U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 000729

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EUR/ERA, GENEVA FOR CD AMB ROCCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL EUN PTER KN IR IN CH
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
CONSULTATIONS

REF: USEU BRUSSELS 716

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Larry Wohlers for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d)


1.(C) Summary: Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney
led the U.S. delegation to the semi-annual U.S.-EU Troika
consultations on Disarmament and Nonproliferation
(CODUN/CONOP). The two sides had a thorough exchange of
views on a wide range of disarmament and nonproliferation
issues -- e.g., Iran, the DPRK, FMCT, small arms/light
weapons, NPT -- engaging in a more substantive dialogue than
often occurs at these meetings. The EU side described the
substantial work it was doing on biological safety and
security and on export control cooperation and announced that
when Malta subscribed to the principles of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism all EU members would
have done so. The EU pressed hard to be included as an
institution in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
but McNerney stressed the U.S.'s concerns about opening up an
action-oriented initiative to bureaucratization. The two
sides agreed to continue consultations on the EU's draft Code
of Conduct for Space Objects, which could provide a useful
counter to the Russian draft treaty on weaponization of outer
space if the CD began discussions of outer space. End
summary

Iran


2. (SBU) Annalisa Giannella of the EU Council Secretariat
described EU actions in this area. The EU was proceeding on
a dual track approach, she said, offering cooperation,
including in the nuclear field, while exercising pressure to
convince Iran to return to the negotiating table. The
passage of UNSCR 1803 showed the wide consensus in the
international community on how to deal with Iran. Giannella
said the EU was now working on its implementation of the
resolution and also mandating High Representative Solana to
continue his contacts with Iran.


3. (C) In response to questions from McNerney, Giannella said
the EU did not take seriously a recent Iranian statement that
there was no bilateral track. She noted that the Iranians
made many statements on both sides of the question, although
she conceded that they would certainly prefer to negotiate
with the IAEA, where they think they can avoid negotiations
on current issues. Giannella also commented that Jallili was
a theologian, rather than a negotiator, as Larijani had been.
The EU found it impossible to have a dialogue with him, but
instead had to listen to hours-long lectures. In response to
a question on sanctions, she said discussions on additional
sanctions were difficult within the EU, as some countries did
not want to go beyond 1803.


4. (C) McNerney and Giannella had similar views of Iran's
claims that it had installed 6,000 new centrifuges. They did
not think the Iranians had so many new ones, nor that
installation of the centrifuges was very advanced. According
to Giannella, the Iranian leadership was rather trying to
create a fait accompli in the negotiations and show their own
public that they were advancing their program. Giannella,
McNerney and Camille Grand, from the French MFA, agreed that
public diplomacy should be improved to get through to the
Iranian people exactly what the Iranian government was doing
to develop a potential nuclear weapons capability. Giannella
thought this might be considered by political directors.

DPRK


5. (SBU) McNerney led off by describing where things stood
regarding the disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities.
She also noted that we were pressing the North Koreans for a
correct and complete declaration on their nuclear activities
and reported that we hoped to have something resolved on a
declaration, at least on plutonium, at a new Six-Party
meeting soon. The process was a slow one, moving in baby
steps. The next phase would likely include removal of spent
fuel, dismantlement of the DPRK's reactor, and verification
activities related to plutonium.


6. (SBU) A discussion of the IAEA's role followed, in which
McNerney said that it was a tricky issue because of the North
Korean negative attitude. Yet from the U.S. perspective, it
was very clear that the IAEA should be involved from the
beginning, especially since the aim of the exercise was to

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have the DPRK return to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards as a
non-nuclear weapons state. Giannella pointed out that the EU
had agreed on a Joint Action to provide financial resources
for IAEA monitoring. Grand said he attached great importance
to giving the IAEA a role in verification of the DPRK's
compliance.


7. (C) In response to a question from Grand, McNerney said
that the issue of North Korean missiles remained alive in the
question of the larger regional peace structure, if not in
the immediate goals of the Six-Party framework itself.

U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative


8. (SBU) Stanislav Vidovic, Head of the Security Policy
Division at the MFA in Ljubljana and Chair of the
consultations, began discussion of this item by noting that
the EU was giving positive consideration to the initiative
but was waiting to see the elements of the deal. McNerney
replied that there was not a lot to update. The Indian
government was still consulting with its coalition partners
in New Delhi and was not prepared to circulate the draft
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. McNerney stressed that
while approval by the U.S. Congress was still possible, time
was running out. If the Indians moved forward in mid-May,
the U.S. would try to secure rapid NSG approval, but if time
did not permit, it would be up to a new Administration to
carry the issue forward.

