ANALYTICAL EXILES FAVOR LIMITED U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH BURMESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000136

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, DRL AND IO
NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM TH
SUBJECT: ANALYTICAL EXILES FAVOR LIMITED U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH BURMESE
REGIME

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 75 (EXILES SEE OPPORTUNITY)

B. CHIANG MAI 21 (CHANGE IN BURMA)

CHIANG MAI 00000136 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

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Summary and Comment
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1. (C) In a subtle shift, influential Burmese political pundits
based in northern Thailand have begun advocating limited U.S.
engagement with the Burmese regime over the past few months,
likely spurred on by the acceleration of Burma's sham roadmap
and the regime's bungled response to Cyclone Nargis. In their
view, limited engagement can coexist with U.S. sanctions already
in place, particularly targeted ones. The keys to this
strategy, they believe, are identifying those military officers
and Burmese Government bureaucrats who have a positive view of
the U.S., and who see their affiliation with the regime purely
as a means of survival; and ensuring that these officials fully
comprehend the economic and political disparity between the
regime's policies and those of other countries.


2. (C) This approach is predicated on the view that a
transition to democratic governance in Burma is a long-term
goal, and probably unachievable in the short-term. It also
reflects the reality that Thai-based Burmese exile groups that
are overtly political, many of which have existed for upwards of
20 years, have failed to effect change inside Burma. When the
Ambassador discussed prospects for change in Burma with Burmese
exiles in January (Ref B),a group that included two of the
sources for this message, the exiles still harbored some hope
for near-term change, though they agreed that if change did not
come to Burma soon, the Burmese would have to wait several
years. Now, they are discounting prospects for short-term
change, focusing instead on longer-term strategic planning. End
Summary and Comment.

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Talk to Whom? How?
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3. (C) In recent separate meetings, Irrawaddy Editor Aung Zaw,
Aung Naing Oo of the Vahu Development Institute (VDI),and
independent analyst/businessman Bo Kyaw Nyein all encouraged the
U.S. to pursue "limited engagement" with Burmese officials.
They emphasized that any such engagement could not include
top-level military officers or senior GoB officials at this
stage. Rather, they highlighted the importance of identifying
and cultivating those mid and low-level officers and government
bureaucrats they say are sympathetic to the U.S.


4. (C) After identifying the target personnel, our three
contacts suggested a variety of approaches we could employ.
Aung Naing Oo recommends feeding them a steady diet of texts on
the principles of democracy and economic conditions in other
countries, thereby allowing them to draw their own conclusions
about the regime's repressive political and backward economic
policies. He emphasized the need to provide this material in
Burmese, since many members of the target group cannot read
English at a sufficiently high level. (Note: We provided Aung
Naing Oo with the Burmese translation of the most recent human
rights report.) Aung Zaw expressed interest in starting a
dialogue with them, even at very low diplomatic levels. Bo Kyaw
Nyein was even bolder, suggesting that the U.S. consider funding
travel to international training for them, and giving Burmese
military personnel the opportunity to interact with U.S. troops.
(Note: Bo Nyein is aware that current USG policy restricts
military training for Burmese armed forces. End note.)


5. (C) Aung Zaw pointed to three former GoB officials he
asserted are "pragmatic," and with whom he believes we can
engage at an appropriate level. They are former Burmese
Ambassador to the UK Kyaw Win, former Deputy Head of Military
Intelligence under Khin Nyunt (also named Kyaw Win),and Kyaw
Thein, another former Military Intelligence figure. Aung Zaw
asserted that all three have valuable insights about who is who
in the regime that they would be willing to share, and that
could help us identify sympathetic officials that might be ripe
for us to engage with.


6. (C) Outside the regime, Aung Zaw suggested we consider
approaching Thi Ha, brother of regime crony Tay Za, as well as
Michael Mo Myint and General Thura Shwe Mann's two sons. These
four too, Aung Zaw opined, either out of self-interest or a real
desire to see change, might also be of assistance. Separately,
Aung Naing Oo agreed to provide his own list of names of
individuals sympathetic to U.S. views.

CHIANG MAI 00000136 002.2 OF 002



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Why?
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7. (C) Our contacts offered several arguments in support of
this approach, the most common of which was that Thai-based
exile groups have been unable to effect change inside Burma,
despite having worked at it for over 20 years. Aung Naing Oo
and other VDI officials also see the upcoming 2010 elections as
a chance to shape Burma's future government, despite all the
imperfections of the regime's roadmap. VDI believes that it
will be possible to gradually change Burma from within after the
elections, and that boycotting the process only ensures a
perpetuation of military rule.


8. (C) For his part, Aung Zaw said the Burmese people have
suffered too long under military rule, and that a different way
forward needs to be found. The regime's bungled relief effort
in the wake of Cyclone Nargis drove this point home for him, he
told us. If the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis haven't
created the conditions for change, he asked rhetorically, what
kind of suffering is necessary to bring them about?


9. (C) Aung Zaw foreshadowed much violence in the lead-up to
the 2010 election, arguing the situation would get worse before
improving, and also highlighted the election as an opportunity
to find a way forward for Burma. Bo Nyein noted the lack of
leverage the U.S. had over the Burmese regime and military,
opining that we had to find a way to exert positive influence
over them in addition to sanctions, which are strictly punitive.
Bo Nyein also appeared to share Aung Zaw's concern for violence
in the run-up to the election, reiterating the conventional
wisdom that the military will form political parties to contest
the vote and that the military would use the regime's mass
mobilization organization (Union Solidarity and Development
Association) to intimidate its opponents.

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What About Sanctions?
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10. (C) None of our interlocutors advocated lifting sanctions as
part of this strategy. Aung Naing Oo, the most forceful
proponent of limited U.S. engagement, told us he understands the
purpose of the sanctions and the moral support they provide to
the democratic opposition. However, all three made a plea for
more targeted and less "general" sanctions. According to Bo
Kyaw Nyein, sanctions such as the 2003 import ban only hurt the
general public, whereas measures such as specific asset freezes,
visa restrictions, and targeting the regime's crony companies
have real practical effects. Also of significance is that all
our interlocutors, while advocating limited U.S. engagement with
the Burmese regime, nonetheless underscored that their ideal
preference is for a direct, open internal Burmese dialogue that
is time-bound and genuine, with representatives of all
stakeholders allowed to participate.


11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon.

MORROW
ANDERSON