Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CANBERRA199
2008-02-27 21:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:
WELLINGTON CLUSTER MUNITIONS MEETING OUTCOMES
VZCZCXRO9071 PP RUEHMJ RUEHPB RUEHROV DE RUEHBY #0199/01 0582103 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 272103Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9092 INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0063 RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0010 RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO PRIORITY 0005 RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 0015 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0005 RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0087 RUEHBE/AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN PRIORITY 0001 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0020 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0027 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 1114 RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0324 RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0026 RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0028 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0021 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0269 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0031 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0027 RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0433 RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY 0056 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0991 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0069 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA PRIORITY 0028 RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY 0065 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 0500 RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO PRIORITY 0177 RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0369 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 7252 RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 0191 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 0236 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 0051 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 0357 RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA PRIORITY 0003 RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 1849 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0495 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0152 RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0180 RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 0059 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0088 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0042 RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 0038 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0058 RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0102 RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0004 RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY 1537 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 0050 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0046 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0593 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0774 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1901
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 000199
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/WRA K. BAKER
ALSO FOR EUR, AF, AND EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PARM MOPS PREL AS
SUBJECT: WELLINGTON CLUSTER MUNITIONS MEETING OUTCOMES
REF: A. A. 2007 CANBERRA 1763 (NOTAL)
B. B. 2007 STATE 167308 (NOTAL)
C. C. 2007 STATE 13607 (NOTAL)
Classified By: JAMES F. COLE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 000199
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/WRA K. BAKER
ALSO FOR EUR, AF, AND EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PARM MOPS PREL AS
SUBJECT: WELLINGTON CLUSTER MUNITIONS MEETING OUTCOMES
REF: A. A. 2007 CANBERRA 1763 (NOTAL)
B. B. 2007 STATE 167308 (NOTAL)
C. C. 2007 STATE 13607 (NOTAL)
Classified By: JAMES F. COLE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C/NOFORN) The meeting in Wellington of the Oslo Process
on cluster munitions was fraught with drama, Dr. Ada Cheung,
Executive Director, Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation
Branch of DFAT's International Security Division reported to
Poloff on February 27th. Nevertheless, progress was made on
a proposed text for discussion in Dublin to permit
interoperability for 10 to 15 years after adoption of the
Convention and on stockpile maintenance for training and
countermeasure development. She noted that although these
proposals were included in a Compendium Annex, the
Like-minded Group expects them to be considered on an equal
footing with the core text of the Convention. Australia
would welcome U.S. assistance in identifying African
countries with potential interoperability issues who can be
recruited to vote with the Like-minded and in reviewing the
proposed interoperability text. Dr. Cheung also requested
Qproposed interoperability text. Dr. Cheung also requested
continued U.S. efforts at the April Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) meeting to assist the Like-minded
Group in resolving our common issues with the Oslo
Convention. End Summary.
U.S. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
--------------
CANBERRA 00000199 002 OF 005
2. (C/NOFORN) Dr. Cheung provided proposed interoperability
language drafted by the Canadians based on Article 1.24 of
the International Criminal Court. The Like-minded Group is
asking for a U.S. reaction to this language in advance of the
CCW meeting in April. According to Dr. Cheung, the
Like-minded Group believes this language will be acceptable
to NGOs and expects a 10-15 year period to be adopted. She
cautioned that this text emphasizes the importance of
adopting appropriate definitions in the Convention. The text
reads:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of the Convention, a
State, on becoming a party to this Convention, may declare
that, for a period of (XX) years after the entry into force
of the Convention for the State concerned, it does not accept
the application of Article 1(c) with respect to its
participation in combined operations and activities with
non-party States. A declaration under this article may be
withdrawn at any time. During this period in which the
declaration under this article remains in force, the State
Qdeclaration under this article remains in force, the State
concerned shall take steps to encourage the governments of
any non-party States participating in such combined
operations and activities to ratify the Oslo Convention."
3. (C/NOFORN) According to Dr. Cheung, only signatories to
the Wellington Convention will have a vote in Dublin.
Consequently, non-state participants will observe only and
will not be allowed to propose text changes. Dr. Cheung
advised that the Like-minded Group may also draw on process
precedent from the Rome Statute of the ICC that excludes
non-voting participants from side meetings and final
discussions.
