U/S BURNS AT 12/5 TSD SOM - AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000004

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2032
TAGS: PREL AF IN PK AS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AT 12/5 TSD SOM - AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN,
INDIA

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Classified By: Charge Dan Clune, Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns met with his Trilateral
Strategic Dialogue (TSD) counterparts Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Secretary Michael
L,Estrange and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka December 4-5, 2007 in
Canberra, Australia, at the TSD Senior Officials Meeting
(SOM). The wide-ranging talks covered regional and global
issues, as well as TSD initiatives. This cable is three of
four and covers discussion of South Asia-related issues
including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Septels report
on TSD initiatives, EAP and NEA issues. End Summary.

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Afghanistan: Concern about Faltering Support in NATO
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2. (C) Secretary L,Estrange confirmed the new Australian
government was committed to the long-term success of
Afghanistan; they were under no illusions as to the
difficulty of the challenges and were looking at options to
develop further support. However, Australia was concerned
about the insufficient and diminishing international
commitment to Afghanistan in terms of military and
development assistance, as well as the capacity of the Afghan
government to maintain security and deliver assistance. He
gave a critical assessment of efforts in Afghanistan, noting
the training of the army was behind schedule, many in the
police force were corrupt, and Pakistan,s current
preoccupation with domestic political matters distracted it
from dealing with insurgents along its border with
Afghanistan. L,Estrange further argued the desire of the
Afghan government to engage elements of the insurgency was of
concern; we needed to avoid any perception of weakness.
Handled in the wrong way, this situation could undermine the
coalition.


3. (C) In spite of the dour picture he painted, Secretary
L,Estrange said the Australian government was not deterred
from the task at hand; in fact the new government,s
commitment was even stronger perhaps than former PM
Howard,s. L,Estrange expressed appreciation for the recent
Dutch decision to remain in the lead role in Uruzgan province
for another 24 months; he lamented that the Dutch had merely
postponed their withdrawal date instead of making a
commitment to condition-based rather than time-based
engagement.


4. (C) In response to Secretary L,Estrange,s inquiry into
Japanese efforts to extend legislation underpinning refueling
efforts in the Indian Ocean, DFM Yabunaka claimed the
Japanese government was working hard to generate public
support for refueling operations. Yabunaka also highlighted
Japanese work with Afghanistan,s police. He reported Japan
had spent $200 million in Afghanistan with another $200
million in the pipeline, and it was considering adding more
funding for refugees. While the Japanese were experiencing
some difficulties implementing programs including the Ring
Road project, Yabunaka pledged Japan,s PRT work would
continue.
Qcontinue.


5. (S) U/S Burns agreed with Secretary L,Estrange,s
assessment of the problems in Afghanistan and thanked him for
the bipartisan support for Afghanistan in Australia. On the
faltering will and political commitment in Western Europe,
U/S Burns said Afghanistan had become an existential crisis
for NATO, at odds with the &one for all and all for one8
credo. However, he argued, the ISAF Regional Command South
Ministerial meeting December 13-14 in Edinburgh offered the
opportunity to keep countries in the fight. U/S Burns
outlined three needs: to convince France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain to work in southern Afghanistan and NATO in general to
&toughen up;8 to more effectively coordinate the

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international civilian efforts; and to work more with
Pakistan on the sanctuary enjoyed by the Taliban along the
border.


6. (S) U/S Burns briefed on U.S. efforts to recruit Paddy
Ashdown to coordinate international civilian efforts; he
requested Australia and Japan reiterate to Afghanistan,s
President Karzai and UNSYG Ban the need for a strong leader
on international civilian efforts in Afghanistan. Both
Secretary L,Estrange and DFM Yabunaka agreed to do so. U/S

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Burns also asked Australia and Japan to join with us in
pressing Spain, Italy, and France to increase their troop
contributions to operations in Afghanistan. L,Estrange
noted the former Australian government had been outspoken on
this issue and expressed conviction the new government would
be similarly assertive once they had time to work through the
issue.

