Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS943
2008-06-20 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

GETTING THE MOST OUT OF FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION

Tags:  PREL EUN CFSP PGOV BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 200856Z JUN 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000943 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN CFSP PGOV BE
SUBJECT: GETTING THE MOST OUT OF FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION
WITH THE EU

Classified By: USEU PolMinCouns Larry Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000943

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL EUN CFSP PGOV BE
SUBJECT: GETTING THE MOST OUT OF FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION
WITH THE EU

Classified By: USEU PolMinCouns Larry Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: The EU's Common and Foreign Security
Policy (CFSP) increasingly drives Europe's foreign policy
agenda. Practically, the monthly GAERC meetings set the
timetable for foreign policy decision-making; theologically,
"EU unity" is a compelling political message that no member
state can ignore. When it works well, CFSP is a positive
force for advancing USG objectives. Frequently, however, the
EU's consensus-based foreign policy process veers off either
into policy paralysis or distorted policy outcomes dictated
by individual member states. Moreover, CFSP has enhanced the
influence of the mid-tier states at the expense of Germany,
the UK and France. The "EU-3" are increasingly unable to
drive policy even when they are united. For the US,
achieving foreign policy objectives in this environment
requires a fresh approach. The most effective member states
have found ways around the paralysis of the official process.
They work the system (both member states and the
institutions) early, informally, and systematically. They do
not limit their discussions to a few member states or select
Brussels officials. The US can profit from this example.
Many member states are eager to work with us and we have much
to offer in terms of global vision and policy expertise. By
reaching out early, we can fashion operational strategies
that leverage member state differences and that can better
coordinate Washington and field efforts. (Note: Because the
EU decision-making operates differently in the economic
sphere, this message will focus only on CFSP.) End Summary

CFSP increasingly drives the European foreign policy agenda
-------------- --------------


2. (U) Senior European officials meet far more often in an
EU context than any other. Foreign ministers alone meet
monthly at the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations
Council). As a result, no sooner do MFAs finish one GAERC
than they begin preparing for the next. But the GAERC is
only the most visible element of an extensive web of EU
foreign policy working groups that meet frequently and funnel

conclusions into the EU Political and Security Committee
(PSC) in Brussels. The very regularity of these meetings
makes them agenda forcing events: the 27 are under pressure
to adopt common positions because the simple act of meeting
requires outcomes.


3. (C) Politically, too, foreign ministers are increasingly
reluctant to take any action without considering how they
will explain it at the next GAERC. For example: diplomats of
the EU participants in the 2006 UN deployment in Lebanon all
assured us that their countries would not have joined the
deployment without the blessing of the rest of the EU-27,
even though the EU had no formal role in the deployment.
This does not imply, however, the emergence of an EU
political "bloc", as many feared might emerge at NATO. On
the contrary, we continually encounter evidence of
disagreements, differing priorities, jealousies, and -- most
importantly -- shifting coalitions. Many member states are
eager to share information and strategies with us, looking
for US support of their positions in internal debates. In
short, CFSP determines the pace, timing, and context of
European foreign policy decision-making, but has not resulted
in a European monolith.

A common strategic perspective...
--------------


4. (SBU) CFSP is frequently a positive force for advancing
US objectives. First it provides a structure for European
actions abroad, including missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova
and Gaza, which neither we nor the Europeans could easily
replicate otherwise. Without CFSP it would also be
impossible to get Europe to work together on complex issues
like Iran and Burma sanctions (where, given European economic
integration, a common policy approach is essential).
Finally, when the EU speaks with one voice, the political
power and moral stature of Europe's message to authoritarian
regimes (Zimbabwe, Belarus and Burma) is greatly enhanced.

