Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS579
2008-04-17 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

US-BELARUS TALKS IN BRUSSELS ON BILATERAL TENSIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL CASC ODIP ETTC EUN BO XH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0862
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0579/01 1081531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171531Z APR 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000579 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR KOZAK AND WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC ODIP ETTC EUN BO XH

SUBJECT: US-BELARUS TALKS IN BRUSSELS ON BILATERAL TENSIONS

REF: A. 041008 02:29 GEE-NEMROFF E-MAIL

B. 041108 03:02 GEE-NEMROFF E-MAIL

C. 041108 03:25 GEE-NEMROFF E-MAIL

Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR KOZAK AND WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC ODIP ETTC EUN BO XH

SUBJECT: US-BELARUS TALKS IN BRUSSELS ON BILATERAL TENSIONS

REF: A. 041008 02:29 GEE-NEMROFF E-MAIL

B. 041108 03:02 GEE-NEMROFF E-MAIL

C. 041108 03:25 GEE-NEMROFF E-MAIL

Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------
1.(C) U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart (Minsk) met with
Belarusian Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov (Washington) on April
10-11 in Brussels to address the deterioration of bilateral
relations. The talks, proposed by Belarus, served to clarify
respective positions, but failed to yield any substantive
results. A deflated Khvostov warned that the Belarusian MFA
could be expected to resume its pressure against U.S. Embassy
Minsk in short order.

2.(C) Offering what he called a "small package," Khvostov
asked for a partial rollback of the U.S. Treasury sanctions
against Belneftikhim to exclude application to its
subsidiaries in exchange for a restoration of the status quo
ante for our respective embassies in Minsk and Washington.
He acknowledged that GOB actions against the U.S. Embassy in
Minsk were in retaliation for U.S. economic sanctions against
Belarus. Ambassador Stewart rejected as a matter of
principle any such linkage between the U.S. diplomatic
presence in Minsk and our sanctions against the Lukashenko
regime. The USG could only consider changes to our current
sanction regime in response to changes in the human rights
and democracy situation in Belarus, including the continued
detention of high profile political prisoner Alexandr
Kazulin. Khvostov insisted that he had a "presidential
guarantee" for Kazulin's release, but failed to provide any
timetable for it. Finally, Ambassador Stewart obtained
Khvostov's assurance that he would convey U.S. concerns to
senior Belarusian authorities regarding the consular case of
detained American citizen Emanuel Zeltser.
END SUMMARY

Participants
--------------

3.(C) On the initiative of the Belarusian MFA, the U.S.
Ambassador to Minsk and the Belarusian Ambassador to
Washington met in Brussels April 10-11 to discuss the
deterioration of our bilateral relationship. The two
ambassadors met for approximately ninety minutes on both days
at the U.S. Mission to the EU and the Belarusian Mission to
the EU respectively. Belarusian Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov
was accompanied by Belarusian Embassy to Brussels DCM Yury
Ambrazevich and Counselor Roman Romanovsky, a former U.S.
desk officer at MFA, who was most recently posted to the
Belarusian Embassy in Paris. Ambassador Karen Stewart was
accompanied by USEU Poloff Courtney Nemroff (notetaker).

Belarus links Diplomatic Presence to US sanctions
-------------- --------------
4.(C) From the outset, Khvostov expressed interest in
discussing U.S. economic sanctions before discussing the
status of our respective embassies or political dissident
Alexandr Kazulin. Belarus could not separate U.S. economic
sanctions from Belarusian steps against "American Embassy
personnel and presence." Khvostov insisted that Stewart
report to Washington a "small package" proposal as his
pragmatic solution to the current situation. The package
would contain the following elements:

-- USG to remove or re-interpret or in some nuanced way
(mentioned upcoming rollover of underlying National Emergency
finding) effect a change in the March 6 Treasury OFAC
guidance within a reasonable time (July/August);
-- GOB to release Kazulin per Belarusian President
Lukashenko's "guarantee" after two required court rulings (no
time set, but we perceived a hint that date could be
discussed if we went with his proposal or that perhaps his
suggested timing for changing the OFAC guidance corresponds
to his expected date for Kazulin release);
-- both sides re-establish full diplomatic relations in
terms of original numbers of staff at Embassies and return of
Ambassadors to their respective posts.
-- After current situation resolved, we could discuss larger
packages or steps.

U.S. rejects link; urges action on underlying problems
-------------- --------------
5.(C) Deploying Washington guidance (Reftels A and B),
Ambassador Stewart emphasized that the United States regarded
existing U.S. sanctions and treatment of bilateral embassies

BRUSSELS 00000579 002 OF 003


as separate issues. She could not negotiate the status of
our embassy in Minsk and suggested that the two sides instead
discuss Kazulin's release. Ambassador Stewart underlined
that any change to current U.S. economic sanctions could only
be considered in response to significant fundamental changes
to the human rights/democracy situation on the ground in
Belarus, but that these issues were precisely what would be
covered in senior-level dialogue immediately after Kazulin's
release. Indeed, Washington was considering what amendments
could be made to sanctions in return for certain improvements
in the human rights situation -- should we get to that stage.
Moreover, it was in Belarus' interest to release Kazulin
quickly as the overall bilateral relationship would be
negatively affected by its worsening domestic human rights
situation, including recent raids on journalists and the use
of force against peaceful demonstrators on March 25. Stewart
reiterated that Kazulin's release would be interpreted by the
USG as a positive step toward improvement of relations,
assuming that he was released unconditionally and that no
other political prisoner cases emerged.