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Pakistan: Domestic Politics and the Fight Against Terrorism
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7. (S) Secretary L,Estrange expressed concern about
uncertainty in the political outlook in Pakistan. While we
needed credible elections and the state of emergency lifted,
opposition leader Sharif was recently banned from running in
the upcoming elections, and it was unclear if the opposition
would boycott the entire process. The second issue of
concern was Pakistan,s capacity to address radicalization
and take on the Taliban and al Qaida in the tribal regions,
while it was focused on these domestic issues. Third,
regardless of the outcome of the current crisis, Australia
was concerned about internal divisions in Pakistan and how
the military, which U/S Burns confirmed still supported
President Musharraf, would continue to maintain security.
L,Estrange argued the international community needed to
engage more with Pakistan.


8. (S) U/S Burns noted that Deputy Secretary Negroponte,s
November visit to Pakistan focused on the question of whether
there was still a center in Pakistani politics. Our capacity
to have an impact was limited, but we supported a moderate
center if possible. U/S Burns argued the northern frontier
provinces had been ungovernable for decades; the difficulties
along the border negatively affected our troops in
Afghanistan. However, he said, Pakistan was our number one
partner in the fight against al Qaida, and we supported the
Musharraf government. Therefore, what happened in Pakistan
was fundamental to our national security. U/S Burns also
noted we are also paying attention to the Pakistan-India
Composite Dialogue; while a hoped-for movement on Kashmir had
been &put on ice8 by recent developments in Pakistan, the
situation was markedly better than 1998 or 2001-2002.


9. (S) DFM Yabunaka expressed concern about command and
control of Pakistan,s nuclear arsenal. Musharraf had waited
too long to resign from the military, he claimed, and made a
huge mistake in confronting the Supreme Court and declaring
the state of emergency. Yabunaka shared his personal
judgment that Musharraf was out of touch with the rest of
Pakistan. He expressed the same concern about Bhutto,
QPakistan. He expressed the same concern about Bhutto,
arguing her strong positions against Musharraf were a result
of her difficulties with the people.

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The Rise of India as a Global Power
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10. (S) Delivering an intelligence assessment, Australian
Office of National Assessment Director General Peter Varghese
said India was undergoing a historic transition, especially
in regards to economic policy. Politically, while the nation
had some sense of its intentions vis-a-vis China and South
Asia, it had yet to articulate a strategic worldview. Much
of India,s future would be defined by its competitive
relationship with China, which would shape its relations with
the rest of East Asia. India would probably be less patient
in its diplomatic relations than China, Varghese noted, but

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believed its ultimate interests lay with the forces of
democracy and democratic change. India, Varghese concluded,
viewed democracy as both a values-based and strategic asset.


11. (S) U/S Burns observed the U.S-India relationship was far
more advanced in the private sector than government. India
was not an ambivalent power, but one without a clear sense of
global identity, with one foot still in the non-aligned camp
and the other foot in the global actor camp. Burns agreed
with Varghese,s conclusion that India was defined by its
democratic system. U/S Burns also noted the U.S.-India
relationship should not be defined through the prism of
China. Predicting that India would be a priority for the new
U.S. president in 2009, as it had been for President Bush,
Burns listed a second green revolution, energy,
military-to-military cooperation, and space as areas of
potential cooperation. Accordingly, the TSD members should
discuss areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.


12. (S) DFM Yabunaka noted he was very pleased with the
evolving intelligence cooperation taking place in the TSD,
said India served as an important counterbalance to China,
and noted an Indian official had asked him: wasn,t it true
that two nuclear powers in East Asia was better than one? On
the other hand, DFM Yabunaka noted India was hampered by
creaky infrastructure and a glacial bureaucratic
decision-making process. The pace of change, development,
and improvisation was far slower in India than in China,
Yabunaka said, giving the Chinese a comparative advantage.


13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Burns.


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