ENGAGING ECONOMY MINISTER LOUSTEAU ON PARIS CLUB,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 000463

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FROM AMBASSADOR WAYNE FOR TREASURY SECRETARY PAULSON
PLEASE ALSO PASS TO A/S LOWERY AND DAS O'NEILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD PREL AR
SUBJECT: ENGAGING ECONOMY MINISTER LOUSTEAU ON PARIS CLUB,
HOLDOUTS, AND ICSID CLAIMS


Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
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1. (C) Treasury Secretary Paulson's April 11 meeting with
Economy Minister Martin Lousteau offers an opportunity to
engage the senior GoA official charged by President Kirchner
with resolving Argentina's pariah status in international
capital markets. Lousteau is in a fight for his political
life. He faces heavy criticism in the press and frequent
calls for his resignation. The President has reaffirmed her
support, but he remains weak and vulnerable. While his
influence over broad economic policy is limited, Lousteau is
clearly interested in pursuing creative solutions to
controversial debt issues. One could say he needs a win, but
his weak domestic position could also make him risk-averse.
Post argues for pressing hard for the GoA to develop a
credible plan for paying Paris Club arrears, recognize its
obligations to pay ICSID awards, and normalize relations with
"holdout" bondholders. End Summary.

Setting the Stage: Lousteau is as Good as it Gets
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2. (C) The April 11 meeting with Economy Minister Lousteau
offers an opportunity to demonstrate to both Lousteau and
other reform-minded officials in the GoA and Central Bank
that there is high-level U.S. interest in helping Argentina
to resolve the debt issues that preclude its reinsertion into
global capital markets. In addition to pressing the GoA to
get serious on Paris Club, Holdouts, and ICSID cases, Post
recommends acknowledging Argentina's impressive recovery from
its 2001/2002 crisis, which exceeded ALL expectations: five
straight years of over 8.5% real growth, twin surpluses
(fiscal and trade),and substantial reductions in povery and
unemployment levels.

Lousteau Battling to Save Job
--------------

3. (C) Minister Lousteau is fighting for his political life.
Many Argentines blame him for the GoA's March 11 decree to
increase export taxes on Argentina's major agricultural
export crops. Lousteau's announcement of the tax hike
precipitated a 20-day agricultural sector strike, a massive
disruption of domestic commerce and exports, and food
shortages in urban areas. It rapidly devolved into a
country-wide challenge to the Kirchners' entire economic
model of taxing the most productive sectors of the economy to
transfer resources to less efficient industry, subsidize
urban consumers and fund inefficient social safety net
programs. Many observers consider it the worst crisis of the
Kirchner era (since 2003),and it is not over, as the strike
was only suspended for 30 days pending further negotiations.


4. (C) While the public associates Lousteau's Economy
Ministry with the GoA policy decision to raise export taxes,
it almost certainly originated with President Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner, her husband Nestor Kirchner, and
powerful Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernandez. President
Kirchner and the Chief of Cabinet have both publicly affirmed
their support for Lousteau, but the fallout from the strike
has left him weakened and vulnerable. He has been forced to
deny rumors of his pending dismissal and there is
considerable media play on possible replacements.


5. (C) Complicating Lousteau's position in government is his
difficult relationship with Internal Trade Secretary
Guillermo Moreno, who is responsible for a complex price
control bureaucracy and is also orchestrating the GoA's
manipulation of official inflation statistics. Although
Moreno is technically Lousteau's subordinate, he is known to
report directly to former President Nestor Kirchner and also
to powerful Planning Minister Julio De Vido. Lousteau's
predecessor, Miguel Peirano, was forced to resign in October
2007, after losing a battle with Moreno over control of the
Argentine statistics agency, INDEC.


6. (C) Lousteau has had no greater success in wresting
control over INDEC from Moreno, which is a crucial first step
for the GoA to regain credibility for its economic policy.
Moreno regularly implements policy changes without consulting
Lousteau, who on several occasions has learned of them from
the press. Most recently, Lousteau and Moreno were caught on
camera yelling at each other, reportedly because Lousteau was
upset at Moreno's unvetted order to ban beef exports (to
maintain adequate local supplies and keep domestic prices

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down) while Lousteau was in the middle of sensitive GoA
negotiations with farmers to suspend the agricultural strike.


