Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CHIANGMAI173
2008-11-14 09:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

BURMESE EXILES TELL STAFFDEL GROVE HUMANITARIAN SPACE WON'T

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM EAID ECON SOCI BM CH TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0173/01 3190922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140922Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0891
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0072
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0053
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0050
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0966
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000173 

SIPDIS

THIS MESSAGE REPLACES CHIANG MAI 171, WHICH WAS SENT IN ERROR

NSC FOR PHU
STATE PASS USAID
STATE FOR DRL, EAP AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM EAID ECON SOCI BM CH TH
SUBJECT: BURMESE EXILES TELL STAFFDEL GROVE HUMANITARIAN SPACE WON'T
BRING POLITICAL CHANGE (CORRECTED COPY)

CHIANG MAI 00000173 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, Consul General, CG, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



--------------
Summary
--------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000173

SIPDIS

THIS MESSAGE REPLACES CHIANG MAI 171, WHICH WAS SENT IN ERROR

NSC FOR PHU
STATE PASS USAID
STATE FOR DRL, EAP AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM EAID ECON SOCI BM CH TH
SUBJECT: BURMESE EXILES TELL STAFFDEL GROVE HUMANITARIAN SPACE WON'T
BRING POLITICAL CHANGE (CORRECTED COPY)

CHIANG MAI 00000173 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, Consul General, CG, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Increased space for humanitarian relief work in the
Irrawaddy Delta won't speed up political change, and the U.S.
needs a strategy for change in Burma involving regional actors
-- these were the two main messages prominent Burmese exiles
conveyed to StaffDel Grove during his brief November 7 visit to
Chiang Mai. The exiles -- Irrawaddy Editor Aung Zaw and
Political Defiance Committee head Kyaw Kyaw -- also offered
their insights on Than Shwe and potential cracks in the regime
that in their view demonstrate that the situation inside Burma
is deteriorating, and presented somewhat differing views on the
effectiveness of the Burmese exile groups operating along the
Thai-Burma border. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Skepticism about Humanitarian Assistance
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On a brief November 7 visit to Chiang Mai, Minority
Senate Appropriations Committee Clerk Paul Grove, accompanied by
Embassy and Consulate Officers, met with Irrawaddy Editor Aung
Zaw and Political Defiance Committee head Kyaw Kyaw. Both
conveyed strong skepticism of humanitarian relief work in the
wake of Cyclone Nargis, emphasizing that the space to conduct it
will not translate into more opportunities for increased
political activity. Kyaw Kyaw asserted that many of the
organizations providing humanitarian assistance were created and
controlled by the Burmese regime, and that Burma's ruling
generals and their cronies were benefiting from the assistance.
It is important, he emphasized, to know who is who, and who is

affiliated with whom.


3. (C) Grove agreed with Kyaw Kyaw's overall assessment, citing
the necessity to understand the complex relationships involved
before moving ahead with relief work. Nothing happens in Burma,
he stated, unless the generals want it to, and if they're
unhappy with something, you get squashed, he added. He also
underscored that the SPDC should not benefit in any way from
assistance provided by the USG, and proposed that the regime be
required to match donor contributions to Cyclone Nargis relief
dollar for dollar. Emboff interjected that the regime would
probably argue it had already done so and cite the PONJA report
as evidence. Aung Zaw said the idea was "not bad," but
questioned the SPDC's transparency. He said he is personally in
favor of more humanitarian aid, but only if it gets to the needy
and if aid workers do not have to compromise in order to carry
out their work.

--------------
The U.S. Needs a Strategy
--------------


4. (C) Both Kyaw Kyaw and Aung Zaw highlighted the importance
of devising a strategy for Burma. Aung Zaw emphasized the need
to work with other countries in Asia in a multilateral approach,
singling out China and ASEAN. Kyaw Kyaw lamented the various
legislative stipulations on how the U.S.' Burma assistance is
divided each year. Aung Zaw expressed the hope that the U.S.
would be in a position to capitalize the next time an
opportunity for change came along. Grove noted the importance
of thinking geostrategically about Burma, and not just focusing
on human rights and democracy. He remarked on the difficulty
the U.S. faces when trying to engage regional actors, noting
that India isn't receptive to supporting Aung San Suu Kyi even
though she is "Burma's Gandhi." Sometimes the Thai say the
right things, he added, but not consistently. Aung Zaw agreed,
saying "we cannot count on Thailand."


5. (C) On the issue of providing assistance to groups
operating along the Thai-Burma border, Kyaw Kyaw appealed for
more money for his Political Defiance Committee, asserting that
it provides funds to activists inside that keep them alive and
cover their lodging expenses. The $250,000 the PDC receives is
only enough to keep 20,000 activists alive for one day. During

CHIANG MAI 00000173 002.2 OF 003


the Saffron Revolution, he stated many who wanted to join the
demonstrations could not because they did not have sufficient
funds to travel to the sites. "We have our networks," he
asserted, and we need to keep them running. He said they
include individuals skilled in information technology, who
provide information from the regime's "databases."


