COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSFER OF (112)

S E C R E T CAIRO 000824

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA FOR IRWIN
OSD FOR AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSFER OF (112)
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES AND (30) SPARE IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES (CORRECTED COPY: CLASSIFICATION
CORRECTION ONLY)

REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST

07/OV/185 FOR THIRTY (30) SPARE IMAGE
INTENSIFIER TUBES

B. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST
07/OV/201 FOR ONE HUNDRED TWELVE (112)
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVGS)

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Description: In Ref A and B, the GOE requests 112
AN/PVS-7B NVG and 30 Spare Image Intensifier Tubes to support
Border Guard Force operations. The spare Image Intensifier
Tubes will allow the Ministry of Defense to maintain NVGs in
their inventory.


2. (C) Reason the purchaser desires NVGs: The Egyptian
Border Guards require the AN/PVS-7B NVGs to operate
effectively at night along their international borders. The
NVGs would improve the capability to operate with U.S. Forces
in a coalition environment as the AN/PVS-7B is easily
sustainable through the U.S. supply system.


3. (C) How the NVGs would affect Egypt's force structure:
These NVGs will increase the Border Guard capability to
conduct night operations along its international borders.
There will be no increase in force structure; however there
will be an increase in Border Guard capability to operate
effectively at night.


4. (S) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and
Egyptian defense/security goals: NVG sales are consistent
with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the
territorial security of regional states. It supports two of
CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt:

a. Enabling allies and partners
b. Protecting U.S. and partner interest.

This purchase would also support two of CENTCOM's Security
Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for Egypt:

-- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and
transformation of allies or partners to reduce their
vulnerability external aggression and coercion"

-- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate
independently or in coalition with U.S. Forces"


5. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of NVGs
requested: 112x AN/PVS-7B are consistent with the quantity of
NVGs required within a U.S. Battalion. The current Border
Guard force has a current operational strength of
approximately 10,000 personnel. The amount requested
provides some additional night-fighting capability to that
force. The spare intensifier tubes are necessary to sustain
that capability. The 30 spare tubes provide a less than 5%
spare part capability for all AN/PVS-7B NVGs in the current
Egyptian inventory.


6. (C) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction
of a new war-fighting capability to the nation or region: The
procurement of these goggles and spare tubes does not
represent a new war-fighting capability to Egypt. However,
the Combatant Commander's concurrence will be provided
separately.


7. (C) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations:
Release of NVGs should not impact the regional balance of
power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's
neighbors. This sale does not introduce new technology to
Egypt or the region and will not impact Israel's qualitative
military edge.


8. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for,
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The
Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect
sensitive, classified military technology over an extended
period. Egypt signed a General Security of Information
Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and
protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons
systems. Egypt has procured night vision technology in the
past to include AN/PVS-7Bs and has met all previous security
and monitoring requirements.


9. (C) Training required either in-country or in the U.S. and



anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S.
trainers in-country: No additional training would be
required for the sale of these NVGs. There is no additional
presence that would be required beyond normal U.S.
interaction with the Border Guard personnel.


10. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the
proposed acquisition: Egypt plans to procure NVDs utilizing
Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated
sufficient funds within their FY08/09 funding priority
listing to finance a potential NVG purchase.


11. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed
acquisition: The Egyptian military has no history of human
rights abuses and is under civilian control. There are no
human rights considerations that would preclude the release
of ammunition to the Egyptian military.


12. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for compliance
verification: The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt
has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point
of contact, working in close coordination with the security
assistance program officer, will review and maintain copies
of the purchaser's physical security and accountability
control plan, maintain a serial number list of all NVGs and
intensifier tubes that may be offered or transferred, and
stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and
inspections as required. The Egyptian military currently has
over 2500 Night Vision Devices of various configurations
in-country and has maintained accountability and security of
those devices without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to
date.


13. (C) Operational Plan and specific end-users: The
operational plan for the NVGs states that the Border Guard
forces will use the NVGs in current operations along the
Gaza-Egypt border. The extent of anti-terrorism missions may
include countering intrusions of terrorists through the Gaza
Strip-Egypt Border Area. The GOE has indicated a willingness
to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and security of
NVGs, and the Office of Military Cooperation will conduct
End-Use Monitoring (EUM) of the devices if the transfer is
approved.


14. (C) Recommendation: The Country Team recommends USG
approval for transfer of the NVGs and the Spare Intensifier
Tubes. This is a coordinated mission position.
SCOBEY