Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CHIANGMAI21
2008-02-06 10:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

CHANGE IN BURMA: NOW, OR IN THE DISTANT FUTURE?

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON SOCI TH BM 
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PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
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P R 061054Z FEB 08
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0665
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0055
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0031
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0721
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000021 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/6/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON SOCI TH BM
SUBJECT: CHANGE IN BURMA: NOW, OR IN THE DISTANT FUTURE?

REF: A. A) BANGKOK 340 (AMBASSADOR AND PRIME MINISTER)

B. B) CHIANG MAI 17 (KARENNI REFUGEE CAMP FEELING SQUEEZED)

C. C) CHIANG MAI 2 (DEATH OF KARENNI REFUGEE)

D. D) CHIANG MAI 10 (STAFFDEL YEO)

E. E) 07 CHIANG MAI 179 (REFUGEES BEMOAN EXILES)

F. F) 07 CHIANG MAI 160 (BURMA BORDER CROSSING QUIET)

CHIANG MAI 00000021 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

----------------
SUMMARY
----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000021

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/6/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON SOCI TH BM
SUBJECT: CHANGE IN BURMA: NOW, OR IN THE DISTANT FUTURE?

REF: A. A) BANGKOK 340 (AMBASSADOR AND PRIME MINISTER)

B. B) CHIANG MAI 17 (KARENNI REFUGEE CAMP FEELING SQUEEZED)

C. C) CHIANG MAI 2 (DEATH OF KARENNI REFUGEE)

D. D) CHIANG MAI 10 (STAFFDEL YEO)

E. E) 07 CHIANG MAI 179 (REFUGEES BEMOAN EXILES)

F. F) 07 CHIANG MAI 160 (BURMA BORDER CROSSING QUIET)

CHIANG MAI 00000021 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Change will not come to Burma for another 20 years if it
does not come soon, was the prevailing sentiment among Burmese
exiles over lunch with the Ambassador. Though there was
disagreement among the group over whether steps could be taken
to help effect short-term change, and whether the post-September
crackdown atmosphere represents an opportunity to do so, all
agreed that failure to take concrete action now would condemn
Burma to several more years of misrule. Attendees also
discussed the need to find an appropriate role for ASEAN, India,
China, and other regional actors. End Summary.


2. (U) Ambassador John made his first official visit to Chiang
Mai January 28-29. His schedule included a call on the Chiang
Mai Governor, a discussion on 175 years of U.S.-Thai relations
with university students at the American Corner, and a lunch
with Burmese exiles and activists. Present at the lunch were
Irrawaddy Editor Aung Zaw, Aung Naing Oo and Win Min from Chiang
Mai University, Christina Fink from the National Council of the
Union of Burma (NCUB) Foreign Affairs Training Program, Pippa
Curwen of the Burma Relief Center, Hseng Noung from the Women's
League of Burma, and Zipporah Sein from the Karen Women's
Organization.

--------------
When Will Change Come?
--------------


3. (C) Though there was some disagreement among the group over
tactics, and whether there would be change in Burma over the
short-term, all participants agreed that the future looked bleak

if change did not come to Burma shortly. There is a pervasive
climate of fear, Aung Zaw and Win Min agreed, noting that a
prominent Burmese economist and a monk, both known for their
participation in regional conferences and book writing, were
afraid of doing/saying anything that could get them into
trouble. Win Min said the economist, who used to criticize the
regime's policies while traveling abroad, was afraid to travel
now in the wake of former UN Country Coordinator Charles
Petrie's expulsion. The military rulers, Win Min added, are
perpetuating the problems, instilling fear in the minds of the
people. There will certainly be an explosion one day, he said,
when people just cannot take it any longer.


4. (C) Aung Zaw opined that due to the regime's determination
to stay in power, it would violently crush any demonstrations
this year unless they were well-organized. Win Min agreed,
noting that there was tangible and deep-seated hatred of the
military over its brutal suppression of the monks, and its
affront to Burma's Buddhist value system. When the monks
demonstrated, they were not only reacting to economic misery,
but they were also fighting for dignity, opined Aung Zaw.


