ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA: WARY NEIGHBORS, HESITANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000561

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE AND EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2018
TAGS: MD PBTS PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA: WARY NEIGHBORS, HESITANT
PARTNERS TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS

REF: A. CHISINAU 556

B. CHISINAU 123

C. BUCHAREST 35

D. BUCHAREST 480 (NOTAL)

E. 07 BUCHAREST 314

Classified By: CDA, a.i. Mark Taplin; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: GOR interlocutors, including President
Basescu, have made clear that prospects for concluding a
border regime treaty between Romania and Moldova prior to
parliamentary elections and the selection of a new Moldovan
president are very low, even if there have been some limited
positive signs in recent months in this underperforming
bilateral relationship. The July 7 visit of Romanian FM
Comanescu to Chisinau left Romanian officials more optimistic
about the prospects for making progress this year, including
the renewed possibility that Romania could open new consular
offices outside of the Moldovan capital. But while there is
more dialogue between the sides than was the case a year, or
even six months ago, Romanian diplomats agree that obstacles
at the political level are unlikely to be overcome soon. On
the plus side, the robust development of day-to-day,
people-to-people cross-border ties will likely continue to
outpace the still constipated political dialogue. End
Summary.


2. (C) During the past month, Embassy has reached out to
various GOR officials to discuss the state of play on the
continuing Romanian-Moldovan negotiations for a border regime
treaty, as well as more generally on Romanian's complex
relations with Moldova. Conversations with President Basescu
(Reftel D) and his chief Foreign Policy Advisor Anca Iliniou
have left no doubt that there is little appetite for
concluding agreements as long as Voronin is in office and his
Communist party is vying for the affections of the Moldovan
electorate. While there may be greater readiness elsewhere
in the GOR to reach accords with Chisinau, Basescu is
effectively in the driver's seat. The President's skepticism
has by and large been translated downwards to a Romanian
approach that is focused on the long-term picture after
Voronin, while promoting wherever possible stronger economic,
commercial and people-to-people ties between the two
countries, as well as positive prospects for Moldova's
eventual accession to the EU.


3. (C) During a June 11 meeting with Charge and Poloff, MFA
Director General for Judicial Affairs Cosmin Dinescu briefed
on the status of Romania's negotiations with the Republic of
Moldova on three potential agreements currently under
discussion: a border regime treaty, a basic political
treaty, and the Romanian initiated talks over a Local Border
Traffic Convention under the framework of the EU Neighborhood
Policy. In all three instances, Dinescu said that while
there had been progress, obstacles remained, a situation he
attributed to "inflexibility" on the Moldovan side and the
limited authorities of Moldova's negotiators.


4. (C) On the border regime treaty, Dinescu went to some
length describing the "de facto" and "de jure" recognition of
the border between Romania and the Republic of Moldova,
arguing that the border exists "independent of successor
state status and subsequent treaties under international
custom." If a country has a border with one state, a change
in the status of the neighboring country does not necessarily
precipitate a renegotiation of the border, he explained.
This is the reasoning behind the Romanian view that the
discussion is not about establishing a border, which Romania
already recognizes as fully established, but rather updating
the technical regime by which the border is managed and
administered, Dinescu underscored. As an example, he said,
Romania sought a border regime agreement as a means for
posting and maintaining border signs, managing environmental
and course changes in the Prut River, and cost-sharing, "but
not establishing borders."


5. (C) Dinescu pointed out that the original text for the
draft border regime treaty in 2005 was submitted by Romania,
and was consistent with similar negotiations undertaken with
Ukraine. He described the initial round of negotiations with
the Republic of Moldova as having moved quickly towards
conclusion. However, Chisinau then unexpectedly introduced
the argument that the two sides needed to conclude a full
"border treaty" versus a border regime treaty, and insisted
on making reference to the 1947 Paris Treaty -- which was an
unacceptable formulation politically for Romania since it
raised the spectre of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on which
the Paris agreement was based. He underscored that Romania's
solution -- a reference to the 1961 "Treaty between the USSR

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and Romania on the Regimen of the Soviet-Romanian State
Frontier" -- avoided the direct linkage to 1947, and made the
point that the state borders were already defined.


6. (C) Chisinau's insistence on a border treaty created both
legal and political problems in the negotiations, Dinescu
observed. The argument made by Moldovan officials that their
government had successfully negotiated a border treaty with
their Ukrainian neighbor was a false analogy. The Republic
of Moldova and Ukraine had pursued a full border treaty since
as former constituent entities of the Soviet Union they only
shared administrative boundaries (i.e., no state border),and
because they had the additional complication of an actual
territorial exchange. It was risky, he suggested, for
Chisinau to argue that there was no border between Romania
and Moldova until a treaty was signed. Dinescu said that
both Romania and Moldova would have difficulties with their
respective parliaments and publics if they seized upon the
notion that there was not a defined border. If Chisinau were
only to accept the Romanian view that the border was already
fully established, it would also help the Moldovan
authorities in reassuring Tiraspol that Romania has no
territorial claims on the Republic of Moldova, Dinescu
emphasized.


