S/I SATTERFIELD BRIEFS GOE ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 000995

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS IR IZ EG
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD BRIEFS GOE ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS

REF: A. AMMAN 1460

B. KUWAIT 512

C. RIYADH 767

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reason 1.4 (b).


1. (S) Summary: S/I Ambassador David Satterfield, the
Ambassador, and a team of Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I and
Washington experts briefed FM Aboul Gheit and EGIS Chief
Soliman May 11 on developments in Iraq, with a focus on Iraqi
PM Maliki's efforts to consolidate state authority and work
to reconcile with/integrate Sunnis into the GOI. S/I
Satterfield underscored the significance of Maliki's
confrontation with Iranian backed Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
Special Groups in Basrah and elsewhere as of strategic import
for both the U.S. and Egypt, Jordan and the GCC states, and
asked for support from the GOE through direct presence in and
engagement with the Iraqi government and political leadership
in Baghdad. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said Egypt would
not send an ambassador to Baghdad because of security
concerns, but said he would dispatch an assessment team. He
expressed interest in the possibility of the GOE training
Iraqi officers in Egypt, but voiced concern that Arab
countries would be aiding Iran by supporting Iraqi PM Maliki.
EGIS Chief Soliman emphasized Egypt's interest in a stable
Iraq, and noted that EGIS maintains a presence on the ground
in Iraq. He recognized recent political progress in Iraq,
providing an analysis strikingly similar to our own. End
summary.

--------------
The Significance of Basrah
--------------


2. (S) Ambassador Satterfield told his interlocutors that
developments in Iraq, notably progress on Sunni
outreach/reconciliation and GOI military action in Basrah,
were significant steps that the Arab neighbors need to
understand and support. He said that the Basrah campaign
demonstrated that PM Maliki is willing to confront
Iran-backed Shia extremists who challenge the authority of
the Iraqi state. Satterfield and his team underscored that
Maliki's intervention in Basrah had weakened and made more
vulnerable Iran's position both in southern Iraq and
throughout Iraq. Iran does not want to place the Iraqi
government or Shia street in a position where they must
choose between the U.S. and Iran, or indeed between the
Government of Iraq and the Government of Iran. But Iranian
overplaying of its hand in Iraq through backing of violent
groups no longer under any meaningful Iraqi control including
Muqtada al-Sadr was leading to just such choices. Iran
wanted to continue to deal with Iraq as it dealt with
Hizballah in Lebanon and radical Palestinians in Damascus;
preferring to advance its interests through violent factions
and surrogates rather than on a state-to-state basis.

--------------
Success of Sunni Awakening Movement
--------------


3. (S) Don Blome, Co-chair of the Force Strategic Engagement
Cell at Embassy Baghdad, briefed EGIS Chief Soliman on the
recent success of the Sunni Awakening Movements. He detailed
the growth from 4,000 to over 100,000 "Sons of Iraq," who are
now playing a pivotal role in stabilization efforts in Iraq.
The key to the success of the effort, he explained, has been
the buy-in of Maliki for the initiative and the gradual
integration of the "Sons" into the GOI's security forces and
overall security plan. A significant result in this program,
he stated, is a growing wedge between local participants --
some of whom had previous involvement in insurgencies -- and
their extremist leaders currently outside of Iraq. The
exploitation of this disconnect is resulting in the
marginalization of terror groups that were active in Iraq
until recently. The end result, he said, is progress towards
building nationalism among those potentially and previously
disenfranchised by the GOI. The local Awakening
participants, he said, are forming political parties and
planning to participate in the provincial elections expected
this fall. Blome suggested that Egypt could help marginalize
the external extremist leaders who travel around the region
looking for funding and political support. Blome also noted
that the GOE could help encourage talks between the GOI and
former Baath military officers on reintegrating the officers
into the Iraqi army.

