U.S.-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BUDAPEST 000345

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE MARC NORDBERG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM MASS PAO KNNP NATO EU EZ PL
RS, IR, HU
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN
BUDAPEST ON DECEMBER 13, 2007

REF: A. SECSTATE 146521

B. MOSCOW 05059

C. MOSCOW 04956

Classified By: Ambassador April H. Foley: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: In the fourth round of expert-level meetings
in Budapest December 13, U.S. and Russian delegations, led by
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister
Kislyak, continued to discuss U.S. plans to place a missile
defense (MD) system in Central Europe (delegation lists at
paras. 23-24). U/S Rood put forward a number of transparency
and confidence building measures to deal with Russia's stated
concerns. The Russian side responded to the U.S. proposed
Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture and the threat
assessment indicators and confidence-building measures,
reiterating a number of objections made in previous talks.
Kislyak stressed that Russia does not see Iran as a threat,
believes there is no need for the proposed MD system, feels
the system threatens Russia, and objects to the fact that the
U.S. will "go ahead no matter what." At the end, Kislyak
undertook to look for ways to reduce Russian concerns as the
U.S. goes forward with deployment, as damage control. U/S
Rood also took the opportunity to register U.S.
disappointment on Russia's suspension of the CFE treaty.
Kislyak responded that the U.S. and Allies are to blame and
"we are not going to return to the old treaty." END SUMMARY.

"There is No Threat"
====================


2. (C) Concerning Russia's thoughts on the U.S. proposed
Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture, Deputy Foreign
Minister Kislyak opened by stating "there is no threat
compelling deployment of a defense any time soon," that the
U.S. is "creating facts on the ground" and there needs to be
agreement on what the threats are. Kislyak said Russia had a
problem understanding what "jointly" means in the
architecture proposed. General Buzhinskiy added that Russia
does not understand the degree of jointness, asking about who
would take decisions on engagement, the level of decision
making, and what the command and control structure would look
like. Kislyak argued that it was more logical to go back to
the original step-by-step proposal which President Putin
offered at Heiligendam: joint monitoring of the threat,
development of a joint threat assessment, and then later
developing a joint architecture based on the needs of the
assessed threat. Noting that the U.S. is proposing parallel
monitoring and missile defense deployment for "threats yet to
be defined," Kislyak said Russia does not understand the
purpose of this system that is "not in our national security
interest." He said Russia had a problem "not only about
technicalities, it's the concept" they have a problem with,
but the U.S. will "go ahead no matter what" Russia says.

No Missiles in Europe
=====================

3. (C) Buzhinskiy said he understood the discussion of
"non-activation" of the European MD system at the "2-plus-2"
meeting to mean that missiles would not be brought into
Europe. He said now the U.S. is instead talking about not
activating missiles in silos, which is "a completely
different thing." Kislyak said sharing information and
building a system before agreeing on what the threats are is
not "joint" cooperation. While stating that the U.S. has the
right to do what it needs to do, so does Russia. If the U.S.
does something deemed "destructive to our own national
security interests, we will take measures." He stated there
were a number of conditions that would reassure Russia the
system will not serve against Russia interests. The two most
important Russian conditions are: suspension of negotiations
on a third site and no deployments of weapons in space. The
"best guarantee" for Russia, Kislyak said, would be for the
U.S. to renounce current plans for the proposed European MD
system.


4. (C) U/S Rood supported cooperation on a joint regional
missile defense architecture as the best way for Russia to
gain confidence that the system would not adversely affect

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Russia's interests. The U.S. is also open to more modest
radar cooperation, and we have elaborated on President
Putin's proposal in our ideas. Rood expressed interest in
hearing Russia's concept of jointness. Responding to
Russia's call for the U.S. to renounce its plans for a MD
system in Europe, U/S Rood clearly stated that the U.S. is
not prepared to do so and that the U.S. has been consistent
on this point. He noted U.S. funding for space-based efforts
was very limited. Rood also said the U.S. had not stated
that we would not bring interceptors into Europe.


