Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS955
2008-06-24 11:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

SYRIA AND IRAN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE AND

Tags:  PREL ECON EFIN KTFN MNUC KNNP PARM IR SY EUN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #0955/01 1761128
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O 241128Z JUN 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000955 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN KTFN MNUC KNNP PARM IR SY EUN
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE AND
SOLANA'S DEPUTY CONFER ON NEXT STEPS

BRUSSELS 00000955 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Alyce Tidball, Acting Political Counselor, for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000955

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN KTFN MNUC KNNP PARM IR SY EUN
SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE AND
SOLANA'S DEPUTY CONFER ON NEXT STEPS

BRUSSELS 00000955 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Alyce Tidball, Acting Political Counselor, for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) During a June 13 visit to Brussels, U.S. Mission to
the IAEA Ambassador Gregory Schulte met with EU Council
Secretariat Director General Robert Cooper to discuss nuclear
non-proliferation efforts vis a vis Iran and Syria. Schulte
obtained Cooper's assurance that the EU would take formal
action on June 23 to designate several Iranian entities and
individuals, including Bank Melli, for asset freezes and
travel bans. (NOTE: The EU adopted the measure at a
ministerial Council meeting on June 23, reported septel.) On
the eve of his departure for Tehran to deliver the P5 1
enhanced package, Solana had "zero" expectation of positive
results. His main objective would be to gain positive and
widespread media coverage of the package in order to fuel
debate on the nuclear issue among Iranian elites. Amb.
Schulte shared U.S. views on the suspected Syrian nuclear
site bombed by Israel and asked for EU support on next steps
on the subsequent IAEA investigation of the Syrian
activities. Cooper was interested in determining whether
Tehran knew of Syria's nuclear activities before the Israeli
attack on the site, since the case could be used to
illustrate to Iran's leadership that such illicit nuclear
programs only served to decrease national security and
regional stability. END SUMMARY.

Low Expectations, More Sanctions Coming
--------------

2. (C) On the margins of a June 13 visit to the Brussels
Media Hub for media programming, U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA
Gregory Schulte, accompanied by CDA Murray and poloff
notetaker, met with EU Council Secretariat Director General
Robert Cooper to review next steps on Iran and Syria in the

IAEA and the EU. At the outset of the meeting, Schulte
obtained Cooper's assurance that the EU would take formal
action on June 23 to designate several Iranian entities and
individuals, including Bank Melli, for asset freezes and
travel bans. Cooper noted that his boss CFSP High
Representative Javier Solana had not wanted the EU to take
the designation action on June 16 because, according to EU
procedures, the issue for decision would have had to have
been published on June 13, just hours before his departure
for his June 13-15 trip to Tehran. Despite efforts to
improve atmospherics for the visit, Solana and his team had
"zero" expectation of positive results. Tehran was miffed at
Solana's decision to turn down the offer of a meeting with
President Ahmedinejad. As a result, Cooper said the Iranian
MFA had already scaled back the delegation's meetings
schedule. Meetings with Majles Foreign Affairs Committee and
Ali Larijani, Velayati, and the Supreme Leader's foreign
policy advisor were now canceled by the Iranian hosts.
Meetings with FM Mottaki and NSA Jalili were still on. In
any case, Solana's main objective would be to disseminate as
widely as possible an upbeat, forward-looking message on the
enhanced package out, with a view toward stimulating debate
among Iran's policy elite. Solana planned to circulate the
P5 1 letter in both English and Farsi as well as an overview
of the benefits of the enhanced package geared toward helping
to transform Iran' into a modern, high tech, energy producing
country. Schulte suggested that Solana not only saturate
Iranian media, but also work with BBC Farsi, VOA, Radio
Farda.

China and Russia Problems
--------------

3. (C/NF) Cooper underscored that certain EU member states
were more anxious to obtain Chinese cooperation on sanctions
than Russian cooperation. In Cooper's view, Chinese oil
deals were on a different level of magnitude than European
deals (Swiss, Austrian) on gas. Cooper said he was planning
to "make a major pitch" to the Chinese Ambassador to Brussels
on its own strategic interest in helping to push the Iranians
harder to suspend and negotiate. Schulte noted that he
would be in Beijing on June 16 where he would make a similar
push. (Note: Cooper shares USEU's assessment that the newly
arrived Chinese Ambassador is well connected in Beijing,
having served in previous assignments in the Office of the

BRUSSELS 00000955 002.2 OF 002


Prime Minister, and MFA Policy Planning.) As for the
Russians, Gazprom's intentions were a concern, as well as the
possibility of an Iran-Russia gas cartel. Russia would
continue to oppose tough sanctions against Iran because it
did not want to endanger profits related to conventional arms
sales and nuclear reactor construction contracts. Cooper
further assessed that, given their own understanding of
Iran's current technical problems, the Russians did not take
seriously the Iranian nuclear program. In Cooper's view,
Russia ceased being serious about sanctions after the release
of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. It
wanted to be "part of the game, but not see it actually
progress."

IAEA Dynamics
--------------

4. (C/NF) Schulte and Cooper agreed that the May 2008 IAEA
technical experts report on Iran was the toughest to date.
Cooper was pleased to see the first reference to a "military
dimension" to the covert program, including through the
linkage of actions such as testing, procurement, and
research. Schulte noted that El-Baradei's own political
report was weaker and even contradicted the experts. This
disparity gave the Iranians an excuse to call for
verification of experts' evidentiary documents. Cooper
agreed that there was strong collateral proof of Iran's
activities; no less than ten EU member states shared
information with IAEA inspectors, including procurement data
from several East European EU member states.

SCR 1803: Waiting for the French?
--------------

5. (C) Cooper lamented that the EU was "nowhere" on 1803
implementation debate given the gap between those who
supported a "robust" approach and those who supported a
narrow one. He hoped that the non-results of the Solana trip
to Tehran would help alter the climate for EU debate in favor
of a robust approach on UNSCR 1803 during the French
Presidency, perhaps as early as July. In response to Amb.
Schulte's question, Cooper also expected the incoming French
Presidency would be able to obtain Commission financial
support for the IAEA nuclear fuel bank initiative in the next
six months.


Syria: IAEA Inspections Needed
--------------

6. (C) On Syria, Amb. Schulte shared U.S. views on the
suspected Syrian nuclear site, including the implications for
North Korea, and asked for EU support on next steps on the
subsequent IAEA investigation. He stressed the importance of
a concerted EU call for IAEA inspectors to be granted full
access to the main site as well as other related sites.
Cooper noted that the United States had garnered support from
the international community for its approach. Many in the
G-77 mistrusted Syria, despite their "rubbish" collective
statements. Cooper was also interested in determining whether
Tehran knew of Syria's nuclear activities before the Israeli
attack on the site, since the case could be used to
illustrate to Iranians that such illicit nuclear programs
only served to decrease national security and regional
stability.


7. (U) Ambassador Schulte did not have the opportunity to
clear this cable before transmission.
CHASE
.