Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BUDAPEST245
2008-03-07 07:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

STRONG RHETORIC BUT MILD INTEREST AS REFERENDUM

Tags:  PGOV KDEM HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7999
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0245/01 0670702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070702Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2662
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000245 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: STRONG RHETORIC BUT MILD INTEREST AS REFERENDUM
APPROACHES


Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000245

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: STRONG RHETORIC BUT MILD INTEREST AS REFERENDUM
APPROACHES


Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: As voters prepare for this weekend's
referendum throughout Hungary's 19 megye (regional
districts),opinion leaders on both sides have been
escalating their rhetoric. Despite the intensity of their
comments, last-minute polling indicates softening turn-out
and the general sense of resignation indicates declining
interest in politics altogether. End Summary.

RED MEGYE; BLUE MEGYE


2. (SBU) Commentators aligned with the opposition continue
to cast the referendum as a vote of no-confidence in what
they portray as a government that is neither democratic nor
legitimate.


3. (C) Ivan Baba of "Budapest Analysis" has written that the
Gyurcsany government's goal is to strip the state of both its
power and its productive capacity through a stage-managed
privatization process. Their desired end-state, he charges,
is an impotent and irrelevant government unable to threaten a
narrow plutocracy which will control the means of production.
The goal, he alleged to us last week, is "a system that
looks democratic ( like Putin's Russia."


4. (C) Orban advisor Karoly Dan echoes this theme,
describing the Gyurcsany government as "not just in a
different lane on the same highway, but on a different path
altogether." After a week which saw another Gyurcsany trip
to Moscow, a step back from Kosovo recognition, and further
accusations of bankrupting public services, Dan contrasted
the present government with what he described as the more
cautious, consultative, and pro-Atlanticist Socialist
government of the mid-1990s. "The MSzP is right about one
thing," Dan concludes, "it has changed: it has gotten much
worse."

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK


5. (C) For its part, the coalition continues to take aim at
FIDESZ's populist rhetoric, casting its own reforms as an
attempt to "remove the last vestiges of Communism." The PM
has vowed to "honor the results of the referendum," but some
are now arguing that there would be no obligation to annul
the educational and medical fees until January of 2009.
There is also a fine line between the government downplaying
the referendum's significance and downright ignoring the
voice of the people.


6. (C) MSzP contacts have been quick to seize on Orban's
comments that Hungary is "not radical enough," raising the
specter that he would stop at nothing to topple the Gyurcsany
government. Baba admits that FIDESZ is vulnerable to these
charges, conceding that "Orban makes all the decisions (
including whether or not Orban will be the Prime Ministerial
candidate." For the first time in years, that has become
more than an academic question, particularly after popular
Debrecen Mayor Lajos Kosa publicly expressed his willingness
to stand as the FIDESZ candidate. Dan notes that the party's
own polling reflects a far better response from swing voters
to Kosa than to Orban, and other opinion surveys show FIDESZ
gaining more ground on the MSzP ( but losing it to
respondents who favor "a third force in politics." These
factors may combine to at least obligate party insiders to
think twice as they prepare for the next elections.

YAWNING IN ANTICIPATION?


7. (C) Comment: For all the extreme rhetoric prior to the
beginning of the mandated "silence period" March 8, the
atmosphere in the days before the referendum remains
curiously flat. The government's South Stream decision has
diverted much of the attention of the major players, and each
of the parties has its own internal distractions. Although
the most prominent scandal is the allegation that SzDSz
President Koka was elected by a fraudulent ballot, the
results of the referendum could present opportunities for
rivals within the MSzP and even within FIDESZ. The latest
polling indicates that efforts to build up the referendum may
be having diminishing returns. Some predictions regarding
turn-out show a plateau and others a decline; moreover, only
30 percent of respondents in one poll believed that the
government should step down as a result of the referendum,
undermining efforts to cast the vote as a de facto vote of no
confidence. The government may welcome these indications
that "March 9 will not change March 10," but they cannot
dismiss the prospect of a storm despite the current quiet.
Whatever happens on March 9, however, all parties should be
concerned about the strong indications of public apathy

BUDAPEST 00000245 002 OF 002


evident on March 8. End Comment.


FOLEY