Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS458
2008-03-27 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

BELARUS: EU TRENDING TOWARD ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIME

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ETTC OSCE EUN BO XH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6300
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0458/01 0871510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271510Z MAR 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000458 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILSON, STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ETTC OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: BELARUS: EU TRENDING TOWARD ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIME

REF: BRUSSELS 411

Classified By: USEU Acting Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

EU Increasingly Swayed by Germany
----------------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000458

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILSON, STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ETTC OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: BELARUS: EU TRENDING TOWARD ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIME

REF: BRUSSELS 411

Classified By: USEU Acting Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

EU Increasingly Swayed by Germany
--------------
1.(C) The EU is in a dilemma as it tries to balance two
contradictory policy desires toward Belarus: Transatlantic
unity and "constructive engagement." The European Commission
and Germany are moving EU member states in Brussels away from
the former and toward the latter. Germany has unusual
influence in the policy debate as it is widely considered to
be the leading Member State authority on Belarus within the
EU. Member States may be ready to abandon a tough line on
Belarus for a variety of reasons including economic interests
(Germany, Lithuania),philosophical aversion to sanctions
(Italy, Sweden),bad information (smaller member states with
no presence in Minsk),and fear of provoking Russia and/or
pushing Belarus farther into Russia's arms (France, other
Mediterranean and East European countries). Some EU Member
States also appear to have become more open to "engagement"
with Belarus given that the EU is unlikely to be equally
tough in its reaction to recent regressive trends in Armenia
and Georgia.
Those who align more closely with the United States (UK,
Poland) are in a dwindling minority. The Brits here have
even intimated to us they now see their role as bridging the
gap between what they see as two fundamentally different
approaches.

HOMS Are No Help
--------------
2.(C) Aware of U.S. views on the controversial German
Ambassador to Belarus, one EU contact pointed out that "there
are now many (Ambassador) Weiss's in the ranks of the EU
Heads of Missions (HOMS)" in Minsk. Responding to a tasking
from the Council's Political and Security Committee, the EU
HOMS in Minsk recently forwarded a list of recommendations
for removal of current EU sanctions against Minsk in the
event of Alexandr Kazulin's release. Among the HOMs'
recommendations to be debated by experts in Brussels on March
31 are a six month suspension of sanctions against the entire
Presidential Administration except Lukashenko, as well as the
maintenance of sanctions against judges and prosecutors
unless it is clear that harassment of the political
opposition has ceased. The HOMS proposals starkly contrast
with those put forward by Council Secretariat staff which
recommended a more narrow suspension of the visa ban against
judges and prosecutors, as well as for the Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administra
tion Madame Petkevich, and possibly the Speaker of the
Parliament.

What they really think
--------------
3.(C) While Member States and EU institutions have carefully
avoided direct criticism of U.S. tactical approach to Minsk,
some have reportedly been sniping privately that Belarusian
pressure on the U.S. Embassy in Minsk was not unprovoked.
Moreover, some European diplomats resented our lack of prior
consultation on the March 6 U.S. Treasury's public
announcement clarifying U.S. economic sanctions on
Belneftikim. According to a friendly Council Secretariat
contact, High Rep Solana himself wants to show solidarity
with the United States in the face of Belarusian
intimidation. We told our Secretariat contact that that this
impulse is not being translated into action on the ground in
Minsk and that a clear statement of support was needed. A
handful of EU contacts (Greece, Council Secretariat, Slovene
Presidency) opined privately that the EU would be unlikely to
achieve consensus on a strong statement of support for the
U.S. Embassy.

If Kazulin Release were announced
--------------
4.(C) So far, USG demarche points for the EU have highlighted
the importance of avoiding the impression of a US-EU split
that would be fostered by a Commission Delegation Office
opening in the midst of a forced U.S. drawdown or closure.
Based on our recent discussions with EU institutional and
Permrep officials, we cannot rule out the possibility that at
least some in the EU -- including some of the most
influential member states -- would be feckless enough to
accept Lukashenko's terms for Kazulin's release, even if the
effective closure of the U.S. Embassy in Minsk were one of
them. The bottom line appears to be that the EU is reverting
to trying to work with the regime in Minsk, with little
thought thus far about the broader potential implications for
Transatlantic cooperation in Belarus or the elsewhere in the
region.

BRUSSELS 00000458 002 OF 002


MURRAY

.