Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CAIRO2264
2008-10-28 11:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

ARAB LEAGUE HAPPY WITH "QATARI INITIATIVE," EGYPT

Tags:  PREL PHUM KPKO SU QA EG 
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VZCZCXRO6600
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #2264/01 3021151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281151Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0728
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1221
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002264 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO SU QA EG
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE HAPPY WITH "QATARI INITIATIVE," EGYPT
LESS SO

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1549

B. KHARTOUM 1532

C. KHARTOUM 1521

D. CAIRO 1603

E. CAIRO 2197

F. CAIRO 1877

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002264

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO SU QA EG
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE HAPPY WITH "QATARI INITIATIVE," EGYPT
LESS SO

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1549

B. KHARTOUM 1532

C. KHARTOUM 1521

D. CAIRO 1603

E. CAIRO 2197

F. CAIRO 1877

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Arab League Advisor told us that the
Government of Sudan (GOS) supports the Qatari initiative as a
way to end the crisis in Darfur, and sees it as an
accompaniment to the recently announced Sudan People's
Initiative. However, Sudanese oppositionists in Cairo said
Darfuri leaders are skeptical that the Arab League and Qatar
can be fair mediators in the conflict because they feel they
are too close to the GOS. As a result, the Darfuri leaders
are not currently backing the proposed Doha talks.
Separately, the Government of Egypt (GOE) expressed surprise
when the Qatari Initiative was announced at the Arab League
Ministerial in early September. The GOE is concerned that
the numerous initiatives on Sudan will prevent a
multi-lateral agreement. However, unless Egypt asserts
itself, it risks being relegated to the role of a back-seat
driver on the Sudan issue. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Meetings with Government Officials, Arab Justice Ministers
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Zeid al-Sabban, the Arab League's Advisor to the
Secretary General on African Affairs, briefed us October 14
on his four-day trip to Sudan where he and a Qatari
delegation, met with GOS and National Congress Party (NCP)
officials and Darfuri leaders to enlist support for the Arab
League-sponsored "Qatari Initiative." Sabban said that
Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, who in
previous meetings had displayed a combative nature, was more
deferential in working with the Qataris. Nafie assured the
delegation that "all issues could be put on the table in
order to resolve Darfur." However, he still insisted that
the GOS views the enactment of Article 16 of the Rome Statute
to stay the ICC indictment of President Bashir as an
essential pre-condition. Sabban told us Sudanese Second Vice

President Ali Othman Taha was forthcoming and keen to move on
the Qatari initiative. Sabban reported that both sides
agreed that this was the "right time" to resolve Darfur, and
they did not want to "lose this opportunity." Sabban told us
that Sudanese State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Kurti
asked the delegation to support Bashir's Sudan People's
Initiative by providing a legal team to help create and
implement internal laws to bring those guilty of crimes in
Darfur to justice (reftels A-C).


3. (C) The delegation attended the Arab Justice Ministers'
meeting on the ICC indictment. Sabban stated that the GOS
presented the ministers with a draft document to stay the ICC
indictment. Sabban characterized the draft as "unacceptable
and silly" because it called on Arab states to withdraw from
the ICC, and to publicly attack the ICC prosecutor. He said
the Arab ministers redrafted the document, and told us that
the new document is based on international law and focuses on
the principle of "Head of State immunity." Sabban sees this
new document as being complementary to the Arab League
solution package for Sudan (reftel D).

--------------
Bashir Encourages the Qatari Initiative
--------------


4. (C) The delegation also met with President Bashir.
According to Sabban, Bashir congratulated the delegation on
their efforts and stated that the GOS is "willing to consider
all demands" to resolve the Darfur situation. Bashir
supports the Qatari Initiative and told the delegation "not
to lose patience." Sabban said Bashir stressed that if the
initiative did not succeed there would be a "return to
clashes" that would "burn all of us" and have "long
repercussions."

--------------
Traveling the Country to Drum up Support
--------------


5. (S) The delegation met Sudan People's Liberation Movement
leader and Government of National Unity First Vice President,
Salva Kiir in Juba. Kiir said the Qatari initiative has his

CAIRO 00002264 002.2 OF 003


"full support." However, he doubts that the inititive will
succeed because it lacks support from he Darfur movements.
Sabban agreed that the deleation must work to gain the
support of the "key arfur movement leaders." He shared with
us the AL/Qatari plan, which he called a "3 2 plan." Sabba
stated that the plan focused on obtaining the spport of
three key internal leaders: Abdallah Yaya, Abdel Shafi, and
Abu Garda; and two importan external leaders Abdel Wahid
al-Nur and Khalil Ibrahim. He felt that with their support
the initative would succeed.