--------------
Iran's Goals in Iraq
--------------

CAIRO 00000995 002 OF 003




4. (S) Jillian Burns, Iran Regional Presence Director in
Dubai, briefed EGIS Chief Soliman on Iran's current goals in
Iraq, saying that Iran fears a strong Sunni-led Iraq, as well
as anti-Iranian, Iraq-based Kurdish groups that could pose a
security challenge to Tehran. She noted that Iran is
battling U.S. forces in Iraq to try to influence the U.S. to
withdraw its presence from the country. She described Iran
as being currently off-balance in Iraq as it reacts to GOI
anger over its role in supporting extremist, anti-government
Shia elements. On the one hand, she said, Iran is one of the
GOI's strongest friends and maintains the second largest
diplomatic presence in Baghdad after the U.S., but the GOI is
becoming increasingly alienated by Iran's destabilizing
actions. The GOI has recently stepped up its indirect public
criticism of Iran, referring negatively to "criminal
elements" operating in the country, and publicly announcing a
fact-finding commission on Iranian weapons in Iraq. Burns
noted that the relationships between Iran and armed groups in
Iraq are only "marriages of convenience," and that the U.S.
is working diplomatically to change Iranian behavior in Iraq.

--------------
The Need for Arab Support
--------------


5. (S) Ambassador Satterfield and his team underscored to
both interlocutors the urgent need for Arab support of and
engagement with Iraq. PM Maliki and the GOI were acting with
greater cohesion and confidence as a "national" government,
although much more needed to be done to advance the rule of
law and the provision of essential services. Reconciliation
efforts, all but non-existent seven months ago, were now
moving forward. These steps needed to be nurtured and
sustained, but the progress was real. Satterfield emphasized
that what happens in Iraq with respect to Iranian ambitions
and power projection, and evolution toward Iraqi pluralistic
government with meaningful Sunni participation should matter
greatly to our friends and allies in the region. Satterfield
cautioned, the U.S. should not remain alone (with Iran) in
Baghdad. Satterfield said that increasing an Egyptian
presence on the ground in Iraq would enable the GOE to gain
more insight into the recent important developments in Iraq,
and would allow the GOE to influence Iraqi politics
positively. Ambassador Satterfield suggested to FM Aboul
Gheit that an Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting in June
at the Iraqi MFA in Baghdad, outside the International Zone,
would be an important symbolic demonstration that the Arab
states view Iraq as an integral part of the Arab world.

--------------
FM on GOE Presence in Iraq
--------------


6. (S) FM Aboul Gheit took on board Ambassador Satterfield's
suggestion regarding an Arab League Ministerial meeting in
Baghdad, but did not commit to attending. He told Ambassador
Satterfield that he would not send another ambassador to
Baghdad, although he will dispatch an assessment team to
Baghdad to view the situation. He noted that the Egyptian
ambassador in Baghdad was assassinated in 2005, and that
another ambassador would be a prominent target for
terrorists. The Minister said that he did not want to
establish an Egyptian diplomatic presence inside the
International Zone that would be a "prisoner" to terrorist
threats. FM Aboul Gheit lamented that Iraq had not responded
to GOE invitations to train Iraqi soldiers in Egypt, and
expressed interest in the possibility of providing strategic
training for Iraqi officers in Egypt.


7. (S) The Foreign Minister spoke negatively about Ayatollah
Sistani in the context of a theatrical angry blast at
variously: the U.S., as responsible for all current regional
crises; Shia and Sunni "turbans and beards" for their
Islamist challenge to secular societies; and the U.S. once
more for "squabbles" with the GOE that had diminished
Egypt,s ability to mobilize the Arab world to confront Syria
and Iran. He described Moqtada Al-Sadr as the only
"Pan-Arabist" among the Iraqi leaders, and questioned whether
Arab leaders would be helping Iran by aiding PM Maliki in an
attempt to "destroy" Al-Sadr. Ambassador Satterfield said
the U.S. was urging Maliki and the GOI to keep the door open
to political participation by the Sadrists. Aboul Gheit took
on board Satterfield's request for Egyptian Ministerial
representation at the May 29 Iraq Compact meeting in
Stockholm.


