Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS444
2008-03-25 16:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:
YVES LETERME FORMS NEW BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBS #0444/01 0851657 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 251657Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7187
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000444
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BE
SUBJECT: YVES LETERME FORMS NEW BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
Classified By: POLCOUNS LYNN GURIAN. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000444
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BE
SUBJECT: YVES LETERME FORMS NEW BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
Classified By: POLCOUNS LYNN GURIAN. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Yves Leterme assumed office as Belgian Prime
Minister March 22 amidst speculation about how long his
government will last and how contentious will be the next
wave of institutional reform talks. Leterme's Flemish
nationalist election partner (NV.A) has given him until
mid-July to propose significant state reforms, while the
francophone Liberals are proclaiming a three year window for
the reforms. With Karel De Gucht remaining as Foreign
Minister, we expect good U.S.-Belgian bilateral relations to
continue and anticipate no early surprises on the foreign
policy front while Leterme hammers out domestic programs and
gets up to speed on foreign policy issues. End Summary.
--------------
Despite Setbacks Leterme Takes the Reins
--------------
2. (U) Flemish Christian Democrat (CD&V) Yves Leterme, sworn
in as Prime Minister on March 20, presented his program to
Belgium,s parliament the same day. After extended
discussion over a 48 hour period, he received a vote of
confidence from the House of Representatives on March 22.
3. (SBU) Leterme's road to the PM job has not been easy since
his party's strong showing in the June 10, 2007, federal
elections. Until the last minute, challenges to his PM
candidacy continued, led at times by francophone Liberal (MR)
President Didier Reynders and fueled by the refusal of
Leterme's election partner, the nationalist New Flemish
Alliance (NV.A),to participate in the interim government
coalition. Leterme stepped up pressure on NV.A to endorse
his government. While five of the six NV.A parliamentarians
supported Leterme's government program, NV.A president Bart
De Wever abstained, an anticipated "symbolic gesture." De
Wever, displeased with the institutional reform package
proposed by former Flemish Liberal PM Guy Verhofstadt ("stage
one"),has said he will reserve his approval of Leterme's
government until later, after weightier reform issues are
negotiated ("stage two").
4. (C) Some political observers believe the collapse of
government formation talks last year under Leterme was a huge
personal setback for him, one that may diminish his political
weight and leadership as Prime Minister. The failure to push
through an institutional reform package strong enough to
appease his nationalist ally, NV.A, as well as pass muster
with the francophone parties, was largely responsible for
torpedoing Leterme's initial formation efforts. While the
widely divergent opinions between hardliners on the Flemish
and francophone sides made it necessary for Leterme to
abandon his early attempts to form a government, many point
to his own gaffes as evidence of his lack of leadership and
negotiation skills. (The biggest gaffes occurred on
Belgium's National day, when Leterme could not remember why
his country celebrated its national day on July 21 nor
remember the French version of the national anthem, feeding
suspicions that he is a closet Flemish nationalist.) In
addition, a rather taciturn, professorial style of conducting
business has not endeared him to his francophone colleagues.
Nonetheless, twelve of the twenty-two newly appointed
ministers are francophone.
--------------
Leterme's Government Program
--------------
5. (U) Despite this prolonged political infighting, the
interim governing coalition approved Leterme's government
program and he presented it to parliament March 20, winning a
vote of confidence from the House of Representatives March
22. The focus will be on the first batch of institutional
reform measures proposed by Verhofstadt's interim government
(stage one) as a jumping off point for the second stage of
the institutional negotiations. Other domestic issues will
center on tightening Belgium's immigration policy, creating
200,000 new jobs, and reviewing social welfare benefits and
policy.
6. (SBU) The new government contains members of five parties
from diverse ideological backgrounds: the francophone
Socialists (PS),francophone/Flemish Christian Democrats
(CdH/CD&V),and francophone/Flemish Liberal parties
(MR/OpenVLD). The need to maintain support across the
coalition,s broad political spectrum required a degree of
vagueness in the newly released program. The initial lack of
substantive detail, and consequently, agreement on major
policy issues, has caused many to publicly question the
potential effectiveness and longevity of the Leterme
government.