6. (C) Aung Zaw noted that many border groups have been
operating for 20 years, and singled out Kyaw Kyaw and Bo Kyi of
the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners as carrying
out good work. He added that in the wake of Cyclone Nargis,
there is more coordination between groups inside and outside,
emphasizing the need to help bridge the gaps between them and
work in a cohesive manner. There shouldn't be battles over
funding or particular projects, he opined, and continued support
for border activities should not be lost as inside funding is
increased.

--------------
China and the UN
--------------


7. (C) Kyaw Kyaw separately offered his views on the extent of
Chinese influence in Burma. China and the regime have already
agreed that 20,000 Chinese workers and troops will be involved
in the gas pipeline project going through Bangladesh, he said.
According to him, the regime has also granted concessions to
China for naval bases in Tenaserim Division. Hundreds of
Burmese military officers are also attending the Chinese
equivalent of U.S. Staff College, he asserted. Many Chinese
small and medium enterprises are also setting up shop in the
area, he said, underscoring that all these agreements were
long-term, and that even if a democratic government came to
power in Burma tomorrow, it would not be able to undo this
damage.


8. (C) Aung Zaw remarked on the uneasiness of the regime's
relationship with China, noting that in a transcript of a recent
meeting in which the Minister of Home Affairs participated that
he obtained, the Minister expressed dislike for China while
underscoring the importance of working within current
"circumstances." He related that General Ne Win courted the
Chinese during his rule in order to secure Chinese agreement not
to support the Burmese Communist Party, drawing parallels
between the way the two dictators deal with China. (Comment:
The implication was that they engage with China to achieve their
goals, but otherwise would prefer to keep it at arms length).
China wants stability, security and economic development in
Burma according to Kyaw Kyaw, but knows full well it cannot
achieve these objectives as long as the current regime is in
power in Burma.


9. (C) Regarding the UN, Aung Zaw asserted that Burmese in
general disapprove of its actions to date. Many actually
believe, though he said he does not, that the regime has bribed
UN Special Envoy Gambari, and perhaps the UNSYG as well. He
lamented the lack of progress during Gambari's time as Envoy,
saying he "missed" Razali. Grove remarked that Razali was
outspoken, but that he lost credibility when he conveyed
assurances by the SPDC regarding ASSK's imminent release (among
others) that never came to pass. He also expressed disdain for
Gambari's mission to date.

--------------
Splits at the Top and 2010
--------------


10. (C) Regarding the 2010 elections, Grove asked Aung Zaw if he
thought the UN was planning on providing election assistance,
stating that "there will be problems on Capitol Hill" if they
do. Aung Zaw replied that the UN needs to stick to its mandate,
including the release of ASSK and political prisoners. Kyaw
Kyaw opined that even after the 2010 elections, not much would
change. Than Shwe would still be calling the shots, he said,
and military officers elected to Parliament would still continue
to wear their uniforms. Aung Zaw said he had been speaking to
recently released political prisoner Win Tin, who he assessed as
"very sharp," but said he did not believe Win Tin's claims that
ASSK could be released by May 2009. If she is released, the
National League for Democracy will certainly win in 2010, he and
Grove agreed. Grove added that if she is released, her safety
would be a concern given what happened at the 2003 Depeyin

CHIANG MAI 00000173 003.2 OF 003


Massacre the last time she was set free.


11. (C) Grove also asked both interlocutors about Than Shwe and
former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. They agreed that Khin Nyunt's
apparatus had not been entirely dismantled. Aung Zaw noted that
in particular, the academic and civilian organizations he
founded still exist. Though no one speaks directly to Khin
Nyunt these days, Aung Zaw asserted that some unspecified army
officers are looking for support from his networks in a bid to
oust Than Shwe. He also alleged that cracks are developing at
the top of the regime, citing a transcript of a meeting Than
Shwe recently had with the Chinese equivalent of the Deputy
Joint Chief of Staff that was passed to him. Kyaw Kyaw on the
other hand, called the ruling junta a "one man show."


12. (C) Despite old age and some psychological issues, Than
Shwe's mind, Aung Zaw asserted, is still functioning. He truly
believes in astrology according to Aung Zaw, which is the main
reason he refused to meet UN Envoy Gambari on his last visit
according to a former astrologer for Khin Nyunt who Aung Zaw
recently spoke to. Than Shwe is also an avid viewer of American
boxing matches, taped and sent to him by the Burmese Embassy in
Washington, and of Korean movies. He is looking for a way out
and wants to ensure his personal safety, according to Aung Zaw,
but the Seven Step Roadmap is his only strategy.


13. (C) Separately, Kyaw Kyaw asserted that the situation inside
Burma is deteriorating. He cited increased desertions from the
military and civilian ministries, primarily due to economic
hardship, not political views. Burmese weapons factories don't
have material necessary for production he said, and mints don't
have paper to print money. 70 percent of GoB approved tour
guides are out of work, he asserted, and have fled to
neighboring countries. Despite these dire conditions, the
regime won't collapse tomorrow, he stated.


14. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon, and cleared with StaffDel Grove.
MORROW