8. (S) In an MFA side meeting, Assistant Minister for Arab
Affairs Dr. Mohammed Zeyad asked Ambassador Satterfield and

CAIRO 00000995 003 OF 003


Ambassador Scobey for security coordination for the Egyptian
assessment team traveling to Baghdad. Satterfield advised
that MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy would appreciate advance
notice of the visit. The Assistant Minister also requested
U.S. assistance in reaching out to the GOI on economic
cooperation with Egypt. A/Minister Zeyad complained that PM
Maliki has not showed an interest in engaging with Arab
states. Satterfield encouraged Egypt to reach out to the
government and people of Iraq for the sake of Egyptian
interests. Satterfield told the Assistant Minister that the
Iraqi Executive Council was functioning more effectively, but
said the GOI had problems moving money and resources.
Satterfield noted PM Maliki's weakness in dealing with the
refugee problem, and described current U.S.-Iraqi
negotiations on a strategic framework/status of forces
agreement as progressing smoothly.

--------------
Soliman's Criticism of Maliki and Iran
--------------


9. (S) EGIS Chief Soliman said that he is closely following
developments in Iraq, and in an analysis that very closely
paralleled U.S. assessments (save for categorical dismissal
of ISCI leader Al-Hakim as "purely Iranian") noted
improvements, especially progress on sectarian
reconciliation. He said that EGIS maintains a presence on
the ground in Iraq, and has an officer in Suleimaniya who
regularly travels to Baghdad. EGIS officers travel to Iraq
and receive Iraqis in Cairo, he noted. He said that Egypt
maintains contacts with "many friends" in Iraq, and works
with Sunnis and moderate Shia. Soliman said that Egypt has a
strong interest in a stable Iraq, and, to that end, has
worked with Iraqi tribal elements on visits to Egypt, Jordan
and Saudi Arabia to foster reconciliation. He expressed his
disappointment, however, that Sunnis are still "excluded" in
Iraq, and criticized PM Maliki for not "being serious enough"
about sectarian reconciliation.


10. (S) Soliman outlined what he sees as important challenges
facing Iraq. He lamented that, in his view, Iraq has no
"real" capable, national intelligence service. Iraq needs a
non-sectarian, national intelligence service to function as
an effective state, he asserted. He said that PM Maliki
needs to do more to cleanse the army and police of militias,
as the Badr brigade and JAM are still present in these
institutions. He called for rebuilding infrastructure in
Iraq's provincial areas, and for increasing dialogue between
factions in these areas. Soliman said there is a need to
reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, and while acknowledging the
significance of Basrah, criticized the GOI for not doing more
in this regard. He cited examples of what he perceives as
GOI permissiveness toward Iran, such as the GOI allowing
Iranian pilgrims, but not foreign Arab Shiite pilgrims, to
visit Karballah, and the GOI permitting Iran to open schools
throughout Iraq. Soliman called for increased GOI efforts to
secure all of Iraq's borders; he acknowledged that Al-Qaeda
has not been infiltrating into Iraq in the same numbers as it
had done previously, but he said more needs to be done to
stop movement and smuggling across the borders.


11. (S) Soliman praised U.S. work in supporting Sunni
Awakening movements, and said that U.S. efforts were
succeeding in spreading Iraqi nationalism and deterring
Al-Qaeda from operating in Iraq. He said that EGIS would try
to influence external, extremist Sunni leaders, and agreed to
Ambassador Satterfield's suggestion of holding detailed
expert-level talks on Sunni groups outside of Iraq. Soliman
described Moqtada Al-Sadr as "relatively weak" and frustrated
with PM Maliki; Egypt has excluded him in the past and
Soliman did not view him either as an "Arab nationalist"
(although he had "elements" of such) or as a serious leader,
he said.


12. (U) Ambassador Satterfield cleared this message.
SCOBEY