Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS54
2008-01-11 16:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: EU OFFICIALS SUPPORT ASHDOWN AND

Tags:  AF AID BE EU EUN IO PGOV PREL PTER SNAR NATO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000054 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL, INL/AP, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, DOD
FOR DASD DAN FATA, USAID FOR WARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: AF AID BE EU EUN IO PGOV PREL PTER SNAR NATO
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: EU OFFICIALS SUPPORT ASHDOWN AND
WORRY ABOUT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN MISSION

REF: A. A) SECSTATE 1001

B. B) BRUSSELS 2603

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHRISTOPHER W. MURRAY FOR REASONS 1.4
(b) AND (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000054

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL, INL/AP, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, DOD
FOR DASD DAN FATA, USAID FOR WARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: AF AID BE EU EUN IO PGOV PREL PTER SNAR NATO
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: EU OFFICIALS SUPPORT ASHDOWN AND
WORRY ABOUT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN MISSION

REF: A. A) SECSTATE 1001

B. B) BRUSSELS 2603

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHRISTOPHER W. MURRAY FOR REASONS 1.4
(b) AND (d)


1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric
Edelman and State Department Counselor Eliot Cohen met with
EU Council Secretariat officials January 8 in Brussels to
discuss Afghanistan. EU Director General for External
Political and Military Affairs Robert Cooper told Edelman and
Cohen the EU should have no problem accepting our proposed
terms of reference for a UN Senior Civilian Representative to
Afghanistan. He suggested that in the coming months when the
EU names a new EU Special Representative for Afghanistan the
EU would want that person to interact extensively with the UN
Senior Civilian Representative.


2. (C) EU interlocutors described negative European public
opinion toward their own involvement in Afghanistan as an
obstacle, but not a deal-breaker. EU officials pressed the
U.S. to back them up on their policies in Afghanistan,
including on counternarcotics. They also asked for U.S. help
in resolving the NATO/EU blockage related to Turkey,s veto
over Cypriot involvement in ESDP missions and requested
bilateral U.S.-EU agreements that would allow the U.S. to
support EUPOL and other ESDP missions. Cohen and Edelman
responded to their questions and concerns and stressed the
importance of working together to make the Afghanistan
mission a success. End Summary.

Introduction
--------------


3. (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman,
State Department Counselor Eliot Cohen, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy Daniel

SIPDIS
Fata, and Secretary of Defense Representative to Europe Bruce
Weinrod Director met with senior EU Council Secretariat
officials over a dinner January 8 hosted by the USEU Charge.
EU officials present included Director General for External
Political and Military Affairs Robert Cooper, Director of the
Policy Planning Unit Helga Schmid, Special Counselor to High
Representative Solana Steven Everts, Director for Defense
Issues Claude-France Arnould, Deputy Director General for
European Security and Defense Policy Pieter Feith, Director
General of the EU Military Staff Lt. Gen. David Leakey, and
Director for Transatlantic Relations Marek Grela.

GREEN LIGHT ON ASHDOWN
--------------


4. (C) Counselor Cohen outlined the USG vision for the role
of UN Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan and our
support for Lord Paddy Ashdown in that role (REF A). Cohen
clarified that the UN Secretary General would make the
appointment. Ashdown would not control resources or have his
own budget other than for his staff. While we currently
anticipate that he would not be &triple-hatted8, we hope
that other international actors would follow Ashdown,s lead.
Robert Cooper said those terms should not present a problem
for the EU. Cooper also indicated that the EU would be
naming its new Special Representative for Afghanistan in the
coming months. Cooper expected the EU to include in its new
representative,s job description an expectation of close
cooperation between the senior EU and UN officials.


5. (C) Several EU officials expressed surprise that Ashdown
would want the job, but none of them objected to his
candidacy. Arnould said that Ashdown should play a role in
coordinating counternarcotics efforts. Feith stressed the
importance of Afghan &ownership8 and said Ashdown must have
a clear strategy on how to back up national Afghan efforts.
Edelman responded that we were in complete agreement.

PUBLIC OPINION: AN OBSTACLE, NOT A CUL-DE-SAC
-------------- -


6. (C) Edelman told EU interlocutors that the U.S. worried
about insufficient appreciation among European publics for

BRUSSELS 00000054 002 OF 003


the high stakes in Afghanistan. Many Europeans see
Afghanistan as a problem for the U.S. or UK (and not others)
to deal with. He said the international community needed to
recognize the stakes and the scale of the challenge in
Afghanistan. Edelman referred to the U.S. administration,s
budget requests for Afghanistan as an illustration of the
magnitude of the problems and our commitment to engagement.
It was critical that European leaders in individual countries
do a better job of getting the message out about the
importance of Afghanistan. He applauded French President
Sarkozy,s recent trip to Afghanistan and suggested it should
be followed up with more commitments by European countries.
The message should be passed that if Afghanistan were to
return to its pre-2001 conditions, there would be enormous
consequences.