CANBERRA 00000199 003 OF 005
4. (C/NOFORN) Dr. Cheung indicated that the GOA is
identifying potential supporters in the region who are not
already members of the Like-minded Group. She specifically
identified Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines with
potential interoperability issues and requested U.S.
assistance in identifying comparable Africom countries. Dr.
Cheung observed that many of the African countries have been
present but do not actively participate in the process and
probably do not understand the implication of the Convention
on their activities such as peacekeeping. Once they are
identified, the GOA and other like-minded countries intend to
reach out to these countries with information and education
on the issues. Dr. Cheung observed that gaining their
understanding and support is important, as voting may be very
close on certain issues. The Core Group is pushing for a 2/3
majority vote process while the Like-minded Group is seeking
agreement through consensus without a vote.
POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS
--------------
5. (C/NOFORN) Cheung expects the definitions to exclude
Q5. (C/NOFORN) Cheung expects the definitions to exclude
sensor-fused munitions, but the proposed language may not
cover the existing weapons stocks of several countries,
including the UK and France. She expects them to propose a
transition period for the defined weapons, although this is
not likely to be palatable to the NGOs. Positive resolution
of issues over maintaining stocks for training and
countermeasure development is expected by the GOA, including
a transparent stock accounting method. Dr. Cheung observed
that issues of national security may ultimately play into
disclosure.
CANBERRA 00000199 004 OF 005
CONTINUING CHALLENGES
--------------
6. (C/NOFORN) The Core Group continues to maintain that
cluster munitions can be eliminated as land mines have been.
This absolutist stance has made the continued participation
of other NGO's difficult as they strive to achieve a credible
Convention that can be practically accepted and effectively
applied by states with cluster munitions. The Core Group
continues to hold hard lines on interoperability, transition
periods, and some definitions. Pressure from the Core Group
resulted in the withdrawal from Australia's delegation of
their two NGO participants as they were unable to reconcile
position of the Core Group with the GOA's positions on
interoperability and munition definitions. Dr. Cheung shared
that at one point during the meeting a rumor was circulated,
allegedly by the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC),that
future mine clearing assistance activities would be
discontinued in countries that voted against the Like-minded
Group.
7. (C/NOFORN) The practical processes of the meeting and
Q7. (C/NOFORN) The practical processes of the meeting and
draft Rules of Procedure presented nearly untenable issues to
many of the Like-minded Group. During the meeting, proposed
changes to the Convention from NGO's were incorporated, but
input provided by other participants was collected only as
annexes. On the fourth day of meetings, draft Rules of
Procedure were distributed limiting future consideration to
only the draft Cluster Munitions Convention (Rule 30),
essentially excluding the suggested changes in the annexes
proposed by participating states. Australia and other
like-minded countries believe that this rule was included in
bad faith. In an attempt to keep discussions going, the
CANBERRA 00000199 005 OF 005
participating states declared their understanding that the
proposals included in the Compendium Annex will be considered
on an equal footing with the core text of the Convention.
MCCALLUM
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/WRA K. BAKER
ALSO FOR EUR, AF, AND EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PARM MOPS PREL AS
SUBJECT: WELLINGTON CLUSTER MUNITIONS MEETING OUTCOMES
REF: A. A. 2007 CANBERRA 1763 (NOTAL)
B. B. 2007 STATE 167308 (NOTAL)
C. C. 2007 STATE 13607 (NOTAL)
Classified By: JAMES F. COLE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C/NOFORN) The meeting in Wellington of the Oslo Process
on cluster munitions was fraught with drama, Dr. Ada Cheung,
Executive Director, Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation
Branch of DFAT's International Security Division reported to
Poloff on February 27th. Nevertheless, progress was made on
a proposed text for discussion in Dublin to permit
interoperability for 10 to 15 years after adoption of the
Convention and on stockpile maintenance for training and
countermeasure development. She noted that although these
proposals were included in a Compendium Annex, the
Like-minded Group expects them to be considered on an equal
footing with the core text of the Convention. Australia
would welcome U.S. assistance in identifying African
countries with potential interoperability issues who can be
recruited to vote with the Like-minded and in reviewing the
proposed interoperability text. Dr. Cheung also requested
Qproposed interoperability text. Dr. Cheung also requested
continued U.S. efforts at the April Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) meeting to assist the Like-minded
Group in resolving our common issues with the Oslo
Convention. End Summary.
