Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CANBERRA1157
2008-11-14 07:03:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

2008 ANNUAL INR-ONA INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

Tags:  PINR PREL AS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBY #1157/01 3190703
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 140703Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0522
S E C R E T CANBERRA 001157 

SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR AND EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: PINR PREL AS
SUBJECT: 2008 ANNUAL INR-ONA INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole for reasons 1.4(a),(b
),(c) and (d)

S E C R E T CANBERRA 001157

SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR AND EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: PINR PREL AS
SUBJECT: 2008 ANNUAL INR-ONA INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole for reasons 1.4(a),(b
),(c) and (d)


1. (S//NF) Summary: The 2008 intelligence exchange between
the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) and the Australian Office of National Assessments (ONA)
was held in Canberra, Australia on Tuesday, 14 October 2008.
The ONA-hosted event covered a wide range of countries and
themes, including Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan, the
Koreas, China, Russia, Indonesia and the Philippines. A/S
Randall Fort led the INR delegation, with INR analysts
providing opening remarks in the discussions of Iran and
Russia and responding to ONA presentations on South and
Northeast Asia.

--------------
Courtesy Call with D/DIO
--------------


2. (S//NF) A/S Fort and POLOF on Monday, 13 October, met
with Major General Maurie McNarn, Director of the Australian
Defence Intelligence Organization (DIO) and his deputy, Mr.
Michael Shoebridge at DIO HQ. The group discussed the
capabilities of Japanese intelligence service interlocutors,
comparing views based on the INR delegation's recent exchange
in Tokyo and those of DIO seniors' and analysts'
similar interactions. McNarn agreed that there were signs of
progress within the senior levels of the Japanese IC
regarding trilateral US-AUS-JPN efforts against countries of
mutual concern-particularly within the defense intelligence
establishment against such themes as North Korean WMD and
China's naval capabilities-but noted that incompatible
security standards continued to be a major hindrance
precluding more robust collaboration. McNarn and Shoebridge
were particularly interested in A/S Fort's comments on INR's
role in leading US Intelligence Community efforts within the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI),
noting that the Australian intelligence community was "hard
pressed" to understand the full extent of the threat, let
alone serve in a position to lead the coordination of any
interagency mitigation efforts. McNarn said the Defense
Signals Directorate (DSD) had "the lead" for Australia in
tackling the issue but was more focused on traditional
intelligence collection/counterintelligence themes, and that

Australian intelligence would need to stay engaged with its
US counterparts to share lessons learned in the cyber arena.

--------------
Courtesy Call with DG/ONA
--------------


3. (S//NF) A/S Fort and POLOF on Tuesday, 14 October, met
with Peter Varghese, Director General of the Australian
Office of National Assessments, in his office prior to the
kickoff of the formal intelligence exchange at ONA
headquarters. Varghese made comments similar to those of
D/DIO regarding the strengths, weaknesses, and personalities
of ONA's Japanese intelligence counterparts. The
conversation segued into a discussion of the evolving role of
all-source analysis in an environment where senior government
officials and other customers had much greater access to
information electronically and were increasingly focused on
informing, analyzing, and shaping policy options.
Varghese asserted that this created an important challenge
for ONA and other intelligence services, with relevance in
the information age-where "once-secret information was
increasingly available through open sources"- determined by
the speed and efficiency by which analysts can sift through
the volume to highlight "what is important" and put it into
context for decision makers.

--------------
Global Overview
--------------


4. (S//NF) The official intelligence exchange began with
Q4. (S//NF) The official intelligence exchange began with
each head of delegation providing general introductions of
their respective participants and short opening remarks,
followed by a "Global Overview" presentation by DG/ONA of
Australia's perspective of its security situation and the
role of intelligence in informing Australian policymakers in
the coming years.


