Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CHIANGMAI185
2008-12-04 07:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

THE NORTH KOREA-THAILAND REFUGEE PIPELINE: A TALE OF TWO

Tags:  PREF PREL PHUM PINR BM LA CH KS KN TH 
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P R 040709Z DEC 08
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0912
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0032
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0044
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0989
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000185 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR LIZ PHU
GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/2/2018
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM PINR BM LA CH KS KN TH
SUBJECT: THE NORTH KOREA-THAILAND REFUGEE PIPELINE: A TALE OF TWO
PROVINCES

REF: 07 CHIANG MAI 151 (NEW ARRIVALS OUTSTRIP RESETTLEMENT)

CHIANG MAI 00000185 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



------------------------------------
Summary and Comment
------------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000185

SIPDIS

NSC FOR LIZ PHU
GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/2/2018
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM PINR BM LA CH KS KN TH
SUBJECT: THE NORTH KOREA-THAILAND REFUGEE PIPELINE: A TALE OF TWO
PROVINCES

REF: 07 CHIANG MAI 151 (NEW ARRIVALS OUTSTRIP RESETTLEMENT)

CHIANG MAI 00000185 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) The number of North Koreans seeking resettlement to a
third country via Thailand is expected to continue to rise,
despite a drop in the number of North Koreans arrested in early
2008, according to officials in Chiang Rai Province, which
borders both Laos and Burma. Though these same interlocutors
spoke of a shift from Chiang Rai to the northeastern Nong Khai
Province as the main route of entry into Thailand, our visit to
Nong Khai did not uncover information about any such significant
migratory movement. The Chiang Rai authorities outlined steps
they have undertaken to deal with the situation, such as
cross-border intelligence sharing, as well as problems they
face, including significant language barriers. They allowed us
to view the Provincial Immigration Detention Center (IDC),where
overcrowding appears not to be an issue at this time.


2. (C) Comment: While the Chiang Rai officials were forthcoming
with information, their Nong Khai counterparts were anything
but. We suspect that there are more North Korean asylum seekers
entering Nong Khai than the provincial authorities told us, but
are not in a position to speculate on numbers. The improvements
in crowding at the Chiang Rai IDC are likely due more to efforts
on the part of the South Korean Government to take in greater
numbers of Northern defectors, rather than to steps actively
taken by Chiang Rai provincial authorities. End Summary and
Comment.

--------------
Numbers up in Chiang Rai
--------------


3. (C) The number of North Korean asylum seekers passing
through Thailand on their way to a third country will continue
to rise as it did from 2005-07 , according to police and

immigration officials in the northern Thai province of Chiang
Rai, which borders both Laos and Burma. In 2005-2007,
provincial authorities told us they detained 190, 542, and 924
North Koreans respectively for illegal entry. In 2008, however,
a significant drop appears to be in the offing; as of the end of
May, the corresponding figure was just 167. Our interlocutors
viewed this as a temporary aberration, and opined that the
numbers would again rise after the 2008 Olympic Games.


4. (C) Our interlocutors attributed the current drop to several
factors, including: cross-border cooperation; intelligence; and
Chinese policy. They reported very good cooperation with their
Lao counterparts, with whom they jointly watch the Mekong River
connecting Laos to Chiang Rai for illegal aliens, but less
effective cooperation with their Burmese counterparts. A nearly
common language, will to work together, and the longevity of
postings for relevant Lao officials contribute to this
cooperative relationship, they said. The Burmese, on the other
hand, have too many officials from different branches of
government in the border area who often rotate, are not willing
to share intelligence, and do not speak the same language, they
lamented.


5. (C) For its part, Chinese policy also has an influence over
the number of North Koreans entering Thailand, our interlocutors
asserted. When Chinese authorities crack down on illegal aliens
already living in China, more attempt to flee, while when they
exercise tighter controls over their borders, as they did in the
run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games, entry and egress become more
difficult, consequently reducing the number fleeing to
neighboring countries. Labor conditions in China also play a
role, they asserted. When factories that employ North Korean
workers face financial problems and lay them off or fire them,
the number seeking resettlement rises.