7. (SBU) On foreign policy issues, Leterme's government
program is also a bit thin, focusing on support for EU
expansion, including support for Turkey's EU accession
without reservation, and support for trade liberalization.
As Belgium prepares for its EU presidency in 2010, it intends
to be "pro-active" in its support of international
institutions. This sketchy program reflects Leterme's
inexperience with foreign policy issues; as a former Minister
President of Flanders his attention focused on domestic
issues, particularly devolution of power to the regions.
-------------- --------------
Bilateral Relations/Continuing Verhofstadt's Legacy
-------------- --------------
8. (SBU) After months of ineffective government negotiations
led by Leterme, the King tasked Verhofstadt in December with
heading an "interim" cabinet through March 20, consisting of
Belgium's two Liberal, two Christian Democratic, and
francophone Socialist parties. As we head into "Leterme I",
Verhofstadt departs for a year-long sabbatical to write a
book and gear up for 2009 EU parliamentary elections. With
Leterme a foreign policy novice and Karel De Gucht remaining
as Foreign Minister, Leterme's foreign policy program is
expected to bear Verhoftstadt's handprint, at least for a
while. While details on his foreign policy goals are sketchy
at this point, Leterme's foreign policy advisers have told us
they expect to follow the "Verhofstadt/De Gucht course" early
on.
9. (SBU) Verhofstadt played an instrumental role in putting
U.S.-Belgian relations back on track after the low point of
spring 2003, taking a series of steps aimed at strengthening
transatlantic ties, including making good on a pledge to
nullify the effect on U.S. officials of the "Universal
Competence" law (which, in its original form, opened the door
to politicized legal action against U.S. officials).
Verhofstadt has been a vocal critic of Iranian nuclear
ambitions and a steady promoter of democratic aspirations in
Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia.
10. (SBU) Under Verhofstadt's watch, Belgium exercised good
leadership on issues involving Africa, particularly in the
Sudan and the Congo. Belgium has also worked within EU
councils to move the consensus on some issues, such as Iran
sanctions, in directions favorable to the U.S. He was one of
the first supporters of Turkey's EU aspirations and propelled
Belgium's early recognition of an independent Kosovo.
Verhofstadt's political legacy will center on these efforts
as well as his efforts at increased transatlantic cooperation
while supporting European integration. Leterme, guided by FM
De Gucht, is expected to follow this course, at least early
on.
11. (C) Comment: Political observers already voice
skepticism about the length and success of Leterme's
government, wondering if it will survive the next round of
institutional reform talks, scheduled to be completed by
mid-July. Vice PM Reynders has openly rejected the need for
a deadline, stating the government now has three years to
work out reforms. Many believe resolution of the "tough
issues," such as regionalization of the labor market or of
corporate tax, demanded by Flemish socialists and
conservatives, respectively, has merely been postponed and
rough waters lay ahead because too many politicians on both
sides of the language divide have made promises on
institutional reform that they cannot redeem without near
complete surrender by the other side. The possible presence
at the negotiating table of Flemish nationalist NV.A leader
Bart De Wever and his francophone counterpart, Olivier
Maingain of the Francophone Democratic Front (FDF),will not
necessarily contribute to any easing of tensions, especially
after Reynders' statement on timing. Nor will the presence
at talks of CdH (francophone Christian Democrats) party
president Joelle Milquet, whom Leterme blames for
consistently arguing against any institutional reforms, make
things easier.
12. (C) Although Leterme is untested at the federal level, we
expect our good bilateral relations to continue, especially
with FM De Gucht and Defense Minister Pieter De Crem staying
on. We expect Belgium to remain committed to interpreting
its mandate in as expansive a fashion as domestic politics
will allow, particularly in promoting international security,
human rights, and democracy programs. While domestic
realities will not allow Belgian leaders to send troops to
Iraq, we expect continued troop support in Afghanistan.
Strong cooperation on counterterrorism and nonproliferation
issues should continue and we will look for continued Belgian
leadership in Africa.
