AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE TEAM TO VISIT U.S. RE IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000103

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, L/PM, PM, NEA/I AND EAP
SECDEF ALSO FOR OGC AND OSD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL KTIA AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE TEAM TO VISIT U.S. RE IRAQ
DEPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENT

REF: CANBERRA 52

Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole for reasons 1.4 (b),(d
).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) David Hallett, Director for Iraq, International Policy
Division, Australian Department of Defense, outlined GOA
thinking about the nature of arrangements Australia will need
to govern deployment of Australian Defence Force (ADF)
personnel and civilian contractors in Iraq when the current
resolution lapses. Hallett plans to lead a small team to
Washington, D.C., February 12-13 to consult on this issue
with DOD, State, NSC and other agencies. He also commented on
some assistance options currently under consideration by the
Australian Cabinet and clarified status of some training
elements in Iraq. End summary.

GOA DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
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2. (C) According to Hallett, Australia needs a treaty-level
agreement for its forces in Iraq, i.e., one requiring
consideration by the the GOA Parliamentary Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties and approval by the National Security
Committee of Cabinet. The arrangement must be legally
enforceable, not only on Australia but also on Iraq. For
that reason, he said, Australia wants to see protections
enshrined in Iraqi law. He added Australia is concerned
about the length of time it takes for the Iraqi Parliament to
pass legislation. Hallett suggested that more limited
arrangements that Australia has used in the past, including
MOUs, MOAs and exchanges of letters, might not suffice for
Iraq, noting that historically Australia has negotiated
bilateral SOFAs. ADF forces must have immunity from criminal
and civil jurisdiction, with Australia retaining exclusive
right to waive immunity.


3. (C) Hallet said he hoped the current UNSC resolution would
be maintained through the end of 2008, following the mid-year
review. To cover ongoing military operations in Iraq,
Australia requires a Chapter 7 UNSC mandate; Chapter 6 will
not suffice. Any arrangement with Iraq will require privity,
permitting Australia to enforce provisions directly with
Iraq, rather than go through the United States or other third
party. Any arrangement must be flexible enough to
accommodate changes in mission of Australian forces.


4. (C) Hallett said he wished to explore in depth with his
U.S. counterparts what kind of arrangement the U.S. is
contemplating in Iraq for its forces and other Coalition
forces. Part of the discussion would focus on the reaction
of Iraq and other coalition partners, and on the timelines
for the various options under consideration, as well as U.S.
Congressional considerations.

NEW DETAINEE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
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5. (C) The Australian team also wanted to discuss a new
detainee management agreement with U.S. officials, noting the
UK, which had pulled out the U.S.-UK-Australia MOU on this
subject, was close to finalizing a new agreement with the
U.S. The GOA was "not comfortable" with assurances under the
current MOU, he said, acknowledging that Australia had not
handed over any detainees in the past 18 months.

ASSISTANCE OPTIONS
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6. (C) Elaborating on Australia's future direction in Iraq,
Q6. (C) Elaborating on Australia's future direction in Iraq,
Hallett said the Cabinet was reviewing a range of options,
including additional humanitarian assistance and training of
security forces. Options included training in countries
adjacent to Iraq or bringing Iraqi security personnel to
Australia for training. One option under consideration, for
example, involves training in Australia by Australian Federal
Police in areas such as rule of law. Australia had been
advised earlier by the United States that security training
of Iraqis outside Iraq "did not work well," Hallett
commented, adding that training in Australia would have other
problems, including poor English language skills of trainees
(coupled with a lack of adequate interpreters) and the

CANBERRA 00000103 002 OF 002


reluctance of the GOI to release military officers, because
of operational needs and concern they might not return to
Iraq.

STATUS OF TRAINERS IN IRAQ
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7. (C) On the status of ADF trainers in Iraq, Hallett
clarified that one group of Army trainers at Camp Taji in
Baghdad had redeployed to Australia when their six-month
rotation ended in December 2007. Other trainers attached to
the Overwatch Battle Group in the southern province of Dhi
Qar, which was scheduled to be redeployed in mid-2008, will
return to Australia at that time. Neither group would be
replaced, Hallett noted, suggesting that no new in-country
security-related training is currently contemplated.


8. (C) In addition to Hallett, the team will include
Commander Scott Ritchie, legal adviser; Mark Pierce,
Political Minister-Counsellor, Australian Embassy,
Washington; and Peter Roggero, Political Counsellor,
Australian Embassy, Washington.

MCCALLUM