--------------
Their Road to Thailand
--------------


6. (C) Our Chiang Rai contacts told us most North Koreans enter
the province via boat from Laos, which they travel to after
spending at least five to seven years working in China. Men

CHIANG MAI 00000185 002.2 OF 003


work mainly as manual laborers, and women mainly in restaurants,
they said. Some of the women even marry Chinese husbands to
make their lives in China easier, they alleged, only to leave
them behind when they flee to Thailand. The cost of the journey
to Thailand can be as high as $5,700, with the smugglers paid in
one of several ways: via garnishment of the wages earned by the
North Koreans in China; through a relative in South Korea; or
via relatives in the planned eventual country of resettlement.


7. (C) Most used to come directly from North Korea to Thailand,
our contacts revealed, in a journey lasting about 10 days,
mainly on passenger and cargo boats. Since late 2007, a route
that appears to be increasing in popularity is to enter Thailand
via speed boat down the Mekong from the Chinese city of
Guanloei. Those who enter Thailand via the Mekong River from
Laos now tend to travel in bigger groups than before, according
to our contacts, though they did not speculate on the reasons
for this change. If Thai authorities are able to intercept
boats before they reach Thailand, they will divert them to the
suspected country of origin, be it Laos or Burma.


8. (C) When detained, the North Koreans are generally without
documents, according to police and immigration officials. They
also appear to have been well-prepared for interrogation,
revealing little if anything about who assisted them.
Provincial authorities believe their migration to Thailand is
organized, but have so far been unable to prove this. Volunteer
interpreters the police have to rely on may not be providing
accurate translation, they opined, contributing to their
inability to find out about the involvement of alien smugglers
and human traffickers. On the other hand, the detainees always
seem to provide sufficient information for the Thai legal
proceedings that eventually result in the North Koreans'
resettlement to a third country. We attempted to get the
perspective of a South Korean who runs a safe house for North
Koreans in Chiang Rai, but we were unable to meet since he had
been deported to South Korea. He subsequently reentered
Thailand, but was again deported in November, and we were unable
to meet him during his latest stay here.

--------------
The IDC on the Up
--------------


9. (C) Once detained, most North Koreans are taken to the
Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Chiang Rai's Mae Sai
District, which borders Burma. Typically, they spend a month
there before being transferred to the Bangkok IDC, where they
wait until they are fined and "deported" (in reality resettled)
to the ROK - or to the U.S. via a transit stop in Seoul.
Immigration officials were prepared to let us enter the IDC, but
we politely declined, not wishing to raise hopes of immediate
resettlement by our presence.


10. (C) We chose instead to view the IDC over a closed circuit
video link. The facility, which the officials told us measures
approximately 720 square feet, can accommodate up to 80
detainees. At the time of our visit to Chiang Rai, 41 North
Koreans were being housed there -- 36 women and five men. The
facility appeared to be clean, though the detainees were clearly
not elated to be there. Immigration officials attributed the
lack of overcrowding to steps taken by the South Korean
Government to dramatically increase the number of North Koreans
it resettled in 2007.

--------------
The Path Less Traveled?
--------------


11. (C) After hearing from several sources, including Chiang Rai
provincial officials, that North Koreans had begun entering
Thailand via the northeastern province of Nong Khai, choosing it
over Chiang Rai because of stricter controls in the latter
province, we traveled to Nong Khai to see what we could find
out. So far, limited statistics our interlocutors there shared
with us do not indicate a shift in the North Koreans' migratory
patterns.


12. (C) The Provincial Governor, police and immigration
officials were all tight-lipped, denying that any significant
number of North Koreans was passing through the province.
Immigration officials did tell us that the Nong Khai IDC was
over capacity, but asserted emphatically that all the occupants
were Lao Hmong. Police officials were the most forthcoming,
admitting to detaining 18 North Koreans between 2005-8, but they

CHIANG MAI 00000185 003.2 OF 003


claimed to have no other information about North Koreans'
movements in the area. We will follow up periodically with the
DEA Office in the neighboring province of Udornthani, to see if
officers there who agreed to assist us in gathering information
about North Koreans' movements through their Thai
counternarcotics contacts, are able to do so.


13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok.

ANDERSON
MORROW