U.S.-EGYPT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP MEETING

S E C R E T CAIRO 000808

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/CT FOR WORMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KISL AG MO SO PK AF LY SU
SUBJECT: U.S.-EGYPT COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP MEETING

REF: CAIRO 292

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
William R. Stewart for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D).

1.(S) Summary: On February 24, the Egyptian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) hosted the third annual meeting of the
U.S.-Egypt Counterterrorism (CT) Joint Working Group (JWG).
State S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Dell Dailey led the
interagency U.S. delegation which included representatives
from NEA and OES. Embassy representatives included the Legal
Attach, the Treasury Attach, the Regional Security Officer,
and members of the Mission's Political-Economic Section. The
Egyptian side included representatives from the MFA, the
Ministry of Interior and the Egyptian Central Bank. The two
delegations discussed issues and cooperative proposals
regarding CT in North and East Africa, methods to target
radicalization and violent extremism, terror finance,
bioterrorism defense, cyberterrorism, and new CT training
opportunities. End summary.

--------------
CT Threats in Africa
--------------

2.(C) The USG opened the discussions with a threat brief on
terrorism in the Trans-Sahara and Horn of Africa regions.
Ambassador Dailey emphasized that Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) represents a significant threat to
regional governments as well as US and Western interests,
noting broader USG concern with AQ's interest in recruiting
regional terrorist groups to its cause. AQIM has shown a
willingness to use suicide tactics and risk high civilian
casualties. The most prominent of this new wave of attacks
has been two multiple-target mass-casualty bombings inside
Algiers, on April 11 (attacks on the Prime Minister's office
and a police headquarters) and on December 11, 2007 (attacks
on Algeria's Supreme Court and on the UN headquarters for
Algeria). In a September 2007 attack targeting President
Bouteflika, AQIM used a suicide vest, another first.

3.(C) Dailey went on to note that AQIM has stated its aim to
target U.S. and other western interests, a change in strategy
from the GSPC and LIFG. In Algeria, it has carried out its
threat in attacks on buses belonging to American (December
2006),Russian (March 2007),and French (October 2007)
companies, in addition to the December 11 attack on the UN.
AQIM has traditionally operated in Algeria and northern Mali,
and has also recruited and trained small numbers of
extremists from Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, and
Libya. Some of these trainees may have returned to their
home countries to plot attacks against local and Western
interests. Approximately 36% of foreign fighters detained in
Iraq come from North Africa - especially from Algeria, Libya,
Tunisia, and Morocco - with smaller numbers from Mauritania.
Dailey emphasized that Libya has the highest per capita
percentage of foreign fighters, suggesting high levels of
radicalization. Dailey then briefly summarized the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),created in

2005. TSCTP's aim is to strengthen regional counterterrorism
capabilities by enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation
among the region's security forces, including law
enforcement, promoting democratic governance, discrediting
terrorist ideology, and countering radicalization and
reinforcing our bilateral military ties. The overall goal
that the USG seeks to achieve via TSCTP is to facilitate
cooperation between those countries and our Maghreb partners
in the war on terror (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia),and
enhance the indigenous capacities of the Sahel states
(Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, plus Nigeria and Senegal) to
withstand the challenges posed by terrorist groups in the
region.

4.(S) S/CT Regional Affairs Officer made specific points
about USG CT efforts in East Africa. He began by noting
concerns regarding the sustainability of the USG CT
relationship with Sudan, given the lack of progress on Darfur
and other matters. He added that our relationship benefits
Sudanese and regional security, including that of Egypt, and
urged the GOE to use its influence with Sudan to encourage it
to sustain this relationship in the face of an al-Qaida
threat that endangers us all. Regarding Somalia, S/CT noted
encouraging signs of outreach by the new Somali Prime
Minister, Nur Hassan, and signals of developing fissures
between the political opposition based in Asmara, and the
al-Shabaab. S/CT emphasized that the USG sees the al-Shabaab
as a terrorist gang that has no future and requested the GOE
encourage both Nur Hassan and the political opposition to
come to an accommodation that will marginalize the
extremists, allow for Ethiopian withdrawal, and create the
foundations for a more secure Somalia.