5. (S//NF) Varghese said that ONA was outlining to its
customers in the Australian policymaking community a world
out to 2030 in which the strategic and economic "Balance of
power" was shifting, with the US remaining the preeminent
global entity, but facing increasing challenges, especially
from emerging or reemerging states like China, Russia, and
India. Varghese described the rise of China as the most
notable development over the last decade, with an economy on
track to become the world's largest by 2020, a rapidly
modernizing military that could pose a direct challenge to
the US within the region, and an increasingly assertive
foreign policy. Varghese described India as "moving from a
rhetorical to an interest-based approach" in its
international relations-noting that many countries looked to
Delhi as the "best option" to serve as a counterweight to
Beijing-but cautioned that India's internal social,
political, and economic divisions were the greatest
impediments to achieving this strategic potential. Varghese
said that ONA viewed the US-Japan-China triangular
relationship as paramount to the security of Northeast Asia,
both in regard to China's rise and the dangers posed by North
Korea. Varghese described ONA's "line" on Southeast Asia as
"generally doing better than many had expected, but with
danger signs in Thailand." In the Middle East, Iran clearly
represented the greatest challenge to regional stability-and
ONA was focusing most of its attention on Tehran because of
it. Varghese asserted that worldwide "Nonproliferation is
under stress," citing North Korea, Iran, and Syria as the
most recent examples, but terrorism was "a good news story
that is getting better, with the violent Islamist threat
receding." He concluded with his views on the changing role
of international institutions, predicting that as "bilateral
approaches reach their limits and multilateralism shows
itself unworkable, new institutions that reflect a
'plurilateral' approach will emerge."


6. (S//NF) When pressed on ONA's assessment of terrorism in
the Asia-Pacific region, Varghese answered that the growth of
Islamic extremism-based movements is constrained, thanks in
part to ongoing successes in combined counterterrorism
efforts, but more because of societal factors in Southeast
Asia that reject the middle-eastern Jihadist model. Varghese
and his analysts assessed that Indonesia Islam was "returning
to its main course following a detour" driven by personal
linkages to the Global Jihad that were formed in Afghanistan
in the 1980s. ONA assessed that al-Qa'ida ultimately has
failed to achieve the strategic leadership role it sought
within the Islamic world.

--------------
Iran
--------------


7. (S//NF) ONA analysts thanked the INR Iran analyst for his
opening comments, which they described as "unconventional,"
"provocative," and "worthy of further discussion."


8. (S//NF) ONA analysts assessed that Tehran "knows" about
its lack of certain capabilities, but plays "beyond its hand"
very skillfully. ONA analysts commented that Iran's Persian
culture was a key factor in understanding its strategic
behavior, commenting that a "mixture of hubris and paranoia"
pervades Iranian attitudes that in turn shape Tehran's threat
perceptions and policies. ONA judged that Iran's activities
in Iraq - both overt and covert-represented an extreme
manifestation of Iranian strategic calculus, designed to
"outflank" the US in the region. ONA asserted that-twenty
years of hostility and associated rhetoric aside-regime
attitudes "have fairly shallow roots," and the most effective
means by which Tehran could ensure its national security
would be a strategic relationship with the US via some "grand
bargain." ONA viewed Tehran's nuclear program within the
paradigm of "the laws of deterrence,"
noting that Iran's ability to produce a weapon may be
"enough" to meet its security objectives. Nevertheless,
Q"enough" to meet its security objectives. Nevertheless,
Australian intelligence viewed Tehran's pursuit of full
self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle, long-standing
covert weapons program, and continued work on delivery
systems as strong indicators that Tehran's preferred end
state included a nuclear arsenal. According to ONA, they are
not alone in this assessment, asserting "while China and
Russia remain opposed to it, they view Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons as inevitable." Varghese concluded the
discussion, commenting ONA is telling its customers "It's a
mistake to think of Iran as a 'Rogue State'."


9. (S//NF) ONA seniors and analysts were particularly
interested in A/S Fort and INR's assessments on Israeli "red
lines" on Iran's nuclear program and the likelihood of an
Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