13. (U) Biographical information on members of the new
government will follow septel. A summary of Leterme's
government program has been forwarded to the EUR-WE-BELGIUM
desk. FOX
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BE
SUBJECT: YVES LETERME FORMS NEW BELGIAN GOVERNMENT
Classified By: POLCOUNS LYNN GURIAN. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Yves Leterme assumed office as Belgian Prime
Minister March 22 amidst speculation about how long his
government will last and how contentious will be the next
wave of institutional reform talks. Leterme's Flemish
nationalist election partner (NV.A) has given him until
mid-July to propose significant state reforms, while the
francophone Liberals are proclaiming a three year window for
the reforms. With Karel De Gucht remaining as Foreign
Minister, we expect good U.S.-Belgian bilateral relations to
continue and anticipate no early surprises on the foreign
policy front while Leterme hammers out domestic programs and
gets up to speed on foreign policy issues. End Summary.
--------------
Despite Setbacks Leterme Takes the Reins
--------------
2. (U) Flemish Christian Democrat (CD&V) Yves Leterme, sworn
in as Prime Minister on March 20, presented his program to
Belgium,s parliament the same day. After extended
discussion over a 48 hour period, he received a vote of
confidence from the House of Representatives on March 22.
3. (SBU) Leterme's road to the PM job has not been easy since
his party's strong showing in the June 10, 2007, federal
elections. Until the last minute, challenges to his PM
candidacy continued, led at times by francophone Liberal (MR)
President Didier Reynders and fueled by the refusal of
Leterme's election partner, the nationalist New Flemish
Alliance (NV.A),to participate in the interim government
coalition. Leterme stepped up pressure on NV.A to endorse
his government. While five of the six NV.A parliamentarians
supported Leterme's government program, NV.A president Bart
De Wever abstained, an anticipated "symbolic gesture." De
Wever, displeased with the institutional reform package
proposed by former Flemish Liberal PM Guy Verhofstadt ("stage
one"),has said he will reserve his approval of Leterme's
government until later, after weightier reform issues are
negotiated ("stage two").
4. (C) Some political observers believe the collapse of
government formation talks last year under Leterme was a huge
personal setback for him, one that may diminish his political
weight and leadership as Prime Minister. The failure to push
through an institutional reform package strong enough to
appease his nationalist ally, NV.A, as well as pass muster
with the francophone parties, was largely responsible for
torpedoing Leterme's initial formation efforts. While the
widely divergent opinions between hardliners on the Flemish
and francophone sides made it necessary for Leterme to
abandon his early attempts to form a government, many point
to his own gaffes as evidence of his lack of leadership and
negotiation skills. (The biggest gaffes occurred on
Belgium's National day, when Leterme could not remember why
his country celebrated its national day on July 21 nor
remember the French version of the national anthem, feeding
suspicions that he is a closet Flemish nationalist.) In
addition, a rather taciturn, professorial style of conducting
business has not endeared him to his francophone colleagues.
Nonetheless, twelve of the twenty-two newly appointed
ministers are francophone.
--------------
Leterme's Government Program
--------------
5. (U) Despite this prolonged political infighting, the
interim governing coalition approved Leterme's government
program and he presented it to parliament March 20, winning a
vote of confidence from the House of Representatives March
22. The focus will be on the first batch of institutional
reform measures proposed by Verhofstadt's interim government
(stage one) as a jumping off point for the second stage of
the institutional negotiations. Other domestic issues will
center on tightening Belgium's immigration policy, creating
200,000 new jobs, and reviewing social welfare benefits and
policy.
6. (SBU) The new government contains members of five parties
from diverse ideological backgrounds: the francophone
Socialists (PS),francophone/Flemish Christian Democrats
(CdH/CD&V),and francophone/Flemish Liberal parties
(MR/OpenVLD). The need to maintain support across the
coalition,s broad political spectrum required a degree of
vagueness in the newly released program. The initial lack of
substantive detail, and consequently, agreement on major
policy issues, has caused many to publicly question the
potential effectiveness and longevity of the Leterme
government.