"Not an Add-On to Whatever You Do"
==================================

5. (C) U/S Rood asked Kislyak to elaborate further on what
Russia sees as "joint" cooperation and their development path
on the Putin proposal. Kislyak said Russia sees a
step-by-step process whereby there is a "joint architecture"
for a monitoring system and a joint center to exchange
information. Regarding a joint information center, he
proposed another center in Brussels in order to include
Europeans in a "joint" cooperation framework. Kislyak said
it is "too early to say" what a solution would look like
because there are different assets to be offered and it
depends on the threat. Kislyak stated that these steps would
represent real "joint" cooperation, "not an add-on to
whatever you do." Buzhinskiy added that it is not just about
assets "but joint analysis, joint evaluation, and joint
conclusions to make decisions. Who will make the decision to
fire the system?"


6. (C) Kislyak said that by pursuing a parallel process of
monitoring and missile deployment, the U.S. is rejecting the
Putin proposal. However, he also said in response to Rood's
question that the Putin proposal was not a "take it or leave
it" one. He lamented that the U.S. was "cherry-picking" from
Russia's proposal, using the Putin proposal as a "bolt on" to
the U.S. approach. Kislyak claimed that Poland and the Czech
Republic were "making statements" of being "extremely
unhappy" about a MD system. However, upon leaving the State
Department in Washington, Polish and Czech diplomats were
saying "it's not Iran, it's Russia." He cited the Czech
Foreign Minister's comment that the MD system was "against a
big country that has the capabilities now," meaning Russia.
Responding to the "cherry-picking" comment, U/S Rood
expressed disagreement, further emphasizing that the U.S. has
not rejected the Putin proposal, but rather has expanded upon
it and reaffirmed U.S. interest in strategic cooperation with
Russia on MD. As for comments by Polish and Czech officials,
the best step Russia could take would be to not make comments
about targeting Poland and the Czech Republic.

Saving Iran's Face
================

7. (S) Reiterating that Russia does not see Iran as a threat,
Kislyak stated "we do not understand" why the U.S. is
"rushing to establish" an architecture. He asked what other
realistic threats are there, offering that Israel is the only
other "threat" in the region. Kislyak said the U.S. is
asking Russia to work jointly on a MD system that the Russian
military believes "will work against us." Furthermore, he
said Russia has no desire to form an alliance with the U.S.
against Iran. He said Russia is attentive to Iran's national
pride, as well as maintaining the "political instruments" to
help provide the Iranians "a way out."


8. (S) U/S Rood stated that North Korean proliferation has
enabled Iran to acquire and produce missiles and created the
potential and grave concern for the least responsible states,
such as Damascus, to acquire this technology. Technology
transfers and the global availability of these technologies
are concerns that will not abate. Emphasizing that leading
nations have a special responsibility for maintaining peace
and security, U/S Rood stressed that Iran is in violation of
Security Council resolutions and any face-saving measures
need to be accompanied by continued international pressure to
come clean on their nuclear development programs.

Armavir Visit: Russia "Less Interested"
=======================================

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9. (C) Regarding the Moscow ABM system, U/S Rood asked if it
countered an Iranian threat. Kislyak responded that the
Moscow system was built to focus on the U.S., and
furthermore, Russia does not see a strategic threat from Iran
"politically, technologically, or economically." Turning to
the Qabala visit, U/S Rood asked if a similar visit to
Armavir radar site would be possible. Kislyak responded that
the Qabala visit was for the purposes that Putin had
proposed. Kislyak said he was disappointed with the results
of the visit and by General Obering's statement that Qabala
"would not be a substitute." Emphasizing that Qabala was
meant to be part of a system to monitor the threat and not to
serve to support a third site against Iran, Kislyak said if
the U.S. proceeds with negotiations with the Czech Republic
and Poland then Russia would be "less interested" in a U.S.
visit to Armavir. Referring to Kislyak's earlier comment
that the Putin proposal was not a "take it or leave it"
offer, DASD Green then asked if there was not a contradiction
with Russia's condition that the U.S. not proceed with
current third site negotiations. Kislyak responded that if
the U.S. goes ahead with the negotiations, then "you are
brushing aside the Putin proposal."