6. (C) In El Fasher in North Darfur, the delegation met with
leaders in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and
UNAMID leaders. Sabban told us that the IDP leaders warned
the delegation not to neglect them because they are "as
important as the rebel movement leaders." IDP leaders said
the rebel movements are "using the camps," have "ruined the
stability of the camps" and provoked Sudanese Government
forces to "kill us." IDP leaders presented the delegation
with a list of 16 demands for their participaion in the
talks. These demands include full deloyment of UNAMID
forces, disarming the Janjawid and constituting a war crimes
tribunal. UNAMID leaders told the delegatin that the AL and
Qatar face a challenge in garnering support for the
initiative. Sabban said the UNAMID leaders told the group
that "internally dsplaced persons do not trust the Arab
League because they believe the AL is biased toward the
Sudanese Government." The delegation attended Darfuri
parliamentary sessions in Nyala, South Darfur and Jeneina,
West Darfur. Sabban said discussions with the
parliamentarians were "open and frank" with most leaders
presenting their own solutions and criticizing Bashir and the
Sudanese Government. Sabban stated the candid discussions
were "shocking" to the Qatari delegation, but he categorized
the meetings as beneficial and "a good exchange of views."

--------------
Doha Talks Not Certain
--------------


7. (C) Sabban said that the Arab League and Qatar will not
set a time for talks in Doha without agreement on the path
forward on the judicial, security, internal reconciliation
and humanitarian elements within Sudan. For this reason the
AL and Qatar support Bashir's Sudan People's Initiative.
This working-level assessment contrasts with AL SYG Moussa's
assertion to the Ambassador that Doha peace talks would be
held by the end of October. (reftel E)

--------------
Egypt Concerned, But Too Risk-Averse to Lead
--------------


8. (S) Ahmed Abu Zeid, cabinet advisor for African Affairs at
the Egyptian MFA, told us October 9 that the Government of
Egypt (GOE) had been surprised by the AL/Qatari initiative.
He said the proliferation of initiatives on Sudan is not
helpful. Abu Zeid stated that the AL/Qatari initiative is
"more focused on the legal case against Bashir and not enough
on the political process." He bristled that Qatar "does not
know the Sudan issue" and AL SYG Moussa "cannot take all the
responsibility." Abu Zeid repeated the Egyptian position
that there be a multi-lateral initiative to "hold feet to the
fire" on Sudan (reftel F). He said that increased Egyptian
involvement would bring "more substance and clarity." AL
Advisor Sabban acknowledged some tensions between the
Egyptians and Qataris after the initial unveiling of the
Qatari initiative at the AL ministerial in September, but he
felt that things were getting better because both shared the
same goals for Sudan.


9. (S) Ahmed Haggag, President Mubarak's Special Envoy for
Darfur and Secretary General of the Africa Society, told us
October 9 that Qatar is a "small country trying to play an
important role." He said the Qatar was using "check
diplomacy", but opined that this could work. However, he
stated that the AL and Qatar should work in concert with
others. Haggag told us that Egypt can bring perspective to
the process, but financial issues limit the role that Egypt
can play. He said that Egypt would not lead because
"loyalties in Sudan are shifty" and "there are too many
Sudanese living in Egypt to side with specific parties."
Haggag said Egypt would support a good agreement, like the
Abuja Agreement that Haggag signed on behalf of the GOE, but
that Egypt is too risk-averse and "worried about losing face"
to lead on Sudan.


10. (C) Comment: While the Arab League/Qatari initiative

CAIRO 00002264 003 OF 003


appears to have buy-in from the GOS, our contacts in the
Sudanese community in Cairo tell us that the Darfur rebel
movements do not trust the Arab League or Qatar and currently
do not plan to participate in the Doha talks. Sabban
stressed AL and Qatari efforts to recruit arfuri leaders,
but could not say if any leaderswould support the
initiative. For its part, Egyt will continue to mull over
its alternatives on Sudan. Although FM Aboul Gheit attended
the Sudan People's Initiative kick-off on Khartoum on October
16, and has publicly supported the Qatari initiative, it is
clear that the GOE is not entirely happy with Qatari
initiative. The GOE's reticence to lead may relegate it to
the role of a back seat driver on an issue of critical,
strategic importance.
SCOBEY