2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART I

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 001025

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NEA, SCA AND EAP
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS
SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART I
(SUMMARY, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, PARTICIPANTS)

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John W. Crowley. Reasons: 1.4
(b)(d).


1. (SBU) This is Part I of a three-part cable reporting on
the annual U.S.-Australia Political-Military Talks held in
Canberra, Australia on October 9, 2008. Part I covers Iraq,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as providing a summary and
list of participants. Part II (septel) covers Persian Gulf
Security (Iran),Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Regional
Architecture, China and India. Part III (septel) covers
Southeast Asia, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Pacific
Islands, Defence White Paper, Enhanced Defense Cooperation,
and the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty.

SUMMARY
--------------

2. (S/REL AUS) PM A/S Kimmitt led a joint State-DoD
delegation to the annual U.S. Australia Political-Military
Talks in Canberra October 9, 2008. The Australians
registered concern at the rapidly diminishing timeline in
which to meet requirements for their forces to remain in Iraq
beyond 2008, and sought a green light from the United States
to begin bilateral SOFA negotiations with the Iraqi
government. (PM Maliki plans to visit Australia on October
23.) On Afghanistan, the GOA reiterated its pledge to
maintain current force levels for the indefinite future,
despite declining public support, and reconfirmed plans to
deploy an OMLT to Uruzgan before the end of the year.
Foreign Minister Smith is preparing to announce additional
sanctions on Iran that go beyond UNSC resolutions, including
adopting EU sanctions and adding Bank Saderat to sanctioned
entities, and will encourage Japan and others to do likewise.
The GOA briefed on the status of the Defence White Paper,
disclosing its conclusion that it would purchase the Joint
Strike Fighter and acquire 6-12 additional submarines. In a
discussion on regional architecture, the Australian mentioned
that PM Rudd may seek to visit Washington in early 2009,
perhaps in February. A full list of participants is provided
at para 13 below.
END SUMMARY.

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
--------------

3. (C/REL AUS) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt and Deputy
Secretary Ritchie exchanged closely congruent global
perspectives, with cautious assessments of developments and
prospects in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and the Middle East. Ritchie said Australia was
focused on developments in its own neighborhood - it was
watching nervously what effects the global financial crisis
might have on China, its largest trading partner, for example
Qmight have on China, its largest trading partner, for example
- but broadly supported Western interests around the world,
such as in Zimbabwe and the Russia-Georgia conflict, and
looked to do more to further those interests, particularly
vis-a-vis Pakistan and Iran. Ritchie enumerated the
challenges facing Australia in its "troubled neighborhood,"
including an increase in illegal immigration from Indonesia,
where Yudhoyono was facing elections; continuing political
instability in Thailand; the "basket case" of the
Philippines; the continuing "burden" of providing security
and development assistance to East Timor; problems o
f bad governance in many of the Pacific Island states; and
illegal fishing and whaling.


4. (C/REL AUS) Ritchie reaffirmed that Australia's alliance

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with the United States remained the bedrock of its foreign
and security policy, ahead of the other two pillars of its
foreign policy: greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific region
and increased involvement in multilateral organizations. He
said the Prime Minister would soon deliver Australia's first
National Security Statement, in advance of an inaugural
National Security Strategy, that would help inform the GOA's
Defence White Paper. Ritchie added Foreign Minister Smith
would issue Australia's first Foreign Policy Annual Statement
later in the year also.


5. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt noted to the Australians that a
new U.S. Administration might be preoccupied initially with
problems in the Middle East, South Asia, Russia and South
America, but that should not be read as a diminution of
America's interest in the Asia-Pacific region. He reiterated
U.S. gratitude for Australia's strong support in addressing
global challenges and acting as an anchor in the region.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

IRAQ
--------------

6. (S/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt briefed on efforts to assist Iraq
in modernizing its security forces, on progress in
negotiating a status of forces agreement (SOFA),including
options in the event a SOFA was not agreed by the end of the
year, and U.S. thinking on overall numbers of U.S. troops
required for Iraq.


7. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie said the GOA was in
the process of preparing points on Australia's role in Iraq
to present to Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki, who planned to
visit Australia on October 23. Ritchie expressed hope that
the U.S. could reach an agreement on a SOFA as quickly as
possible, cautioning that Australia was running out of time
to put in place requirements to continue its presence in Iraq
after 2008. At a minimum, Australia needed to have a legal
basis to stay on, he said, stressing that the U.S. negotiated
outcome needed to be embedded in Iraqi law. Australia hoped
to piggy-back on the U.S. agreement, once it had reviewed the
text. Without proper legal protection, however, Australian
forces in Iraq, including the security detachment guarding
the Australian Embassy, would simply stop all activities
after December 31. This may force the closure of the
Australian Embassy, he added, although the GOA was exploring
the possibility of according diplomatic accreditation to the
security detach
ment personnel to avoid this outcome.


8. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary of Defence Stephen Merchant
interjected that Australia had refrained so far from
Qinterjected that Australia had refrained so far from
initiating separate bilateral negotiations on a SOFA with
Iraq, partly to avoid introducing complications into the U.S.
negotiations but also because Australia believed it would be
unable to negotiate more comprehensive protections than could
the U.S. He urged that the United States give Australia the
green light to begin initiating its own agreement with Iraq,
if the U.S. believed the time was right. A/S Kimmitt took
the request on board.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------

9. (C/REL AUS) Ritchie said the Australian Cabinet had taken
up the issue of Australia's role in Afghanistan following

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withdrawal of the Dutch in 2010. Australia remained strongly
committed to Afghanistan, he said, and the GOA expected to
maintain its current level of forces there, concentrated on
Uruzgan Province, for the indefinite future. Prime Minister
Rudd was focused on successful outcomes, however,
specifically, how to measure progress in Afghanistan, and,
equally important, how to convince the Australian public,
whose support for Australia's military involvement in
Afghanistan had recently fallen below 50 percent for the
first time, to continue to support the effort. Regardless,
he reiterated, Australia was committed to Afghanistan
post-2010 for "a very long time." The Cabinet was
considering options, including requirements for maintaining
its aid program that may depend on availability of U.S.
enablers. Ritchie thanked the United States for providing
accommodations for Australia's diplomatic personnel i
n Kabul following the bombing of the Serena Hotel.
Construction of a temporary embassy co-located with the Dutch
had encountered delays, he said, but the Australian
government was looking for a new site on which to establish a
permanent mission, evidence of its long-term commitment to
Afghanistan. Ritchie drew attention to a recent Australian
press item that erroneously suggested Defence Minister
Fitzgibbon had said the conflict in Afghanistan was not
winnable, clarifying that the Minister had actually echoed
the UK Defence Minister's comment that the conflict could not
be won by military means alone.


10. (C/REL AUS) Merchant reaffirmed Australia's plan to
deploy an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in
Afghanistan later in the year. With the emphasis shifting to
more training and mentoring, more enablers would be needed,
he said. He solicited U.S. views on the future of Regional
Command-South. Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary for
South and West Asia, the Middle East and Africa, observed the
Dutch had irritated Australia by insisting on a European
successor to preserve its legacy in Afghanistan after 2010.
Australia needed to have a say over what country it would
partner with after the Dutch departed, she asserted. The
Dutch government had publicly couched its military presence
in Afghanistan as a "reconstruction" mission and consequently
faced a domestic political backlash when its forces started
to take casualties, she commented.


11. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt briefed on the status of the U.S.
strategic review of Afghanistan, and on gains made in
Qstrategic review of Afghanistan, and on gains made in
increasing the size and capacity of the Afghan National Army.
He expressed U.S. gratitude for Australia's contribution in
Afghanistan, not only for the quality of its fighting force
but also for its reconstruction efforts.

PAKISTAN
--------------

12. (C/REL AUS) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt provided an
overview of financial and political threats to Pakistan's
stability, and the situation in the Federally-administered
tribal areas (FATA),voicing pessimism that the GOP had
grasped the seriousness of the threat from militant elements
within the country, despite the recent Marriott Hotel
bombing. The Pakistani military did not lack the capability,
but may lack the will to effectively confront the insurgents,
he observed.


13. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie echoed A/S Kimmitt's
assessment, predicting there could be a major crisis in

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Pakistan in one month or less. Australia wanted to step up
its aid to Pakistan, including providing counterinsurgency
training. Peter West, Assistant Secretary of Defence for the
Americas and North and South Asia, elaborated that the
Australian government had approached Pakistan's Directorate
for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on counterinsurgency
cooperation. ISI had drawn a sharp distinction between al
Qaeda, on the one hand, and the Taliban and its supporters,
on the other, insisting COIN could not be used against the
latter, as it would hurt development efforts in the FATA.
Responding to the current debate in the West about whether to
negotiate with moderate elements of the Taliban, Ritchie
expressed GOA skepticism that such a course would be
effective. The GOA believed in the utility of seeking to
induce Taliban defections but thought direct negotiations
were dangerous.

PARTICIPANTS
--------------

14. (U) Participants in the 2008 U.S.-Australia Pol-Mil Talks
included:

UNITED STATES
--A/S Mark T. Kimmitt, PM Bureau (Head of delegation)
--DASD David Sedney (East Asia)
--LTC Desmond Walton, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, OSD
--Col. J.K. Arruda, Chief, PACOM/J53
--LTC Rocky Carter, Joint Staff, J5, SE Asia
--Abraham Denmark, OSD
--David Michaels, Australia Country Director, OSD
--Tim Liston, Political-Military Officer, PM/RSAT
--Col. A.J. Britschgi, DATT, Embassy Canberra
--Aleisha Woodward, Country Desk Officer, EAP/ANP
--John Crowley, Acting POLCOUNS, Embassy Canberra (notetaker)

AUSTRALIA
--David J. Ritchie, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
--Steve Merchant, Deputy Secretary for Intelligence, Security
and International Policy, Australian Department of Defence
(ADOD)
--Jennifer Rawson, First Assistant Secretary, International
Security Division, DFAT
--Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary, South and West
Asia, Middle East and Africa Division, DFAT
--Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary, North Asia
Division, DFAT
--Chris de Cure, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Americas
Division, DFAT
--Richard Rowe, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Division,
DFAT
--Peter Woolcott, First Assistant Secretary, South-East Asia
Division, DFAT
--Hugh Borrowman, First Assistant Secretary, International
Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C)
--Miles Armitage, Assistant Secretary, Asia, Americas and
Trade Branch, International Division, PM&C
--John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Affairs and
Q--John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Affairs and
Intelligence Branch, DFAT
--Peter West, Assistant Secretary, Americas and North & South
Asia Branch, International Policy Division, ADOD
--Rodger Hodgkins, Strategic Analysis, Office of National
Assessments
--Beverly Mercer, U.S. Political and Strategic Section, DFAT
--Cameron Archer, Director Defense Policy and Liaison

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Section, DFAT (notetaker)
--Jonathan Gilbert, Executive Officer, Defense Policy and
Liaison Section, DFAT (Notetaker)


15. (U) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message.

MCCALLUM