EU RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID AG LY MO MR TS EUN XI
SUBJECT: EU RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION

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Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball for re
asons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU considers the Maghreb an area of high
priority due to its proximity, its historic ties to Member
States, and the role of Maghreb immigrants in the EU. While
the EU shares U.S. concerns on CT issues, its primary focus
is promoting trade, development and human rights. In January
of this year, the EU met formally with the African Maghreb
Union (AMU) for the second time. While in theory the EU
would like to pursue formal relations with the AMU as one
supranational organization to another, the lack of cohesion
within the AMU makes this currently impossible. If the
Western Sahara issue were to be settled, however, the AMU has
the possibility of becoming an effective regional
organization and the EU might have a functioning partner in
the area. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Deputy Pol Minister Counselor and PolOff met council
and commission staff, representatives from the Embassies of
Algeria and Morocco, and a political officer from the French
Permanent Representation to the EU. Topics covered included
readouts from the recent EU-AMU summit, summaries of the
recent negotiations taking place between the EU and each
Maghreb state, and prospects for EU-AMU relations. PolOffs
also discussed U.S. priorities for the region and possible
areas for U.S.-EU cooperation in the five Maghreb states.

Morocco
--------------


3. (c) C) The Government of Morocco seeks so-called
"advanced status" in its formal relationship to the EU,
within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Union
for the Mediterranean (EuroMed or the Barcelona Process).
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner
gave some support to this request in a recent public
statement when she listed Morocco as one of four neighboring
countries with which the EU wants to "deepen" it ties.


4. (C) Council Secretariat and European Commission staff
members are focused on the role of the monarchy, progressives
and Islamic radicals when discussing future Morocco-EU
relations. Leonello Gabrici, who covers the Maghreb region
in the External Relations directorate at the European
Commission (RELEX),said that the king has to show that he,
rather than Islamisists, has viable solutions to Moroccan
problems, while not alienating social and religious
conservatives. If he can successfully keep this balance,
Morocco-EU relations can continue to improve.


5. (C) The French are keen to respond to Morocco's desire
for a closer relationship with the EU during their
presidency, according to Raja Rabia, political officer for
the Mediterranean and Near East at the French Permanent
Representation to the EU. An Association Council meeting is
scheduled for October 2008, in which the French and Moroccans
expect to define this relationship better.


6. (C) Embassy of Morocco Political Counselor Badreddine
Abdelmouni and Pol Off for EU relations Nacim Tourougui said
that Morocco already enjoyed a more important economic and
political relationship with the EU than other countries in
the region. They pointed to the fact that in the region,
only Morocco has an Open Skies agreement with the EU, and
that it is the only African nation to have signed on to the
Galileo satellite project. They described the
as-yet-undefined advanced status as something more than an
Association Agreement -- which they have under the ENP --
that will incorporate political, economic, and cultural
activities.

Algeria
--------------


7. (C) Algeria is a foreign policy challenge for the EU.
European Council officials Ruth Kaufmann-Buehler and Milton
Nicolaidis cited a recent International Crisis Group (ICG)
report which noted greater risk for internal political
instability. Gabrici from RELEX said that the EU is "shy"
about creating closer ties because of its basic distrust of
Bouteflika's leadership. The Commission is also concerned

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about the growing Chinese presence in the economy, as well as
investments by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could affect
European interests. Despite the distrust on both sides, the
EU is aware that it needs to work with the GoA, to protect
its borders and its access to Algeria's vast gas and oil
reserves. Algeria knows it needs to maintain economic ties
with Europe, or else risk having it's economy "cannibalized"
by China. Despite their mutual dependence, Gabrici described
the political relations between the EU and Algeria as a
"dialogue of the deaf."