--------------
Pakistan-Afghanistan
--------------

10. (S//NF) ONA analysts led the discussion of Afghanistan
and Pakistan, asserting that Afghan President Karzai's
description of the two countries as "conjoined twins" may be
accurate in the fact that "illness in one body affects the
other," but his tendency to blame Pakistan for all of
Afghanistan's problems ignores reality. ONA assesses that
the Taliban is not only resilient-but gaining momentum-and
"the insurgents think they are winning." ONA analysts
emphasized intelligence trends in cross-border activities,
safehavens, and divisions within Pakistani security services
that highlight their growing concerns about Pakistan, saying
that while it is unlikely to fail, it is becoming more
fractured and in danger of breakdowns in central control
where the security of Islamabad's nuclear weapons could come
under threat. According to ONA, Pakistan's economic downturn
threatens its ability to focus on counterterrorism, mass
unrest, and territorial governance. On a positive note, ONA
assessed that "opportunities exist at the tribal level, where
the state is unwilling or unable to achieve and/or sustain
presence" to engage on common security concerns-noting that
while Pakistan's tribal areas were not directly comparable to
those in Iraq, some "lessons learned" could be
applied in winning the support of the local populace. ONA
concluded its presentation by posing an open question of the
degree to which the Taliban will have some role in
Afghanistan's future, given Karzai's outreach under the
rubric of "reconciliation."


11. (S//NF) Varghese commented that in personal meetings and
intelligence exchanges with ONA and other Australian
services, Pakistani General Kayani continually comes across
as ambivalent on the issues of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency, reiterating that India remains the core
mission-and priority-of the Pakistan defense and intelligence
establishment. ONA assesses that Pakistan's military and
security elite view this as "an American war,"
which combined with a very hard sense of anti-Americanism
combines into "a very dangerous cocktail."

--------------
Northeast Asia
--------------


12. (S//NF) ONA analysts led the discussion of Northeast
Asia during a working lunch, providing a regional overview
that included China, Japan, Taiwan, the Koreas, Russia, and
India. ONA assessed that China, clearly rising to be the
region's preeminent power, was focused on a perception
management campaign to contain any notions of a "China
threat," while Japan was "divided internally" on such basic
issues as defining "its own place" in Asia and the modern
world-despite its push for a seat on the UN Security Council.
ONA viewed the management of the US-Japan alliance as the
single most important factor shaping the security of
Northeast Asia, whether to balance China, prevent a conflict
on the Taiwan Strait, or deter North Korea. ONA viewed the
Taiwan Strait situation as "cooling," but stated that the
long-term trajectory was negative-especially as Chinese
military capabilities grow rapidly in parallel with unmet
expectations for a KMT-led government in Taipei "to deliver"
on improved ties to the mainland.


13. (S//NF) ONA highlighted India as the strategic
power-once firmly ensconced in the non-aligned movement-being
courted by the US and its allies to balance China's rise, but
noted India's social system and economic disparities posed
unaddressed sources of internal instability that ultimately
undermined its near-term effectiveness and long-term
potential. ONA assessed that Japan would continue to push
Qpotential. ONA assessed that Japan would continue to push
for increased engagement and investment in India, but
asserted that Japanese cultural chauvanism continued to be an
underlying issue that hindered improved economic and security
ties with India. ONA argued that China's ability to acquire
"strategic depth" was limited by geography, and that
this-combined with an export driven economy that demanded
access to international energy, resources, and trade
networks-constrained its ability to exert an uncontested
sphere of influence akin to the US or Soviet Union during the
Cold War.

--------------
Russia
--------------


14. (S//NF) ONA analysts concurred with INR analysts'
comments on Russia, describing Russia as both "A rising power
and a declining state," with a resurgent determination to
leverage military force to protect its interests even as
demographic trends indicated a diminishing population base
from which to support a large-scale military buildup. ONA
asserted that demographics were "starting to bite this year,"
especially in labor sources, and posited that the negative
trends in Russia's long-term sustainability were exacerbated
by its over-reliance on energy exports for revenues and
compounded by increasing economic interdependence with the
west. ONA acknowledged that much of its
analysis of Russian intent was linked to its focus on the
accumulation of power of the former President and the
"securicrats," commenting that ONA had "gotten to know Putin
very well over the last few years" and that he "set the tone"
for Russia's actions at home and abroad.


15. (S//NF) ONA described the Baltic states and Ukraine as
"countries that are in Russia's sights," with the dangerous
similarities in Moscow's view of the ethnically Russian
population and strategic geography of Crimea to those which
motivated its recent actions against Georgia.