5.(S) A senior Ministry of Interior official, General
Ibrahim Hamad, responded for the GOE, discussing the
interconnected nature of most African terrorist and extremist
groups and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Hamad emphasized that
most of these regional groups draw their original inspiration
from the ideology of the MB. According to Hamad, within
their own borders, the Egyptians have had a great deal of
success in combating the MB. He emphasized that GOE security
services have also been successful in getting many extremists
to renounce violence. With that said, he also shared USG
concerns about the spread of former GSPC elements throughout
North Africa, and noted that some AQIM cells were headed to -
or had arrived in - both Somalia and Darfur in response to
announcements about placement of foreign troops in each
location. On the issue of Sudan in particular, the GOE
stated that a unified Sudan is necessary for Egyptian
national security. Hamad added that no one can accept
genocide in Darfur, emphasizing that dialogue with the
Sudanese is more preferable than ostracism.

6.(C) Hamad also emphasized Egyptian involvement in
region-wide efforts to combat the current threat. He
emphasized that the rate of successful attacks in the NEA
region remains low, due mostly to cooperation between
regional security services. One of the main reasons that
regional cooperation has become an imperative is because of
terrorists increased reliance on the internet and
non-traditional forms of communication and recruitment.

--------------
Training Assistance
--------------

7.(C) The JCG then transitioned into an overview and
discussion of CT training cooperation between the U.S. and
Egypt. Ambassador Ashraf Mohsen, Deputy Assistant Foreign
Minister for Counter Terrorism, led off by emphasizing the
GOE's satisfaction with the type of CT training that MOI
officials have been receiving over the past several years.
He emphasized, though, that they wish to explore the
possibility of being involved with training in conjunction
with TSCTP countries, or even as a full participant in the
Partnership. This "trilateral" training that the GOE
envisions focuses on GOE trainers and facilities being
utilized to train Maghreb or Sahel states, backed by USG
funding. The GOE also requested more detailed training to
confront cyber-terrorism and cyber-threats. This could
include course offerings via the State Department's
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, as well as other technical
assistance programs offered by the GOE. Embassy RSO noted
that the USG has spent $11 million over the past 9 years
toward ATA training for Egypt, and we hope to continue and
build upon this programming. He added that we can prioritize
additional cyber-related courses that the GOE wants, though
Egypt will need to furnish USG trainers with specifics on
what courses they are seeking. Dailey also promised to
follow-up on the GOE proposal for a possible trilateral
arrangement between the U.S., Egypt and other countries in
North Africa for training, but cautioned that the USG had not
decided to go forward with such a program; noting that we
would first need to gain agreement within the USG and
identify sources of funding.

--------------
Terrorist Finance
--------------

8.(C) Samir el Shehad of Egypt's Money Laundering Combating
Unit at the Central Bank (Egypt's Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU)) led off by mentioning that Egypt is eager to join the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and that he would also
like to see more African countries join the Egmont Group (the
international body of FIUs). He suggested that this would be
a good way to involve African countries in the fight against
terrorist finance. Embassy Treasury Attach replied that the
U.S. strongly supports the development of countries' FIUs,
and is providing some technical assistance to some of the
African countries which are trying to establish FIUs or have
new FIUs. He noted that the U.S. is also sponsoring the
candidacy of some FIUs which are hoping to join Egmont.
Regarding membership in the FATF, he commented that while the
membership is slowly growing, FATF wishes to expand in a
cautious and deliberate manner. He said he would seek
guidance from the Department of Treasury, and Dailey added
that the State Department would assist as needed in order to
provide the GOE with an answer.

--------------
Cooperation on Bioterrorism Defense
--------------

9.(SBU) With State OES leading the brief and discussion, the
U.S. introduced for the first time the possibility of
bilateral bioterrorism-related collaboration -- with a
positive GOE response. In January 2008 (reftel),the U.S.
had proposed four areas of bilateral CT cooperation on
bioterrorism including approaches to food defense and
agroterrorism, forensic epidemiology for multi-sectoral
investigation of suspected bioterrorism, and scientific and
technical cooperation on bioterrorism risk assessment
methodologies and pathogen security. OES provided detailed
proposals on these areas of cooperation based on GOE input
from January.