7. (SBU) On foreign policy issues, Leterme's government
program is also a bit thin, focusing on support for EU
expansion, including support for Turkey's EU accession
without reservation, and support for trade liberalization.
As Belgium prepares for its EU presidency in 2010, it intends
to be "pro-active" in its support of international
institutions. This sketchy program reflects Leterme's
inexperience with foreign policy issues; as a former Minister
President of Flanders his attention focused on domestic
issues, particularly devolution of power to the regions.
-------------- --------------
Bilateral Relations/Continuing Verhofstadt's Legacy
-------------- --------------
8. (SBU) After months of ineffective government negotiations
led by Leterme, the King tasked Verhofstadt in December with
heading an "interim" cabinet through March 20, consisting of
Belgium's two Liberal, two Christian Democratic, and
francophone Socialist parties. As we head into "Leterme I",
Verhofstadt departs for a year-long sabbatical to write a
book and gear up for 2009 EU parliamentary elections. With
Leterme a foreign policy novice and Karel De Gucht remaining
as Foreign Minister, Leterme's foreign policy program is
expected to bear Verhoftstadt's handprint, at least for a
while. While details on his foreign policy goals are sketchy
at this point, Leterme's foreign policy advisers have told us
they expect to follow the "Verhofstadt/De Gucht course" early
on.
9. (SBU) Verhofstadt played an instrumental role in putting
U.S.-Belgian relations back on track after the low point of
spring 2003, taking a series of steps aimed at strengthening
transatlantic ties, including making good on a pledge to
nullify the effect on U.S. officials of the "Universal
Competence" law (which, in its original form, opened the door
to politicized legal action against U.S. officials).
Verhofstadt has been a vocal critic of Iranian nuclear
ambitions and a steady promoter of democratic aspirations in
Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia.
10. (SBU) Under Verhofstadt's watch, Belgium exercised good
leadership on issues involving Africa, particularly in the
Sudan and the Congo. Belgium has also worked within EU
councils to move the consensus on some issues, such as Iran
sanctions, in directions favorable to the U.S. He was one of
the first supporters of Turkey's EU aspirations and propelled
Belgium's early recognition of an independent Kosovo.
Verhofstadt's political legacy will center on these efforts
as well as his efforts at increased transatlantic cooperation
while supporting European integration. Leterme, guided by FM
De Gucht, is expected to follow this course, at least early
on.
11. (C) Comment: Political observers already voice
skepticism about the length and success of Leterme's
government, wondering if it will survive the next round of
institutional reform talks, scheduled to be completed by
mid-July. Vice PM Reynders has openly rejected the need for
a deadline, stating the government now has three years to
work out reforms. Many believe resolution of the "tough
issues," such as regionalization of the labor market or of
corporate tax, demanded by Flemish socialists and
conservatives, respectively, has merely been postponed and
rough waters lay ahead because too many politicians on both
sides of the language divide have made promises on
institutional reform that they cannot redeem without near
complete surrender by the other side. The possible presence
at the negotiating table of Flemish nationalist NV.A leader
Bart De Wever and his francophone counterpart, Olivier
Maingain of the Francophone Democratic Front (FDF),will not
necessarily contribute to any easing of tensions, especially
after Reynders' statement on timing. Nor will the presence
at talks of CdH (francophone Christian Democrats) party
president Joelle Milquet, whom Leterme blames for
consistently arguing against any institutional reforms, make
things easier.
12. (C) Although Leterme is untested at the federal level, we
expect our good bilateral relations to continue, especially
with FM De Gucht and Defense Minister Pieter De Crem staying
on. We expect Belgium to remain committed to interpreting
its mandate in as expansive a fashion as domestic politics
will allow, particularly in promoting international security,
human rights, and democracy programs. While domestic
realities will not allow Belgian leaders to send troops to
Iraq, we expect continued troop support in Afghanistan.
Strong cooperation on counterterrorism and nonproliferation
issues should continue and we will look for continued Belgian
leadership in Africa.
13. (U) Biographical information on members of the new
government will follow septel. A summary of Leterme's
government program has been forwarded to the EUR-WE-BELGIUM
desk. FOX