But policy paralysis and least-common denominator results
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Unfortunately, the CFSP process all too often results
in policy paralysis. The wide divergence of interests among
the 27 is certainly one reason (how could they ever agree on
a common energy policy toward Russia?). However, the more
fundamental problem is that the requirement for unanimity
skews both the process and its outcomes. Even on critical

BRUSSELS 00000943 002 OF 005


priority issues, such as the EULEX deployment in Kosovo,
unanimity bogs down the process and forces the 27 into
agenda-consuming deliberations. On issues of less import, or
more controversy - ranging from policy toward Georgia, Turkey
and ESDP, the Greeks on Macedonia, the Russian Partnership
and Cooperation negotiations etc -- the process either ends
without consensus or results in a decision too watered down
to be useful. Unanimity means that individual states can
and do insist on outrageous "red-lines" (the Cypriots are the
leading but hardly the only practitioners of one issue
diplomacy).

The rising influence of the 2nd tier member states
-------------- --------------


6. (C) A key result of the CFSP process is the diminishing
dominance of the majors (Britain, Germany, and France).
Partly this is a function of the present political
weakness/lack of strategic unity of the EU-3. Partly too, it
is because the EU has become too big and its foreign policy
too complex for the majors to maintain strategic dominance.
Instead, we are seeing a rise in influence of the mid- tier
member states. In recent weeks, for example, Spain's
orchestration of a change in EU Cuba policy has clearly
demonstrated how a committed member can utilize the dynamics
of CFSP to build momentum for change despite significant
opposition.


7. (C/NF) Spain has done this systematically: orchestrating
its proposal with sympathetic officials in the Council
Secretariat and Commission (who can often help drive agendas
by writing initial policy drafts),building a coalition of
states, and applying considerable pressure on smaller states.
Moreover, one of the evolving dynamics of CFSP is that
smaller states are frequently reluctant to challenge a
committed state on a given issue, knowing that the unanimity
process means that they might need that state's support (or
acquiescence) on a different issue in the future. The
implicit threat of such retaliation (and indeed the Spanish
have made it explicit at times) is clearly one reason why,
with the exception of the Czechs, most eastern European
states have quietly acquiesced to Spain's Cuba policy, even
though they generally do not share Spain's romanticized view
of Castro's Cuba.


8. (C/NF) There are many other examples of the growing
ability of the mid-tier states to orchestrate coalitions.
For example, a group led by Spain, Austria, Cyprus, and
Luxembourg has been instrumental in preventing the EU-3 from
strengthening sanctions against Iran. Sanctions against
Burma have languished for similar reasons. Mid-tier states
were also successful in slowing down the Kosovo recognition
process. Of course the EU-3 are still influential - a
general rule of thumb is that any major initiative requires
the support of at least one of them. But they alone are not
sufficient to drive CFSP decision-making.

Making CFSP work for us: Lessons from the Euros
-------------- -


9. (SBU) It would be tempting to suggest that the solution
to the EU's CFSP weaknesses is to shift our policy engagement
with Europe to other venues, be it NATO, OSCE, or
bilaterally. That, however, is not a viable option. As
noted earlier, it is the EU agenda that drives Europe's clock
and policy thinking, and any foreign minister will have to
defend his actions around an EU table in Brussels.
Furthermore, the theology of a common EU foreign policy
approach has become politically unassailable. No other
institution, including NATO, has a similar degree of
political legitimacy in European eyes, or can serve as a
platform for the broad range of foreign policy discussions
that we have with Europe.


10. (C/NF) More instructive, therefore, is to look at how
the European member states themselves make the system work to
their advantage. Understanding that the CFSP is essentially
a multi-lateral system, they have adapted their policy
approaches appropriately. Based on conversations and
observations in Brussels, here are some suggested "do's and
don'ts" for getting the most out of CFSP:

--Don't spend scarce time and resources on trying to achieve
actionable outcomes from official meetings (troikas),
conclusions or statements. The EU is at its worst when it
meets with us "officially". Troika meetings can be useful
exchanges of information but rarely result in true policy
dialogue. This is both because the right people are not in
the room and because the presidency is usually constrained by

BRUSSELS 00000943 003 OF 005


27-agreed talking points. Out of the box thinking or
brainstorming is difficult in this environment. Similarly,
the drafting of EU conclusions or US-EU declarations can be
interminable exercises in lowest-common denominator language.
Member states insist on specific redlines, then avoid
accountability by hiding behind the opaqueness of the
process.