U.S. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
--------------
CANBERRA 00000199 002 OF 005
2. (C/NOFORN) Dr. Cheung provided proposed interoperability
language drafted by the Canadians based on Article 1.24 of
the International Criminal Court. The Like-minded Group is
asking for a U.S. reaction to this language in advance of the
CCW meeting in April. According to Dr. Cheung, the
Like-minded Group believes this language will be acceptable
to NGOs and expects a 10-15 year period to be adopted. She
cautioned that this text emphasizes the importance of
adopting appropriate definitions in the Convention. The text
reads:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of the Convention, a
State, on becoming a party to this Convention, may declare
that, for a period of (XX) years after the entry into force
of the Convention for the State concerned, it does not accept
the application of Article 1(c) with respect to its
participation in combined operations and activities with
non-party States. A declaration under this article may be
withdrawn at any time. During this period in which the
declaration under this article remains in force, the State
Qdeclaration under this article remains in force, the State
concerned shall take steps to encourage the governments of
any non-party States participating in such combined
operations and activities to ratify the Oslo Convention."
3. (C/NOFORN) According to Dr. Cheung, only signatories to
the Wellington Convention will have a vote in Dublin.
Consequently, non-state participants will observe only and
will not be allowed to propose text changes. Dr. Cheung
advised that the Like-minded Group may also draw on process
precedent from the Rome Statute of the ICC that excludes
non-voting participants from side meetings and final
discussions.
CANBERRA 00000199 003 OF 005
4. (C/NOFORN) Dr. Cheung indicated that the GOA is
identifying potential supporters in the region who are not
already members of the Like-minded Group. She specifically
identified Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines with
potential interoperability issues and requested U.S.
assistance in identifying comparable Africom countries. Dr.
Cheung observed that many of the African countries have been
present but do not actively participate in the process and
probably do not understand the implication of the Convention
on their activities such as peacekeeping. Once they are
identified, the GOA and other like-minded countries intend to
reach out to these countries with information and education
on the issues. Dr. Cheung observed that gaining their
understanding and support is important, as voting may be very
close on certain issues. The Core Group is pushing for a 2/3
majority vote process while the Like-minded Group is seeking
agreement through consensus without a vote.
POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS
--------------
5. (C/NOFORN) Cheung expects the definitions to exclude
Q5. (C/NOFORN) Cheung expects the definitions to exclude
sensor-fused munitions, but the proposed language may not
cover the existing weapons stocks of several countries,
including the UK and France. She expects them to propose a
transition period for the defined weapons, although this is
not likely to be palatable to the NGOs. Positive resolution
of issues over maintaining stocks for training and
countermeasure development is expected by the GOA, including
a transparent stock accounting method. Dr. Cheung observed
that issues of national security may ultimately play into
disclosure.
CANBERRA 00000199 004 OF 005
CONTINUING CHALLENGES
--------------
6. (C/NOFORN) The Core Group continues to maintain that
cluster munitions can be eliminated as land mines have been.
This absolutist stance has made the continued participation
of other NGO's difficult as they strive to achieve a credible
Convention that can be practically accepted and effectively
applied by states with cluster munitions. The Core Group
continues to hold hard lines on interoperability, transition
periods, and some definitions. Pressure from the Core Group
resulted in the withdrawal from Australia's delegation of
their two NGO participants as they were unable to reconcile
position of the Core Group with the GOA's positions on
interoperability and munition definitions. Dr. Cheung shared
that at one point during the meeting a rumor was circulated,
allegedly by the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC),that
future mine clearing assistance activities would be
discontinued in countries that voted against the Like-minded
Group.
7. (C/NOFORN) The practical processes of the meeting and
Q7. (C/NOFORN) The practical processes of the meeting and
draft Rules of Procedure presented nearly untenable issues to
many of the Like-minded Group. During the meeting, proposed
changes to the Convention from NGO's were incorporated, but
input provided by other participants was collected only as
annexes. On the fourth day of meetings, draft Rules of
Procedure were distributed limiting future consideration to
only the draft Cluster Munitions Convention (Rule 30),
essentially excluding the suggested changes in the annexes
proposed by participating states. Australia and other
like-minded countries believe that this rule was included in
bad faith. In an attempt to keep discussions going, the
CANBERRA 00000199 005 OF 005
participating states declared their understanding that the
proposals included in the Compendium Annex will be considered
on an equal footing with the core text of the Convention.
MCCALLUM