Qabala "Turned Off"
===================

10. (S) Moving the discussions to indicators on threat
assessments, U/S Rood referred to Russian FSB General
Vnietsiyev8 comments in Paris that a flight test of a
two-stage solid propellant missile from Iran would be an
indicator that would change their perception of an Iranian
threat. Kislyak and Buzhinskiy both responded, stating that
General Vnietsiyev was unable to make it to this experts,
round, but they did not recall this statement as a Russian
threat assessment "criterion." Kislyak emphasized that a
missile's range is the important criteria for Russia. U.S.
delegation intelligence analyst Kozlusky provided details on
the November 20 Iranian flight test of the two-stage, solid
fuel "Ashura" from the Semnan region in central Iran. The
U.S. noted that, although the launch encountered guidance
problems, the missile is projected to have a 2,000-2,500 km
range. Buzhinskiy acknowledged that Russia was not aware
this had occurred, but doubted that it was a solid propellant
missile, stating Qabala had been switched off for maintenance
during that time period. Kislyak drove the point home that
"Qabala was created against you", but now "we are relaxed and
could afford not to service it." Buzhinskiy also added that
there had been no "political decision" to use Qabala to
monitor Iran, hence it was not configured to do so. Pointing
out the unprecedented nature of U.S. shared intelligence with
Russia, U/S Rood suggested that Russia provide information to
change U.S. views that Iran is not a threat. Buzhinskiy
responded by asking the U.S. to provide "real" technical data
and "not just words."

You Say Milestones, I Say Criteria
==================================

11. (S) Kozlusky provided a briefing on a number of
indicators of long-range missile capability, including
testing to a range of 2000-2500 km, demonstration of staging,
and use of high energy propellants. Kislyak commented that
there is a difference in what he sees as "milestones" to
watch for and "criteria" for joint action. He believed that
such criteria require a "political decision" based on an
analysis of technical, military, and political
considerations. Buzhinskiy went further, stating that the
indicators presented were very broad and general in nature,
highlighting, for example, that some chemical "indicators"
are also used to manufacture household paint. He said the
"only criteria" he would consider is a "successful test of a
missile at a certain range." When asked to provide a list of
more detailed criteria, Kislyak responded that he was being
asked for a "list for your criteria, for your decision."
Summing up his views on the indicators presented, Kislyak
said "we have not been convinced" and "the system you are
deploying is targeted at us and not Iran." He added that the
U.S. threat indicator idea was "politically awkward" for
Russia, because if they agree to criteria/milestones, then
they are implicitly accepting the eventual construction of
the MD sites. Before there can be agreement on indicators or
related actions, Kislyak stated, there must be agreement on

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if the threat is "real or not." Continuing, he pointedly
asked if the U.S. already had people permanently stationed at
the proposed construction sites. U/S Rood responded that the
U.S. only had people at the site examining geographical
suitability. U/S Rood pointed out that not all indicators
need to be present to reach a threat assessment. He
encouraged Kislyak to develop a joint set of indicators; this
would help to bring about a convergence of views.


12. (C) Kislyak said that the U.S. had presented a "serious"
paper on indicators, which the Russian side would need to
seriously study. He added that Russia's concerns could be
reduced through transparency and confidence building
measures. The ministers at the 2-plus-2 had come close.
Some ideas had been put forward that must be developed.