Nonproliferation Treaty Review Process


9. (SBU) In the brief discussion of the NPT review process
and especially the upcoming Preparatory Committee, McNerney
highlighted U.S. priorities for the PrepCom and raised
several procedural issues. She urged EU support for the U.S.
position that the 2009 PrepCom take place in New York and
hoped the EU would help move the 2008 Chair away from seeking
a consensus document, which was almost certainly not
achievable. The U.S. Representative to the Conference on
Disarmament (CD),Christina Rocca, recalled that the U.S.
delegation had worked closely with the EU at the 2007 PrepCom
and hoped the practice could be repeated.


10. (SBU) Grand replied that the EU would support holding the
next PrepCom in New York, and Rosine Couchoud, of the
Disarmament and Nonproliferation Directorate at the French
MFA, agreed that there was no point in trying to get
consensus on a text. It was preferable, she said, to engage
in substantive discussions, rather than focusing on a text.
She commented that the EU would circulate two papers at the
PrepCom - one on civil nuclear energy (from the 2007 PrepCom)
and one on nuclear weapon free zones and negative security
assurances. Grand suggested exchanging texts on withdrawal
before the meeting to ensure that the U.S. and the EU were on
the same wavelength.

Multilateral Fuel Assurances


11. (U) McNerney began by pointing out that the U.S.
considers that all the proposals on the table help deal with
the larger issue of getting states to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing and to rely on the market for such services.
Rather than looking for a perfect solution, the U.S. believes
it is better to have many ideas blossom with the IAEA playing
a central role in each. Giannella replied that the EU has
much the same approach. It has developed criteria to assess
the various proposals but has not selected among them.


12. (SBU) In discussing the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
proposal for a nuclear fuel bank, to which the U.S. has
committed USD 50 million, Giannella said that the EU needed
more details, e.g., who would decide on distributions from
the fuel bank, before committing any funds. She noted that
the IAEA was delaying the elaboration of such details until
contributions were made and urged the U.S. to press the
Agency to work out more details.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)/Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT)


13. (C) Grand led off by asking whether there was any chance
of moving Pakistan, Iran, and China, the three CD members
that have opposed the six CD presidents' work program, to
support it. Rocca replied that the situation seemed the same
as last year. She pointed out that China's articulated needs
had been met by the Six Presidents' draft work program (CD

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1840),putting China in an ambiguous position. The Chinese
want to protect Pakistan and therefore find it difficult to
take yes for an answer. According to Rocca, it was vital to
get CD members to press the new Pakistani government, and not
just in Geneva, but at the political level in Islamabad.
Giannella supported this assessment by noting that the
Pakistani CD ambassador had told her that the EU never made a
demarche in Pakistan on this issue. She noted that HR Solana
was going to Islamabad; she would urge him to raise the issue
there and get back to the U.S. on the results.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism


14. (U) Vidovic said that the EU supported this initiative
and reported that now only Malta among EU members had not
adhered to the GI principles. If Malta did so, the EU
Council would issue a formal statement of support. McNerney
described the upcoming meetings and noted that 68 states had
now subscribed to the GI principles. Spain was working to
get Latin American states to join, and she had been urging
the Gulf states to do so and was hoping to get Saudi Arabia's
adherence. McNerney also noted that as countries moved
toward developing nuclear energy, the GI was a complementary
effort, which addressed potential vulnerabilities for misuse
of nuclear energy.

Civil Nuclear Cooperation


15. (U) McNerney briefed the EU on recent U.S. actions to
build a foundation for nuclear cooperation with developing
countries. The U.S. had signed an MOU with Bahrain (MOU's,
she noted, are steps preliminary to negotiating formal "123"
agreements on nuclear cooperation),would do so with the UAE
soon, and already had signed a 123 agreement with Jordan.
Each of these agreements contained provisions in which the
governments indicated their intent to rely on the markets for
fuel supplies rather than pursuing enrichment and
reprocessing. The U.S. was also promoting the "attractive
offer," which Presidents Bush and Putin had launched in 2007,
and Amb. Jackie Wolcott had recently been appointed to
explain its merits.


