SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FORD'S CAIRO MEETINGS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000690

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08
TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC PARM PREL IS EG
SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FORD'S CAIRO MEETINGS ON
THE 2008 NPT PREPCOM

Classified By: ECPO Mincouns William R. Stewart for reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) Summary: On March 13, Special Representative for
Nuclear Nonproliferation Christopher Ford discussed the
upcoming April-May Nonproliferation Treaty PrepCom with MFA
Assistant Minister for Cabinet Affairs Ambassador Wafaa
Bassim and Arab League Director for Multilateral Affairs Wael
Al-Assad. Bassim pushed for compliance with the 1995 NPT
Review Conference resolution on the Middle East, and urged
progress on the provision of nuclear fuel. MFA Counselor Ali
Sirry suggested that the upcoming NPT PrepCom should try to
achieve a negotiated consensus document. Arab League
Director for Multilateral Affairs Wael Al-Assad told Ford
that in the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference it would not
be feasible to have an all-encompassing Final Document. He
criticized the U.S. for ignoring the nuclear programs of
non-parties to the NPT, and called for an improved atmosphere
at the September-October 2008 IAEA General Conference in
Vienna. Ford told his interlocutors that the U.S. wants to
move beyond procedural debate at the PrepCom into a
substantive airing of views. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Bassim began by saying she valued
consultations with the United States before the PrepCom. She
said that all states need to keep the universality of the
Nonproliferation Treaty in mind, but that Egypt was open to
being "creative on implementing measures." She declared that
nonproliferation should not exclusively be the focus of
discussions, but in fact that "disarmament is the main goal,"
and must not be overlooked. Bassim added that it was
important for the nuclear weapons states to comply with
previously-agreed commitments, specifically identifying the
package of agreements reached at the 1995 NPT Review
Conference, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.



3. (C) She faulted the states party to the 1995 RevCon
agreements, especially the nuclear weapons states, for a
"lack of will" to fulfill the agreements, and stressed the
need to "keep the regime alive." Bassim opined that we
should not let the Iranian issue lead to preventing other
countries from developing nuclear energy. She said Egypt was
concerned not only about Iran, but also about how an Iranian
nuclear weapon could trigger an arms race in the region and
elsewhere.


4. (C) MFA Multilateral Affairs Counselor Ali Sirry suggested
that at the upcoming 2008 NPT PrepCom it would be desirable
to "aim high" and try for an agreed consensus document,
rather than just a Chairman's Summary. If this proved
impossible, he continued, a summary would be acceptable, but
we should not preclude a consensus document. He said that
Egypt liked the idea of having a negotiated document at this
PrepCom, "if we can." Sirry said it was important that the
PrepCom not concentrate solely upon procedure, as occurred
last year, but instead focus on steps to implement the 1995
Middle East Resolution. Sirry added that Egypt wanted to
keep the Additional Protocol "voluntary," at least until NPT
universality had been achieved. He worried that fuel-cycle
restriction efforts would hurt the emerging nuclear programs
of developing countries.


5. (C) Ford said that the U.S. goal at the upcoming NPT
PrepCom would be to try to move beyond procedural debate into
a substantive airing of views. The U.S. is concerned that
Iran may try to dispute the Chairman's Summary, although the
summary's purpose is to avoid requiring consensus. Ford said
that the U.S. supports the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
wants to promote international cooperation on this issue
within the context of safeguards and other nonproliferation
commitments. He noted that Iranian pursuit of a nuclear
weapon imperils NPT universality. Ford pointed out that the
international community had offered Iran a generous
assistance package if it gives up uranium enrichment and
re-processing.


6. (C) In a separate meeting, Arab League Director for
Multilateral Affairs Wael Al-Assad said that in the run-up to
the 2010 RevCon it would not be feasible to have an
all-encompassing Final Document, and that it would be wise to
cultivate areas that are appropriately "ripe" for agreement.
The Arab states needed to see serious discussion and
movement on implementing the 1995 Middle East Resolution,
especially from the NPT depository states. He believed that
it was important to "set measures in place" by 2010, such as
creating a mechanism to assess progress on Middle East issues
between sessions of the NPT.


7. (C) Al-Assad criticized U.S. policy for ignoring the

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nuclear programs of non-parties to the NPT. He said that the
Arab League heartily supported international cooperation on
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and believed that some
kind of fuel-supply plan was important. Al-Assad stressed
that without very solid assurances of supply, enrichment
would remain an attractive option. Al-Assad said that at
recent Middle East Track II discussions at the Hague, Iranian
representatives argued that Iran had been prevented in the
past from acquiring fuel supplies from abroad, and is
therefore reluctant to give up its program without fuel
supply guarantees.


8. (C) Al-Assad said that the Arab League worried about the
"worsening atmosphere" at the IAEA, and "threats" apparently
made by the EU and others to break longstanding consensus on
IAEA General Conference resolutions, such as the general
Middle East safeguards resolution. Al-Assad said that the
Arab League was open to ideas on how to improve the political
atmosphere at the IAEA, which affects NPT PrepCom issues.
Al-Assad said that contrary to press reports, during the
March 4-5 Cairo Foreign Ministers' Arab League Summit
Preparatory Conference, the Arab League had not adopted a
resolution calling upon Arab states to withdraw from the NPT
if Israel admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. One idea
that he said does have support in the Arab League is a
refusal to sign any new nonproliferation treaties until at
least 2010, unless "progress" (NFI) is made regarding Israel.



9. (C) With regard to the upcoming 2008 PrepCom, Al-Assad
said that the USG's paper on the Middle East last year had
not been in keeping with the USG's otherwise commendably
fresh approach, and he urged the U.S. to take "practical
steps" to move things forward. Al-Assad said he was hearing
that Iran was agreeable about the 2008 PrepCom agenda, and
uninterested in reopening it. Al-Asad said the Arab League
is currently enthusiastic about a 2004 IAEA proposal for a
seminar on lessons from other nuclear weapon free zones
worldwide, provided that such a meeting included "a look at
the Middle East." Finally, Al-Assad said that he had heard
that Japanese Ambassador to the International Organizations
in Vienna, Yukiya Amano, was in the running for IAEA Director
General. Al-Assad mentioned that he had been slightly
concerned at Amano's angry reaction when Iran attacked him
personally at the 2007 PrepCom.


10. (C) Ford told Al-Assad that the NPT review cycle process
itself obviated any need for additional mechanisms, such as
those Al-Assad mentioned. Ford said it would be important to
reach agreement on fuel-supply issues to undercut Iran's
arguments, and to provide benefits to countries genuinely
interested in civilian nuclear power. Ford said he regretted
that in 2006 the Arabs had broken the consensus approach on
the Middle East that had prevailed at IAEA General Committees
for many years. Today's unpleasant atmosphere was a result
of this, he said. Ford said he hoped for better cooperation
at the 2008 IAEA General Committee this fall in Vienna.


11. (U) ISN/MNSA cleared this message.





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