Addressing Russian Concerns
===========================

13. (C) Responding to Russian concerns with the proposed MD
system, U/S Rood provided nine transparency and
confidence-building measures for Russian consideration that
include:

- Regular exchanges of information on MD policy, program,
technical, funding, threat assessments in a U.S.-Russia
Transparency Working Group;
- U.S. assurance not to construct in Europe more than 10
silo-launchers for 10 long-range GBIs without prior
notification and discussions;
- U.S. assurance of no major modifications of interceptor
silo-launchers without prior discussions;
- U.S. assurance to take into account developments in Iranian
missile program in decision making to bring the interceptor
site in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic to full
operational status;
- U.S. assurance not to conduct interceptor flight-tests from
silo-launchers in Poland;
- Sharing of "real-time" radar tracking data via centers in
Moscow and Brussels;
- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at
missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia;
- Potential visits to MD facilities in Poland and/or the
Czech Republic (subject to Host Nation agreement); and
- U.S. to provide Russia with rapid alerts via the
Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") of
any long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor
launches.

What Do You Mean By Operational?
================================

14. (S) Considering the proposal to use missile interrupter
plugs as a confidence-building measure, Buzhinskiy responded
that since it would only take several hours to make the
missile operational again, "it is not sufficient." Regarding
the possibility of storing missiles next to silos instead of
in them, Russian MoD Division Head Yegeniy Ilyin expressed
the concern that it would take only ten days to put the
interceptor in a silo. Mr Englander stated that MDA's
experience is closer to 20 days for each interceptor.
Reiterating their interpretation of Defense Secretary Gates,
comments at the "2-plus-2" meeting, that not having missiles
in silos meant no missiles in Europe, Buzhinskiy boiled down
the Russian condition to "silos are empty, missiles not in
Europe." Kislyak, further elaborating the Russian position,
stated that not fully operational means the interceptors
don't work, that Russia knows they don't work, and that
Russia knows this in advance. The best way to ensure that
interceptors are disabled is to keep them in the U.S.
Furthermore, he said if there are no missiles in the silos,
then there is no requirement for the radar to be turned on
either. This would allay Russian concerns about the radar
reaching into their territory.


15. (C) Rood said there are a number of ways to ensure that
interceptors won't work. Plugs could be installed in ways
that physically disable the interceptors. Visits or
technical monitoring could be used to determine that the
interceptors are disabled. Kislyak said Gates had said that
interceptors would not be put in silos. Rood replied that

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our concept is to bring interceptors to Europe and store them
in the silos. Is Russia interested in not loading the silos?
Would that decrease Russia's concerns? We propose an
interrupt mechanism, if you suggest the silos be empty, then
we can take that back to capitals.


16. (C) Kislyak asked to expand on ideas for the radar. Rood
said the U.S. is open to Russian ideas, and we could examine
ways to keep the radar off rather than on. Buzhinskiy said
the radar is useless when missiles are not in their silos.
Englander said that the radar is generally off unless
directed to engage a missile. Green said the radar needs to
be calibrated periodically. Buzhinskiy repeated that if
there are no missile in silos, that makes it easier to deal
with the radar.


17. (S) Buzhinskiy asked if the rapid alerts via the
"Hotline" would be pre- or post-notification. He said the
Russian early warning system will automatically react and a
post-notification would be too late. U/S Rood said the U.S.
could not assure Russia that it would be able to provide
pre-notifications. Buzhinskiy then went on to say that the
U.S. "may simply change the warhead to be nuclear."


18. (S) Responding to Kislyak's question on whether it was
the Poles and Czechs that did not want Russian observers at
the third site or the U.S., U/S Rood said it is a combination
of both. The U.S. does not think having daily observers is
necessary, and, furthermore, the Poles and Czechs have
obvious sensitivities with stationing a permanent Russian
force in their countries. Regarding the reciprocal
stationing of personnel in the U.S. and Russia, Buzhinskiy
said Russia does not see the U.S. as a threat and instead
sees the MD system in the Czech Republic and Poland as the
real threat. DASD Green offered that the U.S. missile
defense facility in Colorado is a worldwide monitoring center
and would be well suited to reciprocal stationing.