16. (U) Bruno Dupre, from the European Commission, explained
that the EC was working to develop a culture of
nonproliferation, safety, and security for countries outside
the EU, as well as within the Union, as they bring nuclear
power on line. Couchoud said that France was doing likewise
as it developed nuclear cooperation with countries in the
Middle East.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)


17. (C) Opening the discussion of the PSI, McNerney outlined
the achievements during its almost five years of existence,
which would be recognized at a U.S.-hosted meeting in May.
She stressed its record of cooperation in interdicting
WMD-related shipments, which had broadened interdiction
opportunities, but noted the constraints under which it
operates, e.g., the inability to board ships on the high
seas. Following McNerney's briefing, the discussion quickly
turned to the long-standing issue of participation by EU
institutions as such in PSI meetings. In this regard,
Giannella repeated the argument that EU competencies made it
appropriate for the Union to participate. In response to a
question from McNerney, Giannella said a paper promised by
the EU to lay out its arguments was not ready; if it would
help, the EU would accelerate its preparation. (Note: Text
contained in reftel subsequently was presented to the USG).
McNerney stressed that a paper would be useful, but made
clear that the U.S. fears that admitting bodies such as the
EU would unnecessarily bureaucratize the PSI and suggested
that if it was to be persuasive, the EU deal with that
concern in its paper.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540


18. (U) Vidovic said the EU supported UNSCR 1540
implementation, raised the issue in bilateral demarches,
conducted workshops on implementation, and is now adopting a
Joint Action to help improve third countries' capacities. He
also said that the EU supported extension of the 1540
Committee's mandate and thanked the U.S. -- in particular its
1540 coordinator -- for its strong support of the resolution.


19. (SBU) McNerney agreed that that the U.S. coordinator (Tom
Wuchte, ISN/CPI) deserved a lot of credit and suggested that

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it would be useful for the EU to name a single point of
contact as well. (Note: The EU side appeared to have
conflicting understandings of whether or not they were in the
process of choosing a coordinator.) She also described the
efforts being undertaken to extend the Committee's mandate
and noted that the U.S. was pressing Russia, South Africa,
and Indonesia to agree. Dupre noted that the EU's "stability
instrument" would provide assistance to states to implement

1540.


20. (SBU) According to Giannella the NAM countries had two
problems with extension of the Committee. Many of them did
not understand the relevance of nonproliferation for them;
seminars were useful in the regard. A few key players saw
the resolution as an imposition by the P-5 on other states.
McNerney agreed that we had to be careful in using the
Security Council to impose international law and should make
it clear that it was up to individual sovereign states to
implement 1540. Grand commented that we have to make it
clear that 1540 was a unanimous decision of the Security
Council and that it was in the interest of all states.

Export Control Outreach


21. (U) The official responsible for export control outreach
at the European Commission, Nicholas Organ, described
Commission activities in the area. The EU has engaged in
cooperative activities with ten countries (China, Ukraine,
UAE, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro,
Albania, FYROM) and has agreed to extend assistance to
another five (Turkey, Tunisia, Georgia, Moldova, and
Malaysia). Activities can cover all or some of the following
fields: legal, licensing, customs outreach, industry
outreach, and assistance to enforcement agencies. Only the
UAE is considered a major transshipment hub. Organ also
noted that the program with China began in early 2006 and has
focused on customs and industry outreach. The EU has
conducted three seminars in China and an additional one on
industry awareness will take place this June. He also noted
that a series of study visits focusing on enforcement
techniques is scheduled for autumn 2008. The Commission has
assessed that the Chinese have been open and constructive
towards the program and have deployed some of the techniques
and lessons learned.


22. (SBU) McNerney noted that U.S. efforts in this area have
focused on transshipment and highlighted the U.S. dialogue
with the UAE. She noted, however, that countries neighboring
the UAE do not have strict laws in this area and warned that
the loophole potential was great. As far as China was
concerned, she complimented the EU on the work done with
China. Some of the problem with China was that it reads
sanctions resolutions more narrowly than others do, but China
also has problems with enforcement. She noted that the U.S.
has engaged in direct talks with Chinese companies, which
have been useful, since these companies wanted to trade with
the U.S. and be seen as meeting high global standards. She
concluded that a lot of work remained to be done with China.

Space


23. (SBU) Irina Gorsic, Security Policy Division, Slovenian
MFA, thanked the U.S. for its comments on the draft EU "Code
of Conduct for Space Objects." The intra-EU group she headed
on the subject was close to agreement on a new draft, which
it would provide the U.S. The EU still had to decide whether
to present the text at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) or the CD and would consult with the
U.S. first. As far as the Russian draft treaty prohibiting
the placement of weapons in space was concerned, the EU
statement to the CD on February 28, 2008 had made it clear
that the treaty could be discussed once a CD program of work
had been agreed.


