Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS863
2008-06-06 15:11:00
SECRET
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

IRAN: FURTHER JAPANESE VIEWS ON P5+1 AND ROME

Tags:  KNNP MNUC IR PARM PREL ENRG JP EUN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000863 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR HARDING, SINGH, CATIPON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2028
TAGS: KNNP MNUC IR PARM PREL ENRG JP EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: FURTHER JAPANESE VIEWS ON P5+1 AND ROME
BILATERAL MEETING

REF: A. A) TOKYO 1541

B. B) DUBAI 00028

Summary
--------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000863

SIPDIS

NSC FOR HARDING, SINGH, CATIPON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2028
TAGS: KNNP MNUC IR PARM PREL ENRG JP EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: FURTHER JAPANESE VIEWS ON P5+1 AND ROME
BILATERAL MEETING

REF: A. A) TOKYO 1541

B. B) DUBAI 00028

Summary
--------------
1.(S) A Japanese diplomat in Brussels provided further
insights on the June 3 meeting between Japanese Prime
Minister Fukuda and Iranian President Ahmedinejad on the
margins of an FAO conference in Rome as reported REF A. Our
contact assessed that Iranian's recent efforts to stimulate
Japanese engagement on the nuclear issue may be aimed at
undermining the current UNSC-mandated diplomacy track. Japan
is also seeking assurances that Italy not be formally
admitted to the P5 1 group. An accomodation to Italy would
trigger domestic pressure in Japan to pursue a similar
status. The Japanese hope Italy can be satisfied with
informal consultations and formal discussions in the G8
context. END SUMMARY

Ahmedinejad Courts Fukuda
--------------

2. (S) One June 6, a Middle East expert at the Japanese
Mission to the EU relayed further details of the June 3
meeting of Iranian President Ahmedinejad and Japanese
President Fukuda in Rome, held on the margins of the
Emergency Food Summit at the FAO in Rome. Our Japanese source
maintained that Tokyo was initially reluctant to agree to the
meeting, but ultimately assessed that the encounter would be
useful for three reasons. First, the GOJ was under domestic
pressure to engage Iran on the welfare and whereabouts of a
Japanese citizen kidnapping in Iran. Moreover, it had been
eight years since the last Japan-Iran Presidential meeting;
Fukuda was interested in taking the measure of Ahmedinejad.
Finally, Tokyo saw this as an opportunity to make clear its
staunch national position that Iran must suspend its uranium
enrichment activities.


3. (S) The meeting, which was held at the request of the
Iranians, lasted nearly one hour, in large part due to the
necessity of triple interpretation (FARSI-English-Japanese).
Referring directly to an internal Japanese memcon of the
meeting, our contact confirmed the substance of the meeting,
which focused on the kidnapping case of a Japanese student in
Iran and Iran's nuclear weapons program. Japanese officials
noted that Ahmedinejad carried himself in a serious and
controlled manner, avoiding ideological rhetoric when
discussing the nuclear issue. Our source speculated that
Ahmedinejad had opted for a low-key approach with Fukuda on
the advice of Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki, who had
previously served as Iran's Ambassador to Japan.

Iran Drops Hints About Mediation Role
--------------

4. (S) According to the Brussels-based Japanese diplomat,
Tehran has dropped several hints that it is looking to Japan
and possibly Switzerland to mediate on the nuclear issue,
including the following actions in recent months:
-- the request for the Fukuda meeting in Rome;
-- the effort to provide Japanese and Swiss governments (as
well as UNSYG Ban) with copies of the May 13 letter to Solana
on the Iranian counterproposal;
-- the assignment of Iranian Ambassador Araghchi - the former
legal advisor on nuclear issues -- to Tokyo;
-- the offer in late May by Iranian Senior Presidential
Advisor Moftaba Samareh Hashemi to visit Tokyo; and
-- the February 2008 visit to Tokyo by Mohammed Javad
Larijani, brother of newly elected Majles speaker (and former
chief nuclear negotiator) Ali Larijani (REF B).

Nevertheless, our contact was skeptical of Iranian
intentions, readily agreeing that such efforts to involve
Japan (and Switzerland) could be part of a broader gambit to
undermine Solana's lead role in support of the P5 1.

Japan Against Expansion of P5 1
--------------
5.(S) The Japanese are anxious about Italy's continued

BRUSSELS 00000863 002 OF 002


lobbying for a formal seat at the table during P5 1
consultations on Iran. While taking some comfort in German
FM Steinmeier's June 5 public opposition to any change in the
existing format, the Japanese would like similar, if private,
assurances from the United States. Our contact warned that
any expansion of the existing group would trigger domestic
pressure in Japan to insist on inclusion as well. In Tokyo's
view, the G8 is the appropriate venue for both itself and
Italy to consult the EU-3 (Germany, France, UK) on Iran
issues.
MURRAY
.