5. (C) Aung Naing Oo asserted that many factors point to 2008
as the year of change. Even astrologers are predicting it.
That said, he argued for a long-term strategy to bring about a
peaceful transition, because no one knows how long Than Shwe and
Maung Aye will remain in power. He emphasized the need to be on
good terms with the military, since a real transition cannot
happen without them, and to invest over the long-term in the
reform process. Zipporah Sein agreed, noting the importance of
changing the military due to the increasing poverty inside the
country. Without change in the military, she stated that the
people will become poorer and poorer. Aung Zaw remarked that if
the military were not so inept at managing the economy, the
people would not be so interested in political change.

-------------- --------------
--------------

CHIANG MAI 00000021 002.2 OF 002


Regional Actors: What Can They Do, and What Can the U.S. Do?
-------------- --------------
--------------


6. (C) The discussion then shifted to regional dynamics, with
the Ambassador noting that Thai policy on Burma had both
positive and negative elements. On the positive side, he
mentioned Thailand's willingness to play host to Burmese
refugees, saying that he could not imagine Singapore, India, or
China accepting this burden. He added that in Thailand, Burmese
exiles also enjoy relative freedom of movement and can carry out
their work. On the other side of the equation, the Ambassador
was critical of the Thai Government (RTG) for not speaking out
forcefully and publicly in support of change. (Note:
Ambassador subsequently made this point in his first meeting
with new Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej -- see Ref A). He
noted that lobbying Thailand to divest from Burma's gas, oil,
gems and timber sectors was not yet yielding results, and sought
opinions on what the U.S. could usefully do to press the Thais.
Pippa Curwen suggested calling the RTG's attention to the
displacement caused by the construction of numerous dams on the
Salween and other rivers. Aung Naing Oo questioned the utility
of pressing the RTG, asserting that it has no influence over
Burma's ruling junta.


7. (C) Aung Zaw opined that Thai society seemed more
sympathetic to the plight of the Burmese in the wake of the
Saffron Revolution. Hseng Noung shared this view, noting that
in the aftermath of the shooting death of a Burmese refugee
(Refs B-C),Burmese organizations have positively influenced
Thai media coverage of the story. Another positive development
in her opinion was the increase in the number of Thai academics
taking an interest in Burma. Zipporah Sein opined that an
increase in the number of Thai-language publications with Burma
content would help call the attention of ordinary Thai to the
plight of the Burmese. Christina Fink and Aung Naing Oo
encouraged the Ambassador to press the RTG to continue to
provide a safe haven for those fleeing the August-September
crackdown, and to improve security for Burmese migrants,
particularly in Mae Sot, where they asserted that abductions,
killings and disappearances continue. Other participants
expressed the view that security was not as important, saying
that they believed much of the violence was gang/drug-related.
(Note: On post's last three trips to Mae Sot since October 2007,
none of our interlocutors expressed concern about
abductions/disappearances -- see Refs D-F. End Note.)


8. (C) Aung Zaw and Aung Naing Oo lashed out at ASEAN, China
and India for being short-sighted and claiming that Burma would
disintegrate without military rule. Aung Naing Oo said they
believed this because they have failed to get acquainted with
opposition figures other than Aung San Suu Kyi, and that they
based their comments about Burma on hearsay rather than fact.
ASEAN countries and China need to look beyond her, he said,
asserting that there is a support system and there are groups
that will step in once a transition takes place.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Increased contact with Burmese opposition groups, both
inside and outside the country, would help China, India and
ASEAN gain a clearer understanding of the forces behind the push
for change in Burma. China has quietly taken steps to reach out
to some of these groups, but India and the ASEAN countries
appear less acquainted with these diverse forces.


10. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Rangoon.
MORROW