Possible consequences if diplomatic assault continues
-------------- --------------
6.(C) At first, Khvostov did not refer to the Belarusian
MFA's latest personnel drawdown demand on the U.S. Embassy to
Minsk. Nonetheless, Ambassador Stewart warned of
consequences for Minsk's diplomatic assault on U.S. Embassy
operations, including a possible impact on the annual
rollover of the Jackson-Vanik waiver. Khvostov objected to
this description of Minsk's actions against the U.S. Embassy,
but later asserted that such diplomatic pressure was the only
means by which the GOB could retaliate against the United
States. He did not react specifically to Jackson-Vanik point
although later he acknowledged that Stewart had made clear
potential future consequences.

7.(C) Later in the talks, however, Khvostov asked repeatedly
whether the United States would impose more economic
sanctions in response to further measures against the U.S.
Embassy. Amb. Stewart stated that the USG did not and would
not link the treatment of our Embassy and current human
rights-related sanctions. The two were unrelated. However,
any further actions against the U.S. Embassy would only add
further complications and separate consequences to the
bilateral relationship.

A vague promise for Kazulin's release
--------------
8.(C) Steering Khvostov back to the underlying issue, Stewart
reviewed steps the USG might take in light of a Kazulin
release, including rolling back parts of sanctions under
appropriate circumstances. Khvostov refused to elaborate on
next steps with regard to the release of Kazulin beyond the
existence of a "presidential guarantee" that he would be
released. Stewart noted that the regime had already
compromised its credibility on Kazulin's release when it
failed to make good on its offer to release him by
mid-February. Khvostov dissembled, clearly giving the
impression that he had not been in favor of that original
promise. In any case, Stewart underscored that significant
changes of the factual basis of human rights conditions in
Belarus would be required to modify the March 6 U.S. Treasury
guidance. In the context of these clear-cut legislative and
policy requirements, she told Khvostov that Washington was
unlikely to accept his "small package" proposal. She also
pointed out that as Treasury gathered facts related to U.S.
economic sanctions on Belarusian entities, it would likely
offer further clarifications of our sanctions related to
their implementation.

Belneftikhim subsidiaries at issue
--------------
9.(C) Pressed to explain why Minsk regarded the March 6
clarification as a "new step," Khvostov said that it
implicated "Estonians, Latvian, and even Turkish" firms.
Khvostov indicated that it was this third country effect of
the March 6 OFAC guidance that worried Minsk. He knew that
OFAC had earlier issued broader general guidance on
subsidiaries under all asset freeze regimes, but stressed
that singling out Belneftikhim specifically in March 6
guidance was expanding the impact of sanctions. He also said
that he was not seeking a change now in the original November
sanction of Belneftikhim.

10.(C) On the second day of talks, Khvostov made plain the
regime's displeasure with Treasury's clarification - going so
far as to assert that he had received assurances in November
2007, that the sanctions did not cover Belneftikhim

BRUSSELS 00000579 003 OF 003


subsidiaries. Amb. Stewart noted that any such
interpretation of the November Treasury sanctions was a
misunderstanding on his part. (Note: Department later
confirmed Khvostov's recollection of November meeting. End
Note) In any event, the March 6 Treasury guidance only made
clear what had already been made fact in the November action
and in Treasury's general position on asset freeze sanctions.
Indeed, that was exactly why the GOB could not expect us to
just "tear up" the March 6 guidance since that would not
change our legal position.

MFA to resume pressure for U.S. drawdown
--------------
11.(C) Khvostov was clearly disappointed by the U.S. refusal
to address U.S. sanctions in the context of the U.S. embassy
situation. He repeatedly insisted his understanding that the
talks agreed by Acting U/S Fried and FM Martynov were to be
held "without preconditions." For his part, Khvostov took
this to mean that the United States would be willing to put
economic sanctions (specifically elimination or "non-use" of
the March 6 OFAC guidance) on the table, along with all other
issues. He complained that the US was "excluding" economic
sanctions and that he would need to seek instructions from
Minsk. Warning that the MFA would find our counter-proposal
unacceptable, the USG could expect that the MFA would end the
current "pause" in the forced drawdown of the U.S. Embassy
and resume its pressure for further staff reductions in short
order. A further exchange of telephone calls between the
Ambassadors on April 11 and April 14 only confirmed again our
respective positions.

Stewart raises Zeltser case
--------------
12.(C) Ambassador Stewart delivered the demarche points (Ref
C) to Khvostov on the welfare of detained Amcit Emanuel
Zeltser detained by Belarusian authorities since March 12.
Khvostov acknowledged some familiarity with the case and
undertook to convey the U.S. message of concern and demand
for immediate consular access to FM Martynov. Ambassador
Stewart stressed the urgency of the matter, given Mr.
Zeltser's medical condition and thanked Khvostov in advance
for his speedy action.

13.(U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Stewart.
MURRAY

.