Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BUDAPEST225
2008-02-29 16:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

TRYING TO HEAD NORTH: NEGOTIATING THE POST-SOUTH

Tags:  PREL ENRG PGOV KDEM HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1550
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0225/01 0601600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291600Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2631
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000225 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PREL ENRG PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: TRYING TO HEAD NORTH: NEGOTIATING THE POST-SOUTH
STREAM LANDSCAPE

REF: BUDAPEST 195 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000225

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PREL ENRG PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: TRYING TO HEAD NORTH: NEGOTIATING THE POST-SOUTH
STREAM LANDSCAPE

REF: BUDAPEST 195 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) We are bracing ourselves for another rough patch with
the GoH in the aftermath of Prime Minister Gyurcsany's latest
trip to Moscow.

ACTIONS AND REACTIONS


2. (C) Having secured the EU's acquiescence with
Commissioner Piebalgs' tepid public statement of
"understanding," the GoH will move forward on its South
Stream deal in the months ahead. As with the negotiations
over the past weeks, transparency will be a key concern in
the implementation phase. Despite a briefing for the leaders
of the five Parliamentary parties on the agreement signed in
Moscow and its subsequent posting on the Foreign Ministry's
website, details on the new state-owned company slated to
represent Hungary will likely be hard to come by. Moreover,
we put little faith in the current line that "it's just a
transit agreement." Still, we'll hear much more of it, along
with the frequent refrain of "we support all pipelines."


3. (C) Ultimately, Budapest seemingly feels content that the
political cover provided by Rome, Vienna, and Sofia will be
sufficient to weather any negative reaction from the U.S.
Their hope is that Washington ) like Brussels ) will
"understand" since, as is their frequent refrain, they "are
only doing what other EU members have already done." Indeed,
they are prepared to take liberties in order to give that
impression, as in Ambassador Banai's publicized comments
during a carefully staged briefing for NATO and EU
Ambassadors February 29 that State Department officials had
expressed "agreement" with Hungary's plans during his recent
meetings in Washington. His remarks have played in the
Hungarian press as U.S. "support" for Hungary's decision.


4. (C) But support for South Stream is not unanimous even
within the MSzP. There are those who see advantages to the
South Stream deal and those who simply see no alternatives.
Even the most ardent trans-Atlanticists continue to express

frustration with Nabucco's slow progress and with what they
see as impossible conditions imposed by our Iran policy. For
many, the South Stream decision is a choice to go with the
possible over the preferable. Gyurcsany advisor Klara Akots
assures us privately that the GoH does not want to see a bad
week lead to a bad relationship.


5. (C) If the pattern of strategic oscillation continues,
the GoH will look for (modest) ways to reiterate their
commitment to Nabucco, most notably the draft IGA they have
circulated to members of the consortium. SzDSz President
Koka is working with the opposition leadership to promote a
five-party parliamentary resolution supporting Nabucco and to
form a standing Nabucco Committee in Parliament. Both Koka
and FIDESZ leader Viktor Orban have indicated their support
in principle for Hungary's appointment of a "Nabucco Envoy."
(Note: Contrary to Koka's interest in the position, the PMO
tells us that the job will be filled by Ambassador Mihai
Bayer, a career diplomat with prior service in Chisinau and
in Asia. Bayer will reportedly take up his new
responsiblities on April 1. End Note.) MSzP MP Attila
Mesterhazy tells us that the PM is planning a trip to the
Middle East, with energy as his first priority. Mesterhazy
also emphasized to us his willingness to consider "any other
ways" Hungary can make clear its trans-Atlantic commitment.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE ON KOSOVO?


6. (C) But South Stream is not only a bad decision: it is a
bad decision which comes at a bad time. Following the events
at Embassy Belgrade, the Gyurcsany trip to Moscow, and a wave
of editorials from across the political spectrum counseling
caution, it now appears that the GoH will likely remain in
neutral for the time being on Kosovo in order to "carefully
assess all the risks and consequences." This move surprised
Orban advisor Karoly Dan, who remarked that "the South Stream
deal should have made Kosovo recognition MORE likely in order
to keep up the government's balancing act."


7. (C) Our sources have made much of recent Embassy comments
regarding our "expectation" that Hungary will recognize
Kosovo, casting them as interference in Hungary's sovereign
decision-making. This strikes us as being at least in part a
convenient and calculated overstatement, especially since our
comments reflected only our trust that Hungary would live up
to its public comments and its private commitments. We've
worked hard to clarify our position, and working-level
sources at the MFA advise us that "the paperwork is ready to

BUDAPEST 00000225 002 OF 002


go." They believe, however, that the GoH is waiting for a
clear majority of EU member states to recognize before it
moves forward.

FRAYED TEMPERS


8. (C) Dan and Mesterhazy admit that the approaching
referendum has tempers fraying on both sides of the aisle.


9. (C) From FIDESZ's perspective, declining projections
regarding voter turn-out threaten to reduce their margin of
victory and thus undermine the political impact of the
referendum. There is already some finger-pointing regarding
the organization of the referendum campaign, and Dan believes
the party needs a major overhaul before the 2009 European
Parliamentary Elections. "Losing was funny in 2002 and sad
in 2006," he concluded, "but it would be tragic next time."
That sense of urgency may explain the opposition's public
characterization of the South Stream deal as a "coup d'etat."


10. (C) Although its public focus has been on minimizing the
significance of the referendum as a "technical exercise,"
Mesterhazy admits privately that "as much as we say it
doesn't matter ) it matters." (Note: He met with us on the
margins of a press conference hastily called to condemn
FIDESZ's "call to radicalism." End Note.) The MSzP hopes
the Prime Minister's latest policy initiatives (reftel) may
give them some long-awaited traction with voters, and would
like nothing more than a referendum which is either
underwhelming ) or better still ) invalid due to low
turn-out.

TURNING FRICTION INTO ENERGY


11. (C) Comment: Both parties are playing to the
grandstands and seizing on any potential advantage. With the
Prime Minister and Orban already denouncing each other as
"buffoon" and "monarch," the South Stream decision has
further increased the government's defensiveness and the
opposition's accusations. Both sides are more ready than
ever to drag the U.S. into their conflicts ) and more
sensitive than ever to the others' perceived efforts to do
so. The end result is that every issue quickly becomes a
domestic political issue ( and that we run the attendant
risk of perceived "interference" as we engage. An
appreciation of that risk should guide ) but not stay - our
hand in the weeks ahead. The government will likely become
less hypersensitive about South Stream and more sensitive to
Western perceptions as time goes by. Our goal will be to use
both the government's desire to keep all options open and the
opposition's ire over the South Stream decision to accelerate
further progress on Nabucco. End Comment.


FOLEY