24. (C) Rocca expressed appreciation for the close
cooperation between the EU and the U.S. and said the U.S.
experts would respond quickly to any new EU draft. She also
stressed that outer space could only be discussed in the CD
after approval of the currently proposed program of work.
This condition was a major consideration in determining
China's policy on the draft CD program of work. She also
informed the EU that the U.S. was again trying to agree with
Russia on a draft UN First Committee resolution on outer
space CBMs, although the sticking point remained that the
Russians tied it to their proposed non-weaponization of space
treaty. Returning to the EU's code of conduct, Rocca agreed

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with Grand that it would be useful in any discussions in the
CD to have another proposal on the table in addition to the
Russia idea.

Chemical Weapons Convention


25. (SBU) The discussion on the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) largely concerned the CWC Review Conference, which was
then under way in the Hague. Gorsic and Grand both said that
after the issue of destruction was taken care of, the
proliferation of CW was the next major issue on the CWC
agenda. Grand said now was not the time to deal with it, but
we should be laying the groundwork for consideration of the
issue in the next 5-10 years. After assuring the EU that the
U.S. commitment to CW destruction was not in question,
McNerney agreed that nonproliferation, including the question
of how to find cheaters, will be the next big issue.

Biological Weapons Convention


26. (U) Giannella and a representative from the Commission
described the range of actions the EU was taking in this
field. Giannella said the EU was considering what topics it
should discuss in papers submitted for the BWC experts'
meeting in August. She also discussed the EU's Joint Action
on biological issues, under which the Union had held five
regional seminars to promote universalization of the BWC and
had carried out assistance visits in Peru and Nigeria. The
EU also had approved a new Joint Action this year in support
of the WHO, which will support regional workshops and
assistance to one model country to help it update
bio-preparedness. The Commission representative noted that
it was supporting regional training centers on biosafety and
security and had developed a global health security
initiative, where it was supporting counter-measures and risk
and threat assessments.


27. (SBU) McNerney complimented the EU on the amount of work
it was doing in this area, which she called "terrific." The
U.S., she said, was taking a regional approach, focusing on
terrorism. The U.S. was emphasizing Pakistan but also
looking at Indonesia and the Philippines. She noted that we
were trying to get some G8 consideration of the issue, one
which could have a big impact on individuals, but the G8
tended to emphasize nuclear concerns. Giannella and Grand
agreed that biological concerns were appropriate for G8
consideration, while noting that Russia had rejected the
thought that there was a problem in Russia.

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)/Cluster
Munitions


28. (SBU) Gorsic recalled the EU's joint statement on cluster
munitions, which called for the negotiation of a legally
binding instrument by the end of 2008. She could not predict
whether the EU would have a common position by the time of
the Dublin meeting of the "Oslo process" in May. Grand noted
that Dublin might not be the final negotiating session of the
Oslo process. He also commented that it was important to
France that the CCW demonstrated that it could work and
thought U.S. engagement in CCW on this issue was helpful.
McNerney commented that the CCW could work only if states
like China and Russia, which may be willing to see the U.S.
have problems, went along.

Small Arms/Light Weapons


29. (SBU) Gorsic emphasized the importance of the third
Biennial Meeting of States on the UN Program of Action on
SA/LW (BMS 3) and hoped the U.S. would decide to attend.
McNerney replied that the U.S. preferred to focus on
practical actions, rather than a lot of meetings, although it
would attend the part of the session devoted to reviewing
implementation of the International Marking and Tracing
Instrument (ITI). She said the U.S. was also concerned that
such meetings encroached on the U.S.'s internal policies.
Giannella said the EU agreed with the need to pay particular
attention to collection and destruction of excess weapons,
but considered that the international community needed to
deal with illicit trafficking, or destroyed weapons would
merely be replaced. Grand agreed with McNerney about the
limited value of many multilateral meetings and assured her
that it was not EU policy to bash the U.S. (or at least, he
said jokingly, not all the time). He thought it was
important to focus on the agenda of BMS's to ensure that they
were more focused.

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Any Other Business: CTBT, Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (HCOC)


30. (C) The EU had requested these items be considered
briefly under Any Other Business, and both sides repeated
well known positions. McNerney made clear the U.S. believed
the CTBT Prepcom had acted weakly in the face of the North
Korean nuclear test and did not see how adding adherence to
the CTBT as a condition in prospective deals with the DPRK or
India would help prevent violations of those agreements.


31. (SBU) On HCOC McNerney reiterated that the U.S. had
committed to providing pre-launch notifications using the
system we planned to use in our bilateral agreement with
Russia. Until that was finalized, we would not go to the
considerable expense of developing a duplicate arrangement.

MURRAY
.