Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BUCHAREST311
2008-04-18 14:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

ROMANIA: FRUSTRATION WITH EU PARTNERS ON ENERGY

Tags:  ENRG EINV PGOV PREL RO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1981
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0311/01 1091459
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181459Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8188
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0044
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0016
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0041
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4134
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0218
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000311 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USEU BRUSSELS FOR AMB GRAY
EEB FOR SMANN, SGALLOGLY
EUR/FO FOR JGARBER, MBRYZA
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC MICHAEL CARPENTER
NSC FOR LCATIPON
DOE FOR TYLER TILLER
STATE PASS USTDA FOR DSTEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018
TAGS: ENRG EINV PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: FRUSTRATION WITH EU PARTNERS ON ENERGY
SECURITY

REF: BUCHAREST 216

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Taplin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USEU BRUSSELS FOR AMB GRAY
EEB FOR SMANN, SGALLOGLY
EUR/FO FOR JGARBER, MBRYZA
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC MICHAEL CARPENTER
NSC FOR LCATIPON
DOE FOR TYLER TILLER
STATE PASS USTDA FOR DSTEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018
TAGS: ENRG EINV PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: FRUSTRATION WITH EU PARTNERS ON ENERGY
SECURITY

REF: BUCHAREST 216

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Taplin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Visiting DAS Matthew Bryza's April 3 meeting
with Prime Minister Tariceanu's Chief of Staff, Ambassador
Mihnea Constantinescu, and Romanian Ambassador to the U.S.,
Adrian Vierita, exposed Romania's frustration with the EU's
reluctance to think strategically about energy security.
Constantinescu seemed to be out of ideas on how to continue
pushing the issue within the EU and sought DAS Bryza's help
in identifying potential allies and new engagement
strategies. Constantinescu sought
reassurance that energy security was an appropriately serious
issue from the U.S. point of view to justify having the Prime
Minister discuss it with President Bush. End Summary


2. (C) Constantinescu began by saying Romania is frustrated
that other EU countries are focusing on
disparate energy projects, which dilutes the EU's ability to
present a common front against Gazprom's aggressive approach
in Europe. He requested DAS Bryza's help in identifying
another European country that shares Romania's energy
security concerns and with which Romania could partner in an
effort to raise the profile of the issue within the EU. DAS
Bryza suggested approaching Poland and/or Lithuania, and
Constantinescu said he would follow up. Constantinescu
stressed that NATO's decision not to include energy security
in its Bucharest summit program was a disappointment to the
GOR, and he sought advice as to which other forums would be
appropriate for encouraging more strategic thinking on the
part of the Europeans. DAS Bryza suggested continuing to
work within the EU to put energy security on the agenda.
This could be done by lobbying for ministerial level
meetings, and by shifting the focus away from the periphery
of the EU back to Brussels. Bryza acknowledged that Romania
has faced an uphill battle in convincing the other European
states that energy is more than just a commercial issue.


3. (C) Reiterating Romania's strong support for the Nabucco
pipeline project, Constantinescu inquired where Turkey and
Azerbaijan currently stand on the project. Bryza responded
that the two governments are close to a gas transit
agreement. Constantinescu characterized Turkish President
Gul's recent visit to Romania as polite and diplomatic, but
without substantive commitments when it came to Nabucco. He
agreed that the Europeans need to engage Azerbaijan more
directly if the EU hopes to ensure stable long-term gas
supplies. He felt that there have been missed opportunities
in the Romania-Azerbaijan bilateral relationship and hoped to
exploit these opportunities more aggressively in the future.


4. (C) Considering alternative strategies should Nabucco not
materialize, Constantinescu said that White Stream (a
pipeline project to draw Caspian Gas to Europe via an
underground route from Georgia to Ukraine) would be an
acceptable option from Romania's point of view. The GOR
remains interested in LNG projects, noting that imports of
LNG from Georgia via tanker across the Black Sea could be one
possibility.


5. (C) Comment. Chief of Staff Constantinescu is the Prime
Minister's lead foreign policy advisor and a very thoughtful
interlocutor on energy issues. His comments suggest that,
while Romania will remain committed to a Southern Corridor
gas strategy, the GOR is less certain of the staying power of
its Nabucco partners, both downstream and up, and is seeking
to hedge its bets. According to Government insiders, the PM
has tasked Constantinescu with re-examining the country's
external energy policy, though his central role in virtually
every important issue at Victoria Palace has made it
difficult for him to focus on this task. Constantinescu's
discourse with DAS Bryza and his desire for reassurances that
the USG will remain committed to Nabucco -- and to European
energy security more generally -- reflect rising anxieties

BUCHAREST 00000311 002 OF 002


that Romania could be left out in the cold if Nabucco
falters. Continued U.S. high-profile engagement on this
issue will be critical to maintaining Romanian resolve. End
comment.


6. (U) DAS Bryza did not have the opportunity to clear this
message.
TAUBMAN