--Don't rely on select EU officials to "deliver" EU policy.
In an EU context, Council officials are organizationally only
the "hired help" in a system that above all protects member
state prerogatives. EU High Rep Solana and Council DG Robert
Cooper have in no sense the power of their equivalents in a
traditional government. They certainly have various means to
influence operational decisions, but the decisions themselves
are taken by the GAERC or Political and Security Committee.
The Commission has somewhat more independence to do projects
and spend money, but even it looks to member states for
political guidance. Bottom line, this is a multi-lateral
process.

--Don't assume that a Quint, Quartet, or P-5 can substitute
for talking to the rest of the EU. These groupings have
their role to play, but they also breed resentment among the
rest of the 27. Aware of that resentment, the EU-3 are
sometimes reluctant to aggressively promote policies they've
agreed to outside the EU (UK contacts have told us that it is
counterproductive for them to lead EU internal debates when
they were perceived as "water carriers" for the U.S.) On the
other han, we have had success in engaging less obvious
like-minded member states (Ireland, Denmark) to help advance
our goals on certain issues (Burma, Cuba, Georgia, Belarus.)
Every issue has a different, often unpredicatble, set of
potential allies, and we frequently note that the degree of
support can depend as much on personal factors as obvious
national interest.

--Do follow the example of successful EU members by talking
early and informally to member states. The dysfunctionality
of the formal process has led the Europeans themselves to
rely on early, informal coordination. Although we are
handicapped as an outsider, a number of member states respect
our expertise, value our global perspective, and usually see
it as a plus to have the US on their side. By engaging early
and widely, we are better positioned to understand particular
member state needs and seek compromise solutions, before
lines are drawn. In the EULEX participation negotiations,
for instance, early discussions have helped us accurately
target our efforts and not waste capital fighting for things
we're never going to get, as well as to determine what we
could achieve if we only pushed harder.

--Do engage future presidencies earlier and more deeply in
establishing joint objectives. Presidency countries not only
help shape the EU agenda, they also invariably seek to have a
successful US relationship. However, they are usually
overwhelmed with responsibilities well before the presidency
even starts. Working with them at least a year before their
presidency will help us define a few key common objectives.

--Do engage the EU at 27 in informal policy discussions. PSC
ambassadors have told us that one of the great values of EUR
A/S Dan Fried's presentations is that he talks openly about
issues that are often shunted aside in official EU meetings
because one or another member state objects. The very fact
that we raise those issues will put them back on the EU's
internal agenda. Such discussions not only are a venue for
the policy brainstorming not possible in an official troika;
they also help grow the kind of long-lasting "roots and
branches" in our relationship with the EU that are already
well-established and pay dividends in the NATO context.
Regular discussions stabilize and deepen the interactions
with our EU partners (who aren't always on the same page as
their NATO delegations just a few miles away). Similarly,
the EU Council's desire for a wide-ranging policy planning
dialogue may be a useful hook to engage not only the Council
but the permreps in Brussels in a discussion of horizontal
issues (such as the security aspects of climate change).

Practical thoughts
--------------


11. (C) The EU's complicated decision-making structure does
not lend itself easily to effective advocacy. A successful
approach to working with the EU requires systematically
exchanging information and coordinating strategy between
Washington, USEU and embassies in capitals. Here are a few
concrete suggestions:


BRUSSELS 00000943 004 OF 005


--Shift some of the senior official time and resources we
currently spend on the formal EU consultation process
(taskforces, troikas, weekly PDAS calls to the presidency
DCM, etc) to structures that permit us, via our embassies in
the field, to directly reach out to member states. The
current web of US-EU meetings were developed based on the
EU's structures. The EU institutions are keen to serve as
the information gate-keeper to the member states, but the
process does not serve our interests well. For example,
information from the PDAS/presidency weekly phone call does
not appear to circulate widely outside the presidency, the
taskforce DVCs are handicapped by the fact that real EU
decision-makers are not in the room (and allow
mischief-making member states to hide behind the opaque
process),while the effectiveness of troika meetings are
often cicumscribed by the fact the EU representatives are
constrained by 27-approved talking points and not able to
engage in open-ended policy discussions. Of course, this
structure of meetings is too deeply embedded to do away with
entirely (and it does serve a useful role in tracking our
official relationship). But the current emphasis on this
formal structure diverts limited resources from the more
useful informal process. There are several ways we could
improve this situation:

--Instead of having the EUR PDAS speak weekly with the
presidency country DCM in Washington, a more effective
approach might be to hold that call with DCMs/Pol Counselors
at our missions in the 27, who could then turn around and
personally brief their MFA political director. This will arm
our posts with context they can use to build stronger ties
directly with capitals MFAs. As other posts have noted to
us, such an approach would force our embassies into the
discussion, make them more useful to host governments, and
give them greater opportunity to identify future-oriented
action items in the US-EU dialogue.

--Hold "troikas" at the DAS or office director level; seek
meetings at 27 for higher level visitors that focus on the
larger strategic picture. One possibility would be to
arrange a mid-presidency meeting between the PSC and the EUR
A/S. This would provide a follow-up to the beginning of the
presidency US-EU political directors meeting. By keeping it
"informal", hosted by either the presidency country or the US
Mission, and by planning for it in advance, it could be an
excellent strategy session. Similar sessions could be
considered for other regional A/S, while at the DAS level we
should look to meetings with the MFA regional working groups.
At a more tactical level, we might also consider enhancing
our dialogue with the EU Council Situation Center. We have
begun to improved this relationship (made possibly by the
US-EU security agreement last year),but real exchange is
growing slowly. Here again, an informal dialogue may be the
way to go until we build up a greater habit of dialogue and
the critical person-to-person credibility.

--Hold an annual strategy session between USEU, ERA and each
non-EUR bureau that deals with the EU: Internal USG
coordination is particularly cumbersome on issues for which
the substantive lead is another bureau. Those bureaus may
have established individual EU contacts, but rarely have the
time and expertise to work the 27 effectively. A regular
strategy session would help us better understand their
priorities and also integrate their contacts into our efforts.

--Recraft the monthly GAERC cables into a future-oriented
solicitation of views and strategy. EU member states do want
to hear our views, but the monthly GAERC cable is an
ineffective vehicle. Our contacts agree that it comes much
too late to really affect member state positions, is not an
invitation to dialogue, and therefore cannot help but be
perceived as patronizing. There are a number of potential
substitutes. One might be for posts to demarche just after
the GAERC: this would simultaneously be useful as readout
while also serving to solicit views on how the US and that
member state could cooperate on preparing for the next one.

--Last but perhaps most important, develop
information/coordination hubs (i.e. a point person/persons)
for priority US-EU issues. There are already several ad hoc
efforts on specific issues to pull together all of the
commuication strands between Washington, Brussels and
capitals: the Iran Sanctions distribution list that USEU
recently established is one; others include email chains that
ERA established on Cuba and SCE on Kosovo. These efforts are
crucial to giving posts credibility as policy advocates,
because few have the staffing to follow all issues in the
necessary depth (nor access to the key email chains that
contain critical context). But the utility of these efforts

BRUSSELS 00000943 005 OF 005


is limited by their ad hoc nature. The value of formalizing
such distribution lists is that they would offer a repository
of info (especially Washington-EU direct contacts that are
mostly uncataloged now),a go-to person for a complex issue,
and a vehicle for coordinating approaches to member states
(essential in this multi-lateral environment). By doing so,
we would make it possible for each post to make a substantive
contribution to a Department-wide effort.


12. (U) These are a few suggestions, but undoubtedly there
are many more possibilities. In the future, we plan to look
at other aspects of the US-EU relationship, particularly on
ESDP, which is too complex to be included in this message.
In the meantime, USEU would be interested in other posts'
thoughts.

MURRAY
.