7. (C) Cooper agreed that most Europeans do not see
Afghanistan as priority for their governments. The biggest
problem is that European publics do not see Afghanistan as a
threat to their security. Even EU Foreign Ministers rarely
discussed Afghanistan at their monthly sessions and the
mission to Chad has as much, or more salience for many
European governments as their commitment to Afghanistan.
Feith observed that if we must sustain a 20-year combat role
in Afghanistan, European publics will look for cheaper and
equally effective ways of countering the terrorist threat to
them that originates in Afghanistan itself. Lt. General
David Leakey added that even in the UK, where there had been
terrorist attacks and threats, people perceived home-grown
terrorism as a bigger problem and one which was easier and
more cost-effective to combat, through the MI5. He said that
Europe lacked what he called the U.S. &sound bite8 of
September 11, which enabled us to convince our public of the
importance of winning in Afghanistan.


8. (C) EU Council Secretariat Defense Issues Director Arnould
said another problem is a public sense of fatalism about
Afghanistan. She argued that even in countries like France
that do perceive a threat, people do not believe success in
Afghanistan is likely and thus don,t see the point in
increasing contributions to the cause. As an illustration,
she explained that it is difficult for politicians to
convince citizens of the value of additional contributions,
i.e., what difference will another twenty helicopters make?
She added that people did not see enough success stories in
Afghanistan. Cooper questioned whether allies had ever
actually agreed to engagement in Afghanistan as a strategy
for combating terrorism. He suspected there had been no such
agreement on strategy ) that countries had simply gone in to
Afghanistan under pressure from the U.S.


9. (C) Edelman countered that there were major successes:
the Afghans had written a constitution, elected a parliament,
built schools. He questioned what the Europeans proposed
that the U.S. do. A fatalist response would mean doing
nothing and just letting the counternarcotics problem, among
others, get worse. Leakey responded that these problems
constituted obstacles, but were not a cul-de-sac.

EU ASKS FOR U.S. BACK-UP ON POLICY
--------------


10. (C) Counselor Cohen asked EU interlocutors how the U.S.
could help in addressing some of the problems they had just
outlined. Several Council officials stressed that European
commitment would be bolstered by a perception of strong U.S.
commitment to consult allies on policy. Feith noted that
some U.S. officials had said they had intended to proceed
with aerial spraying to counter poppy cultivation without
taking into account EU views, which were strongly opposed to
aerial spraying. On police reform, he said his impression
was that the U.S. had a certain view about what had to be
done, which the EU could not influence. Counselor Cohen
responded that the U.S. had deferred to President Karzai,s
wish on aerial spraying. More broadly, he suggested that the
weight of individual countries, influence on strategy in
Afghanistan will be proportionate to their efforts there.

NATO-EU BLOCKAGE
--------------

BRUSSELS 00000054 003 OF 003




11. (C) Arnauld raised the issue of Turkey,s blockage of
NATO/EU coordination on the EU,s police training mission for
Afghanistan (EUPOL). She asked whether the U.S. could help
resolve the problem. Cooper added that NATO had pressed the
EU to develop the police training mission, and the EU would
like to build on it, but they are hampered by this blockage
and its consequences. As an example, he noted that as a
result, the EU has to send people to Afghanistan with only
the same level of security that NGOs receive. Cooper added
that the EU is willing to make concessions to Turkey if they
are confident that Turkey is &in a mood to give back.8


12. (C) Edelman responded that Turkey was very aggrieved by
the still-unresolved Cyprus problem, and the Turks saw the
NATO-EU blockage as their main leverage. He added that the
Turks were preoccupied with other problems, but that the U.S.
continues to raise this point with the GOT. (Note:
separately, after the dinner, Leakey raised with DAS Fata the
EU,s request for USG support for the EUPOL police training
mission (REF B). Leakey argued that in light of the
probability that the general NATO/EU blockage will not be
resolved for perhaps ten years or more, it was important that
the U.S. and EU reach bilateral agreements on how to
coordinate, not just on EUPOL in Afghanistan but in other
areas where NATO-EU cooperation could be blocked. Fata
assured him we would continue to work on finding a solution
to this problem. End Note.)


13. (U) This message has been cleared by Under Secretary
Edelman and Counselor Cohen.

MURRAY