Tunisia
--------------


8. (C) The French described Tunisia as being the "worst
case" in the AMU. In contrast, the Commission representative
was much more positive in his outlook. The French
concentrated on the absolute lack of political freedom, while
the Commission focused on the comparatively healthy state of
the economy, the existence of a social welfare net, and the
large percentage of the population with a good level of
education. The Council called it the most stable state in the
Region. Both the Commission and the Council expressed
concerns over Ben Ali's leadership, and Gabrici pointed to
the lack of an identified potential successor to Ben Ali as a
source of potential instability.

Libya
--------------


9. (C) Since Libya can't/won't join the European
Neighborhood Policy due to Israel's participation, the French
told us the EU is looking for a new instrument for
formalizing improved relations with the GoL, with a
"framework agreement" cited as one possibility. Although the
French asked the Commission to research and present options
the French Presidency might pursue with Libya, the Commission
has not yet responded. French PolOff Rabia gave three
reasons for the EC's hesitation: (1) Libya's atrocious past
record on human rights; (2) its links to terrorism; and (3)
its opposition to nonproliferation. Gabrici agreed that
Libya poses unique challenges, but said that with natural gas
reserves worth USD 25 billion or more, Libya could play an
important role in achieving European energy security.

Mauritania
--------------


10. (C) Mauritania participates in the African, Caribbean
and Pacific program under DG Development at the Commission,
and in the Barcelona process but not in the ENP.
Participating in ACP gives Mauritania access to European
development funds and privileged access to European markets
not available to ENP countries, support both sides agree is
necessary, according to French Pol Off Rabia. Its relatively
small size and underdeveloped economy led both Commission and
Council contacts to ignore its role in EU-AMU relations for
the near future.

EU and the AMU
--------------


11. (C) The Moroccan officials described the substance of the
EU-AMU dialogue as "nothing." They claimed responsibility
for starting the process, but said to date it had only
achieved a process of dialogue and defined some areas of
interest for future cooperation. Both EU and Maghreb country
officials expressed the hope that UN sponsored deliberations
will eventually lead to a settlement of the Western Sahara
dispute, and that the AMU can develop into a more effective
organization.


12. (C) Council Secretariat officials indicated that the AMU
is eager to continue the EU-AMU dialogue, because it creates
a space for the AMU to meet and cooperate internally. Due to
the Western Sahara dispute, Morocco and Algeria have been
unable or unwilling to commit to high level internal AMU
meetings. However, the supra-national character of the two
"unions" demands that AMU leaders work together in this case.
The AMU leaders apparently hope getting national leaders to
the table for this event will be a first step in improving
regional integration.

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13. (C) Gabrici sees some significant obstacles, though, to
closer EU-AMU ties. Chief among them is the skepticism on
each side whether the other side can be trusted and is acting
in good faith. While as recently as ten or fifteen years
ago, large segments of the European and Maghreb population
believed closer ties would benefit everyone, changes such as
the rise of anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiment in
Europe, and the emergence of terrorist groups such as
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),have
fueled distrust on both sides as well as an apparent wish to
maintain a safe distance.


14. (C) However both European and Maghreb governments see
advantages to closer cooperation, and the ENP has given them
some useful tools not previously available under the
Barcelona process. For example, under the ENP each country
in partnership with Europe develops its own plan of reform,
setting its own priorities and timelines, and seeks European
financial and technical assistance in achieving these goals.
This structure gives the EU much better leverage when pushing
governments to live up to their commitments and schedules,
since they are not imposed from without. The action plans at
the national level also create the opportunity for greater
coordination in each country's development sector. Finally,
successfully reaching the benchmarks of an action plan lets
the European Union use the "more carrots, fewer sticks"
approach that it prefers. Both Jordan and Morocco saw their
annual grants from the EU increase approximately 20 per cent
because of their improvements in governance, education and
other sectors. Funding for Jordan increased from 110 million
Euro for 2005-2006 to 265 million for 2007-2010 (from 55
million per year to 66.25 million); funding for Morocco went
from 275 million Euro in 2005-2006 to 654 million for
2007-2010 (from 137.5 million per year to 163.5 million).

MURRAY
.