7. (C) In light of Moreno's autonomy and clear indications
that former President Nestor Kirchner remains in charge of
economic decision-making, we question how much influence
Lousteau wields in this government. That said, Lousteau
clearly appreciates the opportunity costs of Argentina's
pariah status in international capital markets and genuinely
appears interested in seeking creative solutions to the
economic issues that have bedeviled the bilateral
relationship for years: Paris Club and holdout bondholders.

Paris Club -- Time for GoA to Get Serious
--------------

8. (C) The GoA has yet to present a formal proposal to clear
its over $4 billion Paris Club arrears, and three separate
Economy Ministers over two administrations have basically
repeated the same refrain: rejection of an IMF role in a
Paris Club deal, while also insisting on generous
rescheduling terms. Ambassador alerted Lousteau on April 9
that Treasury officials are expecting him to make serious and
realistic proposals during the April 11 meeting. Econoffs
have also encouraged staff-level Economy Ministry officials
to consider the Paulson/Lousteau bilat as the first step in
the development of a serious GoA proposal for submission to
the Paris Club Secretariat.


9. (C) Ministry staffers respond that they are developing
possible options, and at least at the staff level there is an
understanding that the most plausible solution is a voluntary
repayment plan. The contentious areas relate to the length
of the payback period, whether the Paris Club will agree to
stop the clock on interest charges, and how soon key export
credit agencies will return to accepting sovereign exposure
in Argentina.


10. (C) Post is aware that on the Ministry's list of options
(but not necessarily at the top) is the unilateral payment of
all arrears to the U.S. (outside of the Paris Club context),
since the U.S. appears to have more legal and policy
restrictions than most other Paris Club member countries.
Economy Ministry staff say the arguments against are: 1)
uncertainty over whether the U.S. would accept the payment;
2) uncertainty over whether this would actually facilitate a
more flexible arrangement with other creditors; and 3) the
loss of a potentially powerful advocate. (Comments:
Apparently Ministry officials do not have with most European
creditors -- except for Spain -- the same open and helpful
dialogue they have with the U.S. Post has not encouraged
this unilateral payback option, and has emphasized that any
solution must be handled through the Paris Club.) The
Economy Ministry is closely reviewing the Paris Club's debt
restructuring deal with Angola, which did not include an IMF
agreement as a prerequisite.

Holdouts -- Emphasize Increasing Pressure
--------------

11. (C) Economy Ministry officials agree privately that the
GoA should eventually find it in its own interest to
normalize relations with the private sector bondholders
("holdouts") who that did not participate in the 2005 debt
exchange. Holdout lawsuits have closed down the GoA's
options for issuing debt under international law. Given high
fiscal surpluses since 2003, and the surplus of international
liquidity, the GoA has been able to meet its financing needs
by issuing bonds under domestic law, and staging private
placements with public agencies (such as the Social Security
Administration) and to the Government of Venezuela.


12. (C) Eventually, however, the GoA will want to tap
international capital markets, requiring some kind of
accommodation with the bondholders. At the moment this is a
non-starter with President Kirchner, as she has frankly told
us on several occasions. Therefore, Post has emphasized in
all meetings with the GoA that while this is not an issue the
GoA is ready to deal with in the short term, it is of great
interest in Washington, as U.S. citizen holdouts are steadily
increasing pressure on the USG and Congress, and also through
the courts.

ICSID -- GoA Should Meet Its Obligations
--------------

13. (C) The GoA continues to stonewall on the settlement of
numerous ICSID international arbitration claims by

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multinational firms, including many energy sector players who
argue that the GoA's "pesification" and later freezing of
dollar-based tariffs in the aftermath of the 2001/2 economic
crisis effectively expropriated their assets. While the face
value of U.S. company ICSID claims alone totals over $4
billion, many U.S. companies have suspended -- but not
withdrawn -- their ICSID suits in order to win GoA
concessions on new business opportunities. One ICSID claim
filed by U.S. energy major CMS is the first post-crisis case
to completely finish tortuous 5-year ICSID arbitration and
appeal process. The GoA, however, has declined to pay the
$150-odd million award to CMS, claiming that CMS must now
attempt to collect through Argentine courts. CMS is
considering whether to seek more direct USG advocacy on its
behalf, citing GoA obligations to the USG under our Bilateral
Investment Treaty, and has already tried once in New York
courts to seize Argentine assets. Post has emphasized to GoA
counterparts that the USG is under increasing pressure from
U.S. ICSID claimants to encourage the GoA to meet its final
ICSID judgment obligations.
WAYNE