Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BUDAPEST69
2008-01-18 15:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

SLEDDING UPHILL: THE PUBLIC MOOD RE REFORM

Tags:  PGOV ECON KDEM HU 
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VZCZCXRO6281
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0069/01 0181555
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181555Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2409
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000069 

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2013
TAGS: PGOV ECON KDEM HU
SUBJECT: SLEDDING UPHILL: THE PUBLIC MOOD RE REFORM


Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000069

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2013
TAGS: PGOV ECON KDEM HU
SUBJECT: SLEDDING UPHILL: THE PUBLIC MOOD RE REFORM


Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) When Parliament returns from recess to begin its
spring session in February, debate will return inevitably to
the Gyurcsany government's reform agenda. Although Prime
Minister Gyurcsany has pledged "smooth and steady progress,"
observers predict that the MSzP will tolerate minor
modifications of the tax structure but no major new
initiatives. For its part, the public appears far from
convinced that the question is how best to undertake reforms.
For some, the question is whether reform is politically
possible; for many others, whether reform is necessary.

UN-CHANGE AGENTS


2. (C) Few here are talking about better mousetraps - much
less building them. Junior coalition partner SzDSz has
unveiled a public campaign to drum up support for tuition and
medical fees in preparation for a spring referendum, but its
members argue privately - and often publicly - that the
government has undermined the right idea with the wrong
approach. Ferenc Juhasz, who will organize the MSzP's
efforts to prepare for the referendum, has indicated that the
party's hopes lie in a low turn-out.


3. (C) Although our own election campaign remains a source
of great fascination, there is little competition here over
the title of "change agent." The reflex of Gyurcsany's
critics - within his own party and beyond - has been to
reduce speed or to reverse direction entirely on reform.
Party Praesidium member Attila Mesterhazy tells us that the
party has circled the wagons around Gyurcsany, but made clear
that "we do not want to start new reforms but to finish what
we've already started." Although he indicated that "minor
modifications" of the tax code are possible, he sees no
immediate prospect of reducing the size of government or of
taking on longer-term issues such as pension reform - issues
they regard as well beyond the public's stress tolerance.
Mesterhazy was silent on the question of the government's
anti-corruption proposals, as most have been since their
initial roll-out.



4. (C) We are constantly struck by the extent to which
contacts across the political spectrum remain in denial,
ignoring the economic imperative of reform and focusing on
the political priority of "solidarity." In returning the
government's Health Care reform legislation back to
Parliament, President Solyom leveled a series of objections,
among them that the plan could not be "guaranteed," as
referred to in the Constitution. Although the legislation
will likely be returned to Solyom in substantially the same
form, the President will weigh in again with his upcoming
decision regarding the date of the referendum organized by
the opposition to question elements of the government's
reform agenda.


5. (C) Even the PM's supporters privately concede that the
referendum will likely succeed, and government spokespersons
have alluded to "finding fees from other sources" to replace
education and medical fees. Even though the referendum does
not compel new elections, the opposition continues to cast it
as a de facto vote of confidence in the Gyurcsany government.
They are also moving toward a second referendum - this one
on the government's health care reforms - later in the year.

MORE SENSE OF ENTITLEMENT THAN COMMON SENSE


6. (C) Gyurcsany's opponents increasingly open fire from the
left on economic issues by casting his actions as attacks on
Hungary's social compact. And with considerable effect.
Among Hungary's aging population, nostalgia for the perceived
security of the communist system is widespread and unease
with free-market competition tangible. But even younger
Hungarians can be remarkably hidebound, often regarding
education, health care, and an expansive array of social
services as not just free goods but free goods in infinite
supply. Many assert "we already pay with our taxes" (itself
a dubious claim given the extraordinary rates of tax
evasion),and few see the connection between Hungary's
bloated welfare apparatus and its anemic economic indicators.
They are, as one student group leader admitted, "not against
anything but the government." Even FIDESZ leader Viktor
Orban, whose party polls strongly among young voters,
privately laments that Hungary remains "a land of no
responsibility and no consequences."


7. (C) For their part, reformers have done themselves few
favors in practice. The Gyurcsany government's approach has
left it vulnerable to questions of competence and to charges
of corruption. The Prime Minister's personal wealth has
reinforced the popular suspicion that behind every fortune

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there is indeed a crime. His management style - described by
some even within the government as "indecision followed by
imposition" - has compounded the problem, leading to
legislation that one legal scholar describes as "always
hurried and often flawed." This invites the public to equate
reform with directives rather than genuine debate even as it
undermines confidence in the government's fundamental
competence. The government's public relations efforts have
been consistently behind the curve in framing issues for
voters, and their focus has often been on limiting damage
rather than the even harder job of making its case. As
Mesterhazy conceded, "the government has forgotten how to
speak to the people."

COMMENT: DEATH OF A SALESMAN - AND A SALE?


8. (C) The Prime Minister's travails will make future
reforms harder and may well make future reformers even harder
to find. But he alone has not given reform its bad name.
Even if the MSzP grows further disposed to dispose of
Gyurcsany, a change at the top is unlikely to represent a
fresh start for reform. Quite to the contrary. Their
"nothing new" strategy is nothing surprising, and no matter
who the salesman is, the concept will remain a hard sell with
a Hungarian public that looks backward more easily than
forward. Polling already shows that Parliament is now less
than half as popular as the postal service: that may well
give the future reforms Hungary needs less than half a
chance. End Comment.


FOLEY