7. (C) Likewise, the MFA's Director for Cooperation with the
Republic of Moldova (and husband of the MFA State Secretary
for Europe),Constantin Matache, blamed Chisinau for the
failure to bring the border regime treaty negotiations to
closure. Matache gave the example of the May 14-15
discussions (ref a),where some of Romania's counterproposals
were reportedly not even presented to senior officials in
Chisinau because the Moldovan negotiators said they
conflicted with their current instructions. On the other
hand, Matache noted that he and his Moldovan counterparts had
been able to work out a relatively positive joint statement
for the May 28 working visit to Bucharest by Moldovan Vice
Foreign Minister Valeriu Ostalep.


8. (C) Matache pointed out that the desultory official
exchanges between Bucharest and Chisinau were actually out of
step with the growing cross-border interactions between the
two countries. Matache said he was surprised at the level of
these unofficial interactions, and described the relationship
below the political threshold as "healthy and getting
stronger." He added that every week there was always some
new link that he was just discovering, mainly--but not
exclusively--in the commercial and trade dimensions. While
acknowledging that political statements on both sides of the
border often gave leverage to those who would oppose a
Romanian-Moldovan accommodation, Matache pointed to that fact
that various parochial interests, both within the ruling
Moldovan Communist Party and in Moscow and Tiraspol, made
concluding formal agreements very difficult.


9. (C) Matache noted that although the border agreement
language was held up by only three minor points (ref. B),
they were difficult to overcome because they were rooted in
the difference between Soviet and Romanian historical views.
He also noted that inclusion of any references in the text to
what were basically Soviet ultimata imposed on Romania, or
other veiled references to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, would
be "political suicide" for any Romanian politician to
endorse; seeking Parliamentary ratification of an agreement
that "basically enshrines a national humiliation" was a
non-starter. Matache noted that Romania wants any agreement
to look forward, not backward. That said, he added, it was
all the more difficult to make progress when the Moldovan
parliament had moved to ban holders of foreign passports from
holding office when only Romanian passport holders in Moldova
were publicly known. Matache was hopeful that there might
yet be some opening for improvements. Until then he was in a
"wait and see" mode.


10. (C) More optimistically, MFA State Secretary for Europe
Raduta Matache (Constantin Matache's spouse) provided Charge
with a relatively upbeat assessment of FM Comanescu's July 7
visit to Chisinau, in which the Romanian FM met with
President Voronin, PM Grechany, and with his counterpart
Andrei Stratan. Matache stressed that Comanescu had had "a
very good visit," that had been marked by a positive and
pragmatic atmosphere. This was in sharp contrast, she
acknowledged, with former Romanian FM Cioroianu's poorly
planned December 2007 visit to Chisinau, which had put a sour
capstone on a difficult year in the bilateral relationship.
Matache was above all encouraged by the fact that Moldovan
officials had indicated they were ready to consider reopening
negotiations to establish two new Romanian consulates in the
Moldovan towns of Balti and Cahul. "It wasn't a complete

BUCHAREST 00000561 003 OF 003


'yes,' Matache explained, "but they understood our arguments
about the necessity of expanding our consular services." She
said that the lines in front of the overstretched Romanian
consulate in Chisinau were at a record high during this
summer season, and both governments recognized they needed to
take steps to improve the situation.


11. (C) Matache was also upbeat by what she hoped would be "a
new type of dialogue," noting that all of the July 7
discussions were "pragmatic, very civilized." FM Comanescu,
she observed, had taken a "very practical line," avoiding the
temptation to "digress on identity issues" and being careful
to refer to "state-to-state relations" rather than other
constructs more problematic to Moldovan ears. It was agreed
that FM Stratan would visit Bucharest soon. There had even
been discussion of common priorities for the use of Romanian
bilateral assistance in 2009; it was a suggestion of a new
willingness to discuss the contours of the Romanian-Moldovan
relationship in a post-Voronin era. In turn, Matache
reported that the Moldovan side had put "surprisingly little
emphasis" on the question of the outstanding border-related
agreements, in contrast to the sometimes acrimonious
exchanges of the past. Instead, she said, "we were just very
thankful that it all went so smoothly," since Bucharest had
come to expect the unexpected -- and untoward -- in its
dealings with Chisinau.


12. (C) Comment: Romania is longing for Moldova to become
more predictable and "flexible." It may take awhile. We
have learned not to pay too much heed to the shifting
rhetorical winds across this border, which blow hot and cold
according to the exigencies of domestic politics in both
countries. Each side has it respective policy and legal
arguments, but neither party is likely to demonstrate the
will to come to closure on a border agreement before upcoming
elections in both countries play out in the first half of

2009. Basescu, in particular, seems intent on avoiding any
steps that would strengthen the hand of Voronin or his
Communist party in the run-up to elections next door. Nor
from what we can see here in Bucharest does Voronin, who
spent most of last year baiting Basescu and the Romanian
government, seem greatly interested in fostering better
bilateral relations, especially since Romania-bashing appeals
to his base and facilitates his dialogue with Moscow and
Tiraspol. Rather, the gravitational pull of Europe,
including the robust employment opportunities for Moldovans
in Romania and beyond, will probably do more in the long-run
to anchor the Republic of Moldova westward than the
problematic intergovernmental relationship. In the upcoming
electoral season, we can only reasonably expect incremental
progress, and, with some luck, a more cordial official
dialogue between the two capitals. End comment.
TAPLIN