Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CANBERRA1271
2008-12-12 07:32:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:
AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA
how-toO 120732Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0681 INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T CANBERRA 001271
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/PDAS FELTMAN, S/I SATTERFIELD, AND
EAP/PDAS DAVIES
NSC FOR DNSA JEFFREY AND DWILDER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA
REF: A) STATE 128040 B) CANBERRA 1258
Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T CANBERRA 001271
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/PDAS FELTMAN, S/I SATTERFIELD, AND
EAP/PDAS DAVIES
NSC FOR DNSA JEFFREY AND DWILDER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA
REF: A) STATE 128040 B) CANBERRA 1258
Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Smith has told Ambassador
McCallum that Australia needs immediate help from the United
States in order to keep its remaining troops in Iraq. The FM
noted that GOA was requested by the US to defer its
negotiation with the GOI so as not to complicate US
negotiations on a US/GOI SOFA. The GOA had done so and kept
its forces there all year while the U.S. negotiated its own
SOFA, Smith said, because it understood their importance. Now
GOA forces will have no basis to remain in Iraq and no legal
protection even if they are invited to stay by the GOI. The
GOA needs immediate help from the U.S. to obtain an
invitation from Iraq to remain after December 31 and adequate
legal protection for its forces. Smith added that the GOA
needed some action by December 20-21 at the latest. Without
an invitation, the GOA would likely have no alternative but
to withdraw its forces by December 31. END SUMMARY
2. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Stephen Smith called in the
Ambassador on December 12. He said he had just come from a
meeting of the National Security Committee and he needed to
discuss Australia's lack of a status of forces agreement
(SOFA) with Iraq. He said he and the Prime Minister did not
appreciate being demarched by its closest ally, particularly
on a subject matter where the GOA had been asked by the US to
defer interaction with the GOI. He and PM Rudd also objected
to a deadline by the U.S to respond to the demarche. The GOA
needed help, Smith declared. They had kept their forces and
imbeds in Iraq all year because they understood their
importance to the US and now they were facing a situation
where they would have no invitation from the host country to
remain and no legal protection if they remained. If there
was no invitation from the Government of Iraq to remain,
Australia would likely have to remove its troops by January
1, the Foreign Minister stated. Australia needed two things,
he continued, an invitation from the Iraq Government to stay,
and adequate legal protection. In addition, Smith said, the
GOA needed help in the next few days not the next few weeks.
3. (S/NF) Smith said the GOA currently had a team in Iraq
discussing with the Iraqis a small piece of legislation
backed up by a letter from the Iraq Government. He stated
that he was very skeptical, however, that anything could be
accomplished by the end of the year. The Ambassador then
asked what the GOA would do if either an invitation to remain
or some legal protection is not obtained from the GOI, to
which Smith replied that the GOA would "cross that bridge
when we came to it."
4. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said the GOA did not want to
withdraw its forces from Iraq but it needed an invitation
to stay from the Government of Iraq and adequate legal
protection, and it needed immediate U.S. assistance to obtain
both. He said the GOA's deadline for some action by the GOI
was December 20-21 and Australian forces would likely have to
withdraw from Iraq if no formal invitation was received from
the Government by December 31,
5. (S/NF) COMMENT: The Foreign Minister's tone during this
brief meeting was cordial but sharp. The unmistakable
Qbrief meeting was cordial but sharp. The unmistakable
message from him, and the Prime Minister, was that Australia
had done what the U.S. had asked it to do and now it was
stuck. Since the U.S. had put Australia there, Australia
expected the U.S. to help it find a solution. The demarche
to which the Foreign Minister referred is ref A, dated
December 4, which asked Post to encourage the GOA to accept
an exchange of notes or letters as a SOFA in lieu of the
agreement the GOA was currently insisting on, since an
agreement would need ratification by the Iraqi Council of
Representatives. Ref B, sent December 11, is the current
thinking from the Australian Department of Defence about how
their forces could remain in the region in the absence of a
SOFA.
MCCALLUM
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/PDAS FELTMAN, S/I SATTERFIELD, AND
EAP/PDAS DAVIES
NSC FOR DNSA JEFFREY AND DWILDER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA
REF: A) STATE 128040 B) CANBERRA 1258
Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Smith has told Ambassador
McCallum that Australia needs immediate help from the United
States in order to keep its remaining troops in Iraq. The FM
noted that GOA was requested by the US to defer its
negotiation with the GOI so as not to complicate US
negotiations on a US/GOI SOFA. The GOA had done so and kept
its forces there all year while the U.S. negotiated its own
SOFA, Smith said, because it understood their importance. Now
GOA forces will have no basis to remain in Iraq and no legal
protection even if they are invited to stay by the GOI. The
GOA needs immediate help from the U.S. to obtain an
invitation from Iraq to remain after December 31 and adequate
legal protection for its forces. Smith added that the GOA
needed some action by December 20-21 at the latest. Without
an invitation, the GOA would likely have no alternative but
to withdraw its forces by December 31. END SUMMARY
2. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Stephen Smith called in the
Ambassador on December 12. He said he had just come from a
meeting of the National Security Committee and he needed to
discuss Australia's lack of a status of forces agreement
(SOFA) with Iraq. He said he and the Prime Minister did not
appreciate being demarched by its closest ally, particularly
on a subject matter where the GOA had been asked by the US to
defer interaction with the GOI. He and PM Rudd also objected
to a deadline by the U.S to respond to the demarche. The GOA
needed help, Smith declared. They had kept their forces and
imbeds in Iraq all year because they understood their
importance to the US and now they were facing a situation
where they would have no invitation from the host country to
remain and no legal protection if they remained. If there
was no invitation from the Government of Iraq to remain,
Australia would likely have to remove its troops by January
1, the Foreign Minister stated. Australia needed two things,
he continued, an invitation from the Iraq Government to stay,
and adequate legal protection. In addition, Smith said, the
GOA needed help in the next few days not the next few weeks.
3. (S/NF) Smith said the GOA currently had a team in Iraq
discussing with the Iraqis a small piece of legislation
backed up by a letter from the Iraq Government. He stated
that he was very skeptical, however, that anything could be
accomplished by the end of the year. The Ambassador then
asked what the GOA would do if either an invitation to remain
or some legal protection is not obtained from the GOI, to
which Smith replied that the GOA would "cross that bridge
when we came to it."
4. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said the GOA did not want to
withdraw its forces from Iraq but it needed an invitation
to stay from the Government of Iraq and adequate legal
protection, and it needed immediate U.S. assistance to obtain
both. He said the GOA's deadline for some action by the GOI
was December 20-21 and Australian forces would likely have to
withdraw from Iraq if no formal invitation was received from
the Government by December 31,
5. (S/NF) COMMENT: The Foreign Minister's tone during this
brief meeting was cordial but sharp. The unmistakable
Qbrief meeting was cordial but sharp. The unmistakable
message from him, and the Prime Minister, was that Australia
had done what the U.S. had asked it to do and now it was
stuck. Since the U.S. had put Australia there, Australia
expected the U.S. to help it find a solution. The demarche
to which the Foreign Minister referred is ref A, dated
December 4, which asked Post to encourage the GOA to accept
an exchange of notes or letters as a SOFA in lieu of the
agreement the GOA was currently insisting on, since an
agreement would need ratification by the Iraqi Council of
Representatives. Ref B, sent December 11, is the current
thinking from the Australian Department of Defence about how
their forces could remain in the region in the absence of a
SOFA.
MCCALLUM