10.(SBU) GOE officials welcomed the U.S. proposals and
expressed some interest. Mohsen signaled that he would relay
the proposals to relevant GOE subject matter experts for
further review, with the promise to respond in the coming
months.

--------------
Al-Azhar University Proposal
--------------

11.(SBU) Mohsen next discussed a GOE proposal for the
training of imams through Egypt's Al-Azhar University. The
GOE has developed this proposal with the intent to better
combat radicalization and radical ideologies. The GOE has
divided this proposal into several key "pillars." The first
is to focus on the training of non-Egyptian imams in an 8-10
week course focusing on the basics of Islam. Second, the
coursework would feature specialized training in foreign
languages, social customs, and local politics tailored to
foreign locales where many of the Egyptian imams will be
sent. The program will also include Arabic language
instruction for non-Arabic speaking imams. Third, Al-Azhar
will translate primary Islamic sources into foreign
languages. Fourth, Al-Azhar wants to establish Arabic and
English websites focused on countering radical ideologies.
Finally, the GOE hopes to use this program to support the
visit of Al-Azhar scholars to foreign countries in order to
combat violent ideology, but also to dispel myths propagated
about Islam, primarily in the West. The GOE emphasized that
approximately 40 countries have expressed interest thus far,
primarily sub-Saharan African states. Many of these states
lack the funds to support sending their imams in great
numbers, and thus the GOE is looking to acquire foreign donor
support. The estimated tuition to train foreign imams has
been placed at L.E. 6500 (approximately $1200). Dailey
agreed to consider the proposal, in coordination with Embassy
Cairo.

--------------
Foreign Fighters in Iraq
--------------

12.(S) In his brief on foreign fighters in Iraq, Dailey
emphasized that Egypt and the U.S. enjoy a strong CT
relationship, and GOE security services have been aggressive
in targeting foreign terrorist cells and facilitation
networks. Over the past year alone, GOE actions and
coordination with partner regional services have led to the
disruption of multiple foreign terrorist nodes. Dailey went
on to show how recently unearthed information from safe
houses in Iraq, coupled with debriefs conducted of AQI
facilitators, have shed much light on foreign terrorist
networks which are sending fighters to Iraq. Documentation
obtained provides an unprecedented level of detail pertaining
to these foreign fighters, including names, dates of birth,
and route of entry used to enter Iraq. After summarizing the
source countries from which these foreign fighters emanated -
culled from the documents seized - Dailey briefly summarized
the primary transit routes which they utilized. While noting
that Damascus Airport remains the primary air-transit point
for these Iraq-bound terrorists, he also noted specific
Syrian efforts to increase security in this regard. Dailey
added that, nonetheless, more action is required on the part
of the Syrian government, and urged the GOE to engage with
their Syrian interlocutors and urge them to increase border
security measures, tighten visa procedures, and increase
information sharing with regional states.

--------------
Pakistan-Afghanistan Threat
--------------

13.(C) Dailey next gave a brief overview of threats
emanating from Afghanistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border regions. He noted that the U.S. initially achieved
considerable success on the Afghan side of the border. That
success has been disrupted by drug cultivation, the proceeds
of which are funding the Taliban and enabling it to buy
manpower. He added that USG efforts at disrupting the drug
trade have had mixed results. On interdiction, results have
been adequate, but there has been no success on eradication
or demand reduction. Part of the difficulty is that the U.S.
military's mission does not include counter-drug operations.
As a result, the security situation is deteriorating. Dailey
noted that the USG would like Pakistan to be more aggressive
on its side of the border adding that, with U.S. assistance,
Pakistan established an intelligence fusion center in the
tribal regions. He mentioned the presence of Batullah
Mehsud's network in Pakistan, adding that the GoP is very
aware of the danger he and other Taliban leaders pose. He
emphasized that the USG continues to work with Pakistan to
ensure that it has the necessary tools to confront the
extremists. This is not restricted to military aid as
Pakistan understands that confronting extremism takes more
than military action.

14.(U) State S/CT has cleared this message.

JONES