Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CAIRO983
2008-05-14 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

MFA OFFICIALS ON AL LEBANON DELEGATION, AL

Tags:  PARM PREL PTER LEB EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4071
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0983/01 1351239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141239Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9252
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1317
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000983 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER LEB EG
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS ON AL LEBANON DELEGATION, AL
MINISTERIAL DYNAMICS

REF: STATE 49259

Classified By: ECPO Mincouns William R. Stewart for reason 1.4 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000983

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER LEB EG
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS ON AL LEBANON DELEGATION, AL
MINISTERIAL DYNAMICS

REF: STATE 49259

Classified By: ECPO Mincouns William R. Stewart for reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings May 13, MFA Senior
Advisor and Spokesman Hossam Zaki and MFA Cabinet Director
for Lebanon Nazih El-Negary briefed us on current plans for
the Qatari-led Arab League (AL) Delegation to Beirut, and the
dynamics at the May 11 AL Ministerial. Zaki said that the AL
delegation needs to defuse the current tension in Lebanon in
order to allow for dialogue on the underlying political
problems. He described Lebanese Sunni suffering at the hands
of Hizballah as "deeply distressing" to the GOE and the
Saudis. Zaki said that the GOE and Saudi Arabia, with help
from Jordan, had to confront the rest of the AL at the May 11
Ministerial, but expressed satisfaction that the AL adopted
"about ninety percent" of the GOE's original draft
resolution. El-Negary said that the Arab League Initiative
would still be in play during the AL Delegation's mission to
Beirut, and that SYG Moussa could raise the idea of an Arab
Force for Lebanon. He cautioned that Egypt would need to
avoid openly favoring the GOL against Hizballah because of
fears that Hizballah could target the Egyptian Embassy in
Beirut. End summary.


2. (C) In line with reftel demarche, Mincouns opened the May
13 meeting with Zaki by expressing USG concern over the
situation in Lebanon, and asking what Egypt and the Arab
League planned to do. Zaki said that the AL Delegation to
Beirut, led by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem,
planned to fly to Qatar the evening of May 13. From Qatar,
the delegation would plan to fly the Qatari PM's private
plane to Beirut, if Hizballah would allow them to land. Zaki
was not able to say when he expected the delegation to reach
Beirut. He described the current Lebanese crisis as
consisting of two layers: 1) the immediate violence on the
streets and in the north, and 2) the underlying political
crisis. Zaki said that the Arab League delegation needs to
be able to first defuse the tension and violence in order to
allow for dialogue to address the underlying political
problems.


3. (C) Zaki offered us his personal analysis that Hizballah

would not attack Christian interests in Lebanon because of
its alliance with Michel Aoun, and therefore Hizballah would
not be able to occupy the entire country. Zaki said that
because of this political dynamic, the Sunnis are paying the
highest price among Lebanese for Hizballah's aggression. In
emotional terms, he said that the suffering of Lebanese
Sunnis is "deeply distressing" and "deeply offensive" to the
Egyptians and Saudis, especially after "what the Sunnis went
through in Iraq." He said that the Lebanese Sunnis'
suffering could lead to a "different calculation" by the
Egyptians and Saudis regarding what could be done to help
them. (Note: Zaki interrupted the meeting to watch Saad
Hariri's press conference on Al-Arabiya, and stood at rapt
attention for about fifteen minutes in front of the
television. He made a point of elaborating sympathetically
on items from Hariri's statement, such as Hariri's reference
to Hizballah's breaking into the offices of the Rafiq Hariri
Foundation and replacing photos of Hariri with those of
Bashar Al-Assad. End note.)


4. (C) Zaki recounted for us the May 11 Arab League
Ministerial debate, saying that the GOE was pleased that the
AL had adopted "about ninety percent" of the original
Egyptian draft resolution. The GOE was disappointed that its
draft criticism of Hizballah for targeting media institutions
was cut from the final resolution due to opposition from
Qatar and Algeria. He described the May 11 AL Ministerial as
pitting Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan against all the other
countries. He characterized Qatar as "the biggest supporter
of Syria," and charged that Qatar also maintains channels to
Iran, Hizballah and Hamas. He described Omani Foreign
Minister Youssef Bin-Alawi as a "spoiler," and said that
Libya played an unhelpful role with its anti-Saudi emphasis.
He said the Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Emirati Foreign Ministers
were not dependable and too "low key" to be of assistance.
Zaki said the North African ministers were not "sufficiently
engaged."


5. (C) In a separate meeting May 13, MFA Cabinet Director for
Lebanon Nazih El-Negary told us that the Arab League
Delegation would plan to conduct negotiations in Beirut with
all the parties, including Hizballah, to determine what
compromises would be acceptable in order to work toward a
political solution to the crisis. He said that although
Egypt does not have a representative on the delegation, the
GOE intends to try to exert influence on the expected

CAIRO 00000983 002 OF 002


negotiations through its embassy in Beirut. According to
El-Negary, the GOE will continue to oppose PM Siniora's
resignation. He cautioned that Egypt cannot afford to openly
favor the GOL against Hizballah because of GOE fears that
Hizballah could target the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut. He
said the Arab League Initiative would still be in play during
the negotiations, and that SYG Moussa could raise the idea of
an Arab Force for Lebanon, depending on the atmosphere in
Beirut and Hizballah's political standing.

SCOBEY