is
plans to bus voters to polling stations and conduct exit polls.
(Note: Having been arrested three times and tortured prior to
fleeing Burma, Lian Sakhong is well aware of the risks
involved.) The ENC already has digital mapping software, he
said, plans to enter its exit polling results into the program,
and make the data public as soon as it is available. The ENC is
in consultation with the Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB)
about extending this effort to include Burma's seven divisions,
rather than limit it only to the ethnic states.


4. (C) When we pointed out that the Ethnic Nationalities Youth
Group (EYNG),despite its connections inside Burma, appears not
to be well-funded, Lian Sakhong agreed, stating that he provides
them whatever funds he can via the ENC. Specifically, he
mentioned $3,000 donated to the ENC by the Danish Burma
Committee last September, part of which was used to buy digital
and video cameras that were subsequently taken across the border
by the EYNG. Currently, however, he said the ENC only has five
cameras remaining inside Burma. Additional funding would
support travel inside Burma to encourage people to vote against
the constitution, and would be used to purchase more cameras to
document abuses on voting day. Lian Sakhong admitted that the
exit polling would be far from comprehensive. We just can't
cover all the townships, he said, but we can be stationed in
several in each ethnic state, and with the help of the FDB, in
the divisions as well.

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How Will the Regime React?
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5. (C) Lian Sakhong admitted the regime is not going to idly
sit back and allow exit polling. He opined the regime will
employ several different tactics to stop it, and ensure the

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referendum is approved. Notable among these is the fact that
the regime has co-opted leaders in ethnic areas who are trusted
by the general population,. Some of them are even participating
on the Referendum Convening Commission, he added. When we asked
for specific names, he mentioned Tun Aung Chain, Sai Tun Myint,
Sai Yee Tip, and Hmu Htang. These leaders, he opined, are
well-placed to convincingly urge voters to support the
constitution. Citing a source in a Mon ceasefire group who
lives in Rangoon, he also said the ruling generals have already
ordered regional commanders to use force if necessary to ensure
voting goes according to plan. If the vote is hijacked, he
opined, the result may very well be another mass uprising.

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Overcoming Divisions
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6. (C) Lian Sakhong told us he is trying to revive and
strengthen the Strategic Consultative Committee (SCC),which,
although in existence since 2001, has not played a significant
role in the exile movement. As currently constituted, the SCC
serves as a forum for ethnic groups represented by the ENC, the
NCUB (National Council of the Union of Burma - an umbrella
organization of Burmese political exile groups),the NCGUB
(National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma - the
self-proclaimed government in exile),the Student Youth Congress
of Burma, the Women's' League of Burma, and the Forum for
Democracy in Burma to meet, exchange ideas, and discuss
political strategy.


7. (C) Since the SCC is the most broad-based representation of
ethnic and Burman groups, Lian Sakhong is attempting to push it
into a more coordinating role among exile groups, and give it
the power to make political decisions. The constituent
organizations are also sharing information about their networks
inside Burma, and Lian Sakhong envisions the SCC eventually
speaking for the exile community with a more united voice. He
said that after the protests and crackdown last
August-September, the SCC felt it needed to be prepared to
coordinate the actions of its members. The group has also
agreed to apply collectively for funding, he added, to avoid its
member organizations competing against each other for limited
resources. Furthermore, the SCC's member groups complement each
other, Lian Sakhong opined. The ENC has more links in Burma's
ethnic states, while the FDB, NCUB, and NCGUB are better
connected in urban areas, he asserted.


8. (C) Lian Sakhong recognizes the challenges ahead,
particularly given that the NCUB participates in the SCC. He
summarized for us disagreements he had previously had with NCUB
General Secretary Maung Maung regarding the draft constitution
produced by exile groups. Maung Maung, he said, tried to use
the document to seek support for the formation of a "shadow,
parallel" Burmese Government in exile. Lian Sakhong, on the
other hand, views the constitution as a valuable tool that could
serve as a model for Burma's future leaders to work from as they
draft their own charter. Forming a government in exile based on
the draft constitution would automatically annul the results of
the 1990 elections, Lian Sakhong noted. While Maung Maung sees
the draft as Burma's future constitution, Lian Sakhong views it
as an alternative to the regime's draft, which the Burmese
people should be able to openly discuss along side the regime's.

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Comments
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9. (C) We are encouraged that elements of the plans Lian
Sakhong outlined to us track very closely with those of the 88
Generation detailed in Ref A: both groups are using word of
mouth as the main means of communicating the "vote no" message;
both need funds for travel to deliver the message; and both have
requested funds for cameras and other equipment that would be
used to document abuses on voting day. Embassy Rangoon will
work to assess the ENC's coordination with 88 Generation,

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ceasefire groups, and youth groups inside Burma. We have asked
the ENC to submit a detailed proposal, which we will share with
Embassies Rangoon and Bangkok before determining if the ENC's
efforts warrant consideration of USG funding.


10. Embassy Rangoon notes that busing activists to polling
stations on election day sounds very unrealistic, given the
enhanced security environment throughout the country that is
likely to increase as referendum day draws closer.
Additionally, EYNG is well-known to Embassy Rangoon. They are a
very small, nascent, disorganized group, without the numbers
needed to conduct a wide-spread campaign. Rangoon poloffs met
with them several times after September. Their members
repeatedly demanded USG funding for "democracy promotion"
programs they could never describe. Many of them fled to
Thailand or were arrested shortly after. Their link to 88
Generation is tenuous at best.


11. (C) The ENC's efforts to unite exile groups are a breath of
fresh air. Personal differences among key exile figures and
mutual distrust have plagued the exile community since 1988.
Though the ENC cannot by itself unite all the groups, any effort
to bring several of them together in a consultative mechanism
that has the capacity to control the actions of its member
organizations is a welcome start.


12. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Rangoon and
Bangkok.
MORROW