2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART II

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001026

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NEA, SCA AND EAP
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS
SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART II
(PERSIAN GULF (IRAN),NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT,
REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE, CHINA AND INDIA)

REF: CANBERRA 1025 (PART I)

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John W. Crowley. Reasons: 1.4
(b)(d)


1. (SBU) This is Part II of a three-part cable reporting on
the annual U.S.-Australia Political Military Talks held in
Canberra, Australia on October 9, 2008. This section covers
Persian Gulf security (Iran),Nonproliferation and
Disarmament, Regional Architecture, China and India. Part I
(reftel) covers Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as
providing a summary and list of participants. Part III
(septel) covers Southeast Asia, Trilateral Strategic
Dialogue, Pacific Islands, Defence White Paper, Enhanced
Defense Cooperation, and the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade
Cooperation Treaty.

PERSIAN GULF SECURITY
--------------

2. (S/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt introduced a discussion of Iran's
role and intentions in the region, including the threat posed
by Iran's continuing nuclear activities, U.S. efforts to
promote stability and prevent proliferation in the region,
and the prospect and consequences of possible pre-emptive
action by Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities.


3. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie agreed with the U.S.
assessment that Iran sought to assert hegemony over the
region, and reiterated the GOA belief that Iran had made a
strategic decision to acquire a breakout nuclear capability.
Referring to estimates that Iran could have a nuclear
capability by 2010, he pointed out that that was only 18
months away. Iran had calculated that the international
community would react only weakly to its nuclear activities,
and had decided it could weather imposition of sanctions,
which were having only minimal effect in any case. Ritchie
said Australia planned to receive two Iranian officials soon:
Iran's ambassador in Vienna planned to visit Australia to try
to convince the GOA that Iran's nuclear activities posed no
threat, and the mayor of Tehran, a presidential candidate,
also planned to visit. Australia acknowledged the arguments
against meeting with Iranians, but believed that Iran would
not get much from such meetings, which would be at junior
levels in the GOA, and it kept international resolve on Iran
firm by demonstrating the West's willingness to talk.

ADDITIONAL AUSTRALIAN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
--------------

4. (S/REL AUS) Deborah Stokes told A/S Kimmitt Australia
planned to implement additional sanctions against Iran that
Qplanned to implement additional sanctions against Iran that
went beyond current UN Security Council resolutions. The new
sanctions, which would be announced by Foreign Minister Smith
in Parliament during the week of October 13, included
adopting EU sanctions against 20 entities, as well as adding
Bank Saderat to the list of sanctioned entities. Australia
planned to encourage Japan and others to take similar steps,
she said. The announcement may dissuade Tehran's mayor from
proceeding with his trip, she added.

NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
--------------

5. (C/REL AUS David Ritchie briefed on Prime Minister Rudd's
initiative in establishing the International Commission on
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND),which

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plans to hold its first meeting in Sydney October 19-21. The
Commission, also known as the Evans Commission after co-chair
Gareth Evans, originally had been established to influence
the outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Review Conference (RevCon),but Evans now wanted to extend
the mandate past the NPT RevCon to address proliferation more
broadly, including threats posed by states that had or were
seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities, including India,
Pakistan, Israel, Syria, Burma, Iran and DPRK. The
Commission also wanted to engage more countries in
subscribing to arms and export control regimes, and to
address new civil/nuclear arrangements. At its initial
meeting, Evans hoped to achieve consensus on an extended
mandate and on a program of work. Ritchie stressed the
Commission was independent from the GOA so Evans was
conducting his own consultations in capitals. Evans
understood the strategic realities involved regarding
disarmament, he added. Turning to the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI),Ritchie praised the U.S. initiative and
reaffirmed Australia's continued strong support for PSI,
expressing hope Indonesia could be brought on board.


6. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt thanked the GOA for having hosted
productive nonproliferation discussions with INS Acting
Assistant Secretary McNerney in June. He registered U.S.
support for ICNND's objectives, underscoring the importance
for the Commission to strike the right balance between
nonproliferation and disarmament.

ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY

REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE
--------------

7. (C/REL AUS) Hugh Borrowman, First Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet, outlined the background to PM Rudd's vision for an
Asian-Pacific Community (APC) by 2020. There was as yet no
concrete plan or proposal, he said, rather the concept was
intended to promote discussion about where the region wanted
to be, and how to fashion a framework that included all major
players and could address the range of economic, political
and security issues. The GOA had so far engaged Wellington,
Jakarta, Singapore, Seoul and Tokyo on APC. Borrowman
characterized the reactions as generally "curious but
cautious," with the exception of Singapore, which had reacted
negatively. Key to PM Rudd's long-term thinking on the APC
was how to engage China across all fronts. Rudd was
Qwas how to engage China across all fronts. Rudd was
contemplating how to promote his APC vision at the 2009 APEC,
and planned to raise the issue in visits to both Beijing and
Washington, possibly in February 2009.

CHINA
--------------

8. (C/REL AUS) Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary for
North Asia, provided a political outlook for China. The
elite, led by Hu Jintao, likely would retain control until
2012, when Hu would turn over the reins to one of his
hand-picked successors. While China might look impressive
externally, its internal politics were characterized by
nervousness, paranoia and uncertainty. Nonetheless there
were no major challenges to the ruling elite in the near
term. Fletcher said the chances of China either falling
apart or improving/reforming dramatically were very small,
forecasting little change in the political settings over the

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next two decades.


9. (C/REL AUS) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East
Asia David Sedney responded that the U.S. analysis tracked
closely with Australia's. He noted that the Chinese
leadership was absorbed with domestic stability, and, while
China had achieved success in achieving economic and
political stability, there were cracks in the facade. China
appeared to be relatively insulated from the current global
financial crisis, he noted. DASD Sedney offered a personal
view that, after following China closely for ten years, he
leaned more toward the evolutionary model. In response to
Ritchie's question about how to harness Chinese support in
the international community, Sedney said part of the key to
China's influence was that they did not try to exercise it,
citing China's investment in Pakistan as an example.
Fletcher interjected that China did not agree with the
premise that it should be helping us. On China-Taiwan
rivalry in the South Pacific, DASD Sedney said there had been
a diplomatic truce following the election of Ma Ying-jeou.
Ritchie responded Australia had observed a change in rhetoric
but not in behavior. The GOA had delivered robust demarches
to Taiwan about bribing Pacific Island state leaders, with
some success; China was not as involved in corruption in the
Pacific.

INDIA
--------------

10. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt described U.S. military
engagement with India, including the fighter aircraft
competition. He told the Australians that difficulties with
end-use monitoring of U.S. defense equipment and technology
sold to India could hamper progress in interoperability.
Col. Jeffrey Arruda, Chief, South Asia/Oceania Policy
Division, PACOM, noted that, despite India's participation in
the Malabar 2007 exercise, India preferred bilateral
engagement and resisted efforts to engage in multilateral
exercises. DASD Sedney remarked that China loomed large in
India's world view, but India was largely absent in China's.
Deputy Secretary Merchant noted that Australia currently had
a modest military program with India, including exercises and
training, but sought to expand the scope of the relationship.


11. (U) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message.

MCCALLUM