--------------
Southeast Asia
--------------


16. (S//NF) ONA analysts described their outlook for
Southeast Asia as "fairly benign," as the region was
generally stable and its states were unlikely to come in to
conflict with one another in the near term. ONA flagged
Thailand's
ongoing political crisis as the most troublesome development,
observing that current events were driving the country to a
boiling point and that it would "will have to make a choice"
between democracy-warts and all-and a coup culture
reliant upon the of an increasingly fragile monarchy for
unity and legitimacy. ONA assessed that the PAD's
objectives-to force the government from power via the
military and monarchy-are grounded in a widely-shared view
that
democratically elected officials cannot resist corruption
within the current system, suggesting a cycle of dysfunction
with no signs of improvement short of royal intervention or
revolutionary change. The political climate in Bangkok
was a major distraction for Thailand's military and elites,
which bodes poorly for the prospects of containing and
defeating the southern insurgency, which was increasingly
demonstrating a sophisticated cell structure and lethal,
well-coordinated terror tactics.


17. (S//NF) Turning briefly to Malaysia, the Australians
said that Singapore's intelligence services and Lee Kuan Yew
have told ONA in their exchanges that opposition leader Anwar
"did indeed commit the acts for which he is currently
indicted," citing unshared technical intelligence. ONA
assessed, and their Singapore counterparts concurred, "it was
a set up job-and he probably knew that, but walked into it
anyway."


18. (S//NF) ONA analysts assess "the tide has turned" on
Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, noting that its leadership has
been devastated-with most seniors killed, captured, or on the
run-and that it has lost its local support networks
and funding. ONA judged JI was shifting near term goals to
its local, vice global/anti-western, interests while
otherwise "creeping back to the shadows" and focusing on
survival. JI would endure and regenerate over the long term,
albeit as a more localized terrorist threat. ONA and the
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) of the Australian
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) agreed that the
impending execution of the Bali bombers probably would
not precipitate retaliatory terrorist attacks against Western
interests, but small scale operations within and against
Indonesian government and security were more likely.


19. (S//NF) ONA asserted that the success of CT efforts in
Q19. (S//NF) ONA asserted that the success of CT efforts in
Indonesia were a "study in contrast" to the ongoing downward
slide in the Philippines, where the collapse of the peace
process in the South threatened to make this area "the new
regional incubator of terrorist Jihadis." ONA terrorism
specialists noted signals and human intelligence that JI
"structuralists" embedded with the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were rethinking plans to return to Indonesia,
while JI "freelancers" were becoming more active and better
linked with Abu Sayyaf Group operatives. ONA judged that the
Southern Philippines increasingly contained "all the
ingredients of al Qa'ida's favored tilling ground."

--------------
Dinner
--------------

20. (C//NF) ONA hosted an official dinner at the Ottoman
Restaurant for A/S Fort and his team of INR analysts. Peter
Varghese used the dinner as a chance to prompt further
discussions on several themes from the exchange, including
the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran and the long-term
impact of Russia's recent military action against Georgia.




21. (C//NF) ONA Attendees/Interlocutors:

Peter Varghese DG/ONA
Brendon Hammer DDG/ONA
Heather Smith DDG/ONA
John Besemeres ADG, Americas and Europe Branch
Harry Genn ADG, North and South Asia Branch
Peter McDonald ADG, Oceana Branch
Russ Swinnerton Acting ADG, Southeast Asia Branch
Ian Parmeter ADG, Middle East and Africa Branch
Ashton Robinson ADG, Transnational Issues Branch
Carolyn Patteson ADG, Executive and Foreign Intelligence
Coordination Branch
Aldo Borgu Senior Analyst, Strategic Issue Branch
Neil Hawkins Senior Analyst, Middle East and Africa Branch
Jacinta Sanders Senior Analyst, Middle East and Africa Branch
Derek Lundy Senior Analyst, Strategic Analysis Branch
Bruce Luckham Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch
Graehame Carroll Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch
Mike Hillman Consultant, North and South Asia Branch
Julia Dixon Senior Analyst, Transnational Issue Branch
Bruce Luckham Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch
John Phipps Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch
Bill Wise Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch
Roger Hodgkins Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch
Luke Yeaman Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch
Kyle Wilson Senior Analyst, Americas and Europe Branch
David Wall Senior Analyst, Americas and Europe Branch
Susan Creighton Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch
Christopher Collier Senior Analyst, Southeast Asia Branch
Marcus Lumb Senior Analyst, Southeast Asia Branch
Simone Alesich Senior Analyst, Southeast Asia Branch
Kevin Smith Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch

MCCALLUM