Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BUCHAREST141
2008-02-21 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

ROMANIA: KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE DEMARCHE DELIVERED

Tags:  PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU KV RO 
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VZCZCXRO3812
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBM #0141 0521508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211508Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7945
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES IMMEDIATE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0368
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 0096
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000141 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE A.JENSEN AND EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU KV RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: A. STATE 16319

B. BUCHAREST 00130

Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas Taubman: REASONS 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE A.JENSEN AND EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU KV RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: A. STATE 16319

B. BUCHAREST 00130

Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas Taubman: REASONS 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) EMBOFF delivered ref. a demarche on February 20 to MFA
State Secretary for Europe Raduta Matache; FM Cioroianu was
traveling in Israel at the time. Matache noted that Romania
was not going to recognize Kosovo's independence, referring
to public comments and commitments made by President Basescu,
Prime Minister Tariceanu and the recent declaration by
Parliament affirming this policy (reported in ref. b). That
said, Matache noted that Romania shares all of the other
objectives expressed by the USG. Romania is committed, she
said, to stay fully engaged in Kosovo and to do what it can
to promote peace, security and prosperity for both Kosovo and
Serbia. Romania has positioned itself to help facilitate
Serbia's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic
structures and institutions, and hopes to play a calming role
with Belgrade.


2. (C) Matache expounded on the reasoning behind the
Basescu's decision to take this approach, reflecting that
Romania has too much history and experience in the Balkans
where borders were changed by outside powers (she mentioned
Soviet Russia's moves on Moldova) to the region's detriment.
She said Romania would maintain its commitments to KFOR and
ESDP, but recognition of Kosovo cannot occur until there was
a substantial change in the current political environment in
Belgrade. Romania wants to assist with that transformation
so that Belgrade can take positive steps towards resolving
its relationship with Pristina. Matache noted Romania is
Serbia's friend and neighbor, and will not abandon it as long
as there was a friendly government in Belgrade. She pointed
out that President Tadic would coming to Bucharest on
February 21, to meet with Basescu, Tariceanu, and Parliament
leaders, in a demonstration of that friendship. She said
Romania could help Serbia weather the charged political
atmosphere resulting from the turbulence triggered by the
Kosovo independence announcement. She hoped Romania would
help Tadic keep open the doors to NATO and the EU.


3. (C) Finally, Matache underscored that Romania's concerns
were not/not related to the Hungarian minority or any issues
involving Transylvania. She pointed out that the UDMR (the
ethnic-Hungarian party) are good partners and work well with
everyone in the government and Parliament. She said Romania
is much more concerned about the implications of Kosovo's
independence for Moldova and Russian-controlled Transniestra.
She said that this point should not be forgotten. She added
that it was important for Romania and the U.S. to keep open
good channels of communication on all of these regional
security issues.


4. (C) Comment: Matache was aware that Basescu's foreign
affairs advisor Anca Ilinoiu spoke to the Ambassador earlier
that afternoon about Tadic's trip to Bucharest. She believed
that Serbia will eventually calm down and accept "the
inevitable," but for now, tensions are a bit high in the
region and someone (like Basescu) needs to be positioned to
help improve the regional dialogue. While Basescu would like
to be a prime interlocutor between Belgrade and Brussels, we
remain skeptical as to his ability to influence events in
Serbia. On the other hand, we are concerned that Basescu
himself has limited his room to maneuver both regionally and
domestically with his adamant opposition to recognizing
Kosovo's independence. End Comment.
TAUBMAN