KNU WILLING TO TALK?; ETHNIC ALLIANCES IN TROUBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000193

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU
STATE FOR EAP, IO AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS BM TH
SUBJECT: KNU WILLING TO TALK?; ETHNIC ALLIANCES IN TROUBLE

CHIANG MAI 00000193 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

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Summary and Comment
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1. (C) The Karen National Union (KNU) is interested in a just
peace with the Burmese regime if a mutually acceptable agreement
can be reached, and a major regime offensive in Karen State may
not take place this dry season, according to KNU contacts.
Other Burmese exile interlocutors told us separately that
efforts to form an ethnic military alliance are hitting snags,
as are attempts to preserve an existing political alliance among
politically-active exile groups.


2. (C) Comment: It is not surprising that exiled ethnic
political groups cannot seem to unite at this critical juncture
in Burmese history with the 2010 elections looming large on the
horizon. The KNU's apparent willingness to talk peace is
somewhat of a surprise, given that its new leadership has
previously expressed hard-line sentiments. However, the "just"
peace the KNU is seeking is likely not attainable under the
current military regime. End Summary and Comment.

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KNU Willing, but is the Regime?
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3. (C) Isaac Po, who has been an excellent source of
information about the KNU and its prolonged struggle against the
Burmese regime for several years, told us on December 4 that if
the group thinks it can achieve a "just and fair" peace with the
Burmese regime, the KNU will seek it out. P/E Chief pressed him
on this point, noting that the KNU's new leadership elected
during its quadrennial Congress this past October has a
reputation for being hard-line. Po agreed, but noted that the
KNU is willing to moderate its position if the circumstances are
right. If a mutually acceptable agreement cannot be reached,
the leadership is prepared to consider "all other options," Po
said without elaborating. (Note: We attempted to meet
recently-elected KNU senior leaders during Charge Dinger's
visit to the Thai-Burma border in October, but were told they
were not available. Two subsequent requests have also gone
unanswered.)


4. (C) Po also told us that the KNU has not observed
large-scale Burma Army or Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA
-- a pro-regime KNU splinter group) troop movements in and
around Karen State in preparation for a likely large offensive,
as is typically the case at the start of the dry season. He
speculated that significant military clashes in Karen territory
might not take place this year, with the regime focused instead
on the upcoming 2010 elections. He relayed separately that Ner
Da, the son of late KNU leader General Bo Mya, has been
marginalized within the organization, given his failure to win a
seat on the group's Executive or Standing Committee. Ner Da is
also likely to lose his Military Attache title, Po asserted,
though he could not say precisely when this would happen.

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Ethnic Political Alliance in Trouble
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5. (C) Meanwhile, three exile political contacts informed us on
separate occasions that the Seven Alliance of ethnic political
groups that held through the May 2008 constitutional referendum
was having difficulty remaining united. The head of the Ethnic
Nationalities Council and a representative of the National
League for Democracy Liberated Areas (ENC and NLDLA,
respectively) lamented the divisiveness. He cited two key
issues causing this: the misuse of USG funds (provided through
the National Endowment for Democracy and other grantees) by the
groups for the "Vote No" campaign ahead of the referendum; and
an effort by the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB --
the largest umbrella organization of exile political groups) to
challenge the regime's right to represent the people of Burma at
the United Nations.


6. (C) According to our contacts, the UN credentials challenge,
which has been reported in the Burmese exile media, has been
particularly divisive. The NCUB has pursued it full tilt,
despite the refusal of the self-proclaimed government in exile
(NCGUB -- National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma)
to lend its support. A Women's League of Burma (WLB) member
told us the disagreements are so stark that the exile movement

CHIANG MAI 00000193 002.2 OF 002


sent two delegations to the UN during the UNGA -- one supporting
the credentials challenge, and another that did not.


7. (C) The same contact also relayed that the NCUB is insisting
that the Seven Alliance move forward in a unified manner with
the NCUB as its leader -- something that the other six groups
are not prepared to do. Contacts at the Forum for Democracy in
Burma, another component of the Seven Alliance, told us that
five of the groups had already agreed to work together on
planning for the 2010 elections, and that the WLB would likely
join, but that it was quite possible they would move ahead
without the NCUB. Both WLB and ENC contacts expressed
frustration at this scenario, noting respectively that it was
"not good for the movement," and that the ENC had to maintain a
strong voice in the process since it is the only group
representing the interests of ethnic minorities.


8. (C) Comment: The leader of the NCUB, Maung Maung, who is the
son of National League for Democracy Central Executive Committee
Member U Nyunt Wei, has a reputation for flexing his political
muscle, often forcing member groups to follow him or be
marginalized within the organization. . End Comment.

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What About Military Cohesion?
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9. (C) Separately, leaders of several ethnic groups with armed
wings, including the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP),
the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA),and the Kachin
National Organization (KNO),presented to us a proposal for a
military alliance that they say also includes the KNU, elements
of the Shan State Army, and some Chin groups. They told us the
aim of the alliance would be to overthrow the current military
regime by 2010. It is a very detailed plan with tables, charts,
requests for weapons, budgets, etc. However, the KNU's Isaac
Po. when we met him on December 4, told us the KNU was not fully
committed to this alliance, and did not want to seek U.S.
support through this proposal. Nor have the Shan requested USG
support for the proposed alliance, to our knowledge. This
leaves doubts as to the real cohesion of the grouping. (Comment:
Even if all the ethnic armed groups pooled their forces, they
would still be severely out-manned and out-gunned by the Burmese
military, and would likely be able to do little more than be a
temporary nuisance to the regime. That said, if there is
interest in reviewing the documents, we can forward them to EAP
or Embassy Rangoon for consideration. End Comment).


10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Rangoon and
Bangkok.
MORROW