SPDC BLAMED FOR KNU ASSASSINATION AS TENSIONS RISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000029

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM BM TH
SUBJECT: SPDC BLAMED FOR KNU ASSASSINATION AS TENSIONS RISE

REF: CHIANG MAI 27

CHIANG MAI 00000029 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) An increasing number of interlocutors are blaming the
Burmese regime for the February 14 assassination of Karen
National Union Secretary General Mahn Sha. Thai officials'
investigation has turned up a regime connection to the killing,
as well as a private Thai link to the plot and photos of the
alleged gunmen, who belong to the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
(DKBA). Press reports of a cross-border attack from Burma into
Thailand appear to be false, as do those of two suspected gunmen
having been arrested in possession of AK-47s. Meanwhile,
Burmese have closed various piers along the Moei River and
beefed up security on the Burmese side of the bridge connecting
Karen State with Tak Province, probably as a precaution against
possible retaliatory action by Thai-based KNU forces. End
Summary.

-------------- --------------
Multiple Actors In A Complex Plot
-------------- --------------


2. (C) As reported in Reftel, Mahn Sha, General Secretary of the
Karen National Union (KNU),was gunned down in northern Thailand
on February 14. (Note: The KNU has waged low-level military
conflict against the Burmese regime for over 40 years, but poses
no real threat to it. The group currently limits its actions to
protecting civilians in Karen State from the Burma Army's
abuses, and attacking small groups of Burma Army soldiers when
it can.)


3. (C) Though hot debate continues over exactly who carried
out/ordered the assassination, an increasing number of fingers
are being pointed at the Burmese regime. KNU contacts told us
today they intercepted radio communications between a former KNU
member now cooperating with two KNU splinter groups -- the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and KNU Peace Council
(KPC) -- and Lieutenant Colonel Myat Htun Oo of Burma's Office
of Military Affairs Security. (Note: The DKBA is a KNU splinter
group that now sides with the Burmese regime and provides
military support to it. The KPC also split from the KNU, and
signed a peace agreement with the regime in 2006). According to
the KNU, just 90 minutes after Mahn Sha's death, the former KNU
member reportedly told Myat Htun Oo that the mission had been
accomplished. This is consistent with press reports that also
make reference to this radio intercept, as well as with
information obtained from local Thai intelligence officials, who
cited their Burmese counterparts in Myawaddy as the source of
the information.


4. (C) According to Thai National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
contacts, Thai police have located the vehicle the assailants
used to flee the crime scene. It is registered to a Thai
businessman who is involved in the DKBA's illegal timber trade.
NIA and Royal Thai Army (RTA) contacts also told us the plot was
funded by the KPC. They also said they have photos of the two
gunmen, who are DKBA members, and who have since returned to
Myawaddy. These claims are consistent with the KNU's assessment
that the gunmen could not have carried out the attack without
help from someone in Thailand, and that the regime could have
paid a handsome sum for that collaboration. Though KNU contacts
told us they are not planning any retaliatory action at this
time, NIA and RTA interlocutors believe there is a high
possibility of increased personalized, retaliatory violence.

CHIANG MAI 00000029 002.2 OF 003


KNU contacts said that if such violence continues, they believe
some of their members and offices will soon be targeted.


5. (C) Comment: Though Mahn Sha's assassination appears not to
have been carried out in direct retaliation for the earlier
assassination of KPC General Ler Mu (see Reftel),NIA contacts
told us Ler Mu's murder created the perfect excuse for the
regime to kill Mahn Sha. Ler Mu's death made retaliatory action
on the part of the KPC/DKBA very plausible. The NIA officials
said they have known about a planned plot to kill Mahn Sha for
about a year now, but they opined that Ler Mu's death gave the
regime a perfect excuse to carry it out. A KNU contact told us
he could not confirm that exiles outside the KNU were in danger
as a result of Mahn Sha's assassination, saying he thought that
was just "speculation." End Comment.

--------------
Separating Fact From Fiction
--------------


6. (SBU) In the aftermath of the assassination, there have been
several press reports on various aspects that have proven to be
inaccurate. On February 14, the Thai Government Public
Relations Department reported that DKBA troops had carried out a
cross-border attack against the KNU into Tak Province. Both KNU
and local Thai contacts have confirmed to us repeatedly that
this report is not true. Separately, exiles and some media
outlets reported that two men were arrested in Mae Sot in close
proximity to the offices of a Burmese exile group while in
possession of AK-47s. This too, is a fabrication, according to
Thai officials. Some Burmese migrant workers carrying pistols
were arrested, they said, but those workers are not connected to
Mahn Sha's assassination. Lastly, February 20 press reports,
including one in the exile publication Irrawaddy, state that
Thai officials have closed some official border checkpoints.
What we learned today from our contacts is that piers along the
Moei River controlled by the DKBA have been closed in advance of
the February 21 Bilateral Township Border Committee meeting,
which is taking place in Myawaddy. They also told us that that
contrary to reports from some Burmese exiles, the Friendship
Bridge linking Myawaddy in Karen State to Mae Sot in Thailand
remains open, though security on the Burmese side has been
increased. They believe this step was taken to prevent any
cross-border violence from disrupting the gathering.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (C) Mahn Sha's assassination brings nothing but benefits for
the Burmese regime: a strong unifying force in the Burmese exile
community is now dead, with no apparent heir waiting in the
wings; the rift between the KNU on one side, and the KPC/DKBA on
the other, will only widen; and the regime can plausibly blame
the assassination on infighting between Karen groups. Mahn
Sha's death can also only weaken what was already a depleted
Karen resistance movement. Separately, we do not expect the
investigation into the assassination to yield results. From
their perspective, the Thai are unlikely to request that the
Burmese hand over the gunmen, because this would amount to a
public acknowledgement that the Thai allows the KNU to operate
on its territory. For their part, the Burmese would not hand
them over, because they do not want to be seen as betraying
those who carry out what they see as good deeds. Furthermore,
though Thai police are pressuring the Thai businessman who owns
the get-away vehicle for information, he is unlikely to provide
any to avoid jeopardizing his illegal timber business, which he
runs in cahoots with the DKBA.


8. (C) If the Burmese regime did indeed sanction the killing, we
wonder if the timing was determined in part by a calculation by

CHIANG MAI 00000029 003.2 OF 003


the Burmese that the new government in Bangkok is less sensitive
to such actions than the interim government would have been.
Many observers saw the Thaksin administration as accommodative
to the Burmese junta's interests. It remains unclear to us
whether Samak's Burma policy will emulate Thaksin's, but a
Burmese decision to carry out this operation in Thai territory
might indicate that the Burmese believe Samak is willing to let
them get away with murder.
MORROW