"First Time in History"
=======================

19. (C) Emphasizing again Russian concerns about the MD
system, Kislyak stated that the "best guarantee for us is
canceling the program." He said it would be the first time
in history that such missiles would be on "our borders." He
repeated that "if there is a threat to our assets, we will
take on the threat." Responding to the U.S. proposed
transparency and confidence-building measures, Kislyak said
Russia is being transparent in expressing the concerns of the
Russian people to a "non-existent threat" and that "we have
to respond to our people." He emphasized the U.S. needed to
understand that Russia sees this MD system as working against
them and "this is how we see the system."


The Road Ahead
==============

20. (C) Concerning the U.S. proposed confidence-building
measures, Kislyak said that he would delegate to his experts
for further consideration. His delegation will report
everything that had been discussed to Putin by the end of the
year. Kislyak said he appreciated the effort to address
Russian concerns. He had come to the view, however, that the
U.S. has decided to deploy without Russia, no matter what.
We now have to consider what can be done for "damage
control." He went on to say that the consequences of the
program will be much larger than what "you do in the Czech
Republic and Poland", that it will have long-term
consequences regarding proliferation, and "we will have to
calculate our options" about the "problems you are creating."
Russia will look at what can be done to reduce the concerns
it has as the U.S. goes forward. Most probably there are
significant limits on what the U.S. can do. The U.S. paper
was carefully written to ensure there would be no veto for
Russia. Kislyak said Russia would look at the ideas
presented. Russia wanted a way to gain a feeling that a
system, deployed in the absence of a threat, could not be
used against its interests.


21. (C) U/S Rood countered that the U.S. wants to continue

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to find a way to address most of Russia's concerns. We will
reflect on today's discussions and Russia's initial reactions
to our ideas on indicators and confidence-building measures,
and the point that had come out in the discussion that the
radar would be off in the absence of a missile launch except
for calibration. He expressed optimism that there was still
time for dialogue since 2013 would be the earliest the U.S.
could make the third site operational. Expressing a desire
for continued dialogue, the U/S proposed that the group
reconvene in January or early February 2008.

CFE and MD: Separate Issues
===========================

22. (C) U/S Rood also took the opportunity to register U.S.
disappointment regarding Russia's suspension of the CFE
treaty. Kislyak reiterated Russian claims that the U.S. and
Allies are to blame for the failure to ratify the Adapted
Treaty. He said "we are not going to change our views, we
are not going to return to the old treaty." He also said the
CFE treaty suspension has nothing to do with the MD
discussions. Providing a final thought on the treaty
suspension, Kislyak said "we are waiting for you." (NOTE:
The U.S. provided Russia with a revised Parallel Action Plan
on 21 December.)

Participants
============

23. (SBU) U.S.: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security John Rood (Head of
delegation),Ambassador Foley, EUR DAS Judy Garber, DASD
Brian Green, State/T Senior Advisor James Timbie, State/T
Chief of Staff Hugh Amundson, OSD Missile Defense Policy
Office Paul Dodge, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, OSD Col.
Jon Chicky, DOD Regional Expert Richard Trout, JCS J5 Scott
Roenicke, MDA Keith Englander, MDA Dan Lally, Senior
Intelligence Analyst Robert Kozlusky, MD Delegation Executive
Secretary William Shobert, Interpreter Yuri Shkeyrov, and

SIPDIS
Embassy notetaker.


24. (SBU) Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak
(Head of delegation),MoD Chief of Directorate General
Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MFA Deputy Head of North America
Department Oleg Burmistrov, MFA Deputy Head of Security and
Disarmament Department Sergey Koshelev, MFA Division Head
Vladimir Pavlov, MoD International Treaty Directorate
Division Head Evgeniy Ilyin, and MFA Counselor and
Interpreter Alexander Obukhov.
FOLEY