DAS KRAMER AND AMB STEWART DISCUSS BELARUS WITH EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID ECON ENRG OSCE EUN BO XH
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER AND AMB STEWART DISCUSS BELARUS WITH EU

Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------
1.(C) EUR DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador Karen Stewart
(Minsk) met the Friends of Belarus informal contact group on
March 14 in Brussels to coordinate policy responses to the
forced recall of Ambassador Stewart from Minsk and the
continued detention of high profile political prisoner
Alexandr Kazulin. EU Friends agreed to renew current
sanctions against the Lukashenko regime and undertook to
consider how to signal its solidarity with the United States.
However, cracks in EU resolve were evident as Germany,
Lithuania, and the Council Secretariat clashed openly on
tactics. EU and German officials argued for more patience on
the Kazulin situation as well as greater EU engagement with
the regime. France reiterated its concern that continued
isolation from the West will drive Belarus further into the
Russian sphere of influence, but along with the UK, asserted
that sanctions remained the West's primary lever against the
regime. Lithuania suggested convening another Friends
meeting before April 7, the date scheduled for the
Commission's Delegation opening in Minsk. END SUMMARY

2.(SBU) During a March 14 visit to Brussels, EUR Deputy
Assistant Secretary David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador to
Belarus Karen Stewart held intensive consultations with EU
institutions and member states on Belarus. These included a
Friends of Belarus meeting hosted by the Lithuanian Mission.
Participation included representatives of the European
Commission, Council Secretariat, and Permanent Missions of
the UK, Sweden, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, France, and
Germany. Although the group issued no formal conclusions,
the Lithuanian Chair concluded the following:

-- Friends had agreed on the need of some kind of signal of
solidarity with the United States.

-- While there had been some disagreement on whether to
impose a deadline for Kazulin's release, the Friends assessed
that April 7 was a key date in the political calendar with
respect to that issue, given the opening of a Commission
Delegation office in Minsk scheduled on the same date as well
as the renewal of EU sanctions against Minsk that same week.

-- While the Delegation's opening was deemed important by
many, the timing presented a problem. Lithuania urged
caution in considering positive action in the current
climate.

-- Finally Lithuania proposed that the Friends meet nearer to
April 7 to coordinate tactics.

A detailed report of the discussion follows.


U.S. Recounts Broken Promises and Bad Faith
--------------
3.(C) At the first Friends of Belarus meeting convened this
year by the Lithuanian Permanent Mission to the EU, DAS
Kramer and Ambassador Stewart provided a detailed briefing to
European Friends on current U.S. sanctions, bilateral
discussions with GOB on prisoners, and the increasing
harassment of US Embassy Minsk, beginning with the forced
recall of Ambassador Stewart. U.S. officials now assessed
that Minsk's initial offer to release six of the highest
profile political prisoners by mid-February was a gambit to
forestall new U.S. economic and financial sanctions. The
regime's initial refusal to release Alexandr Kazulin to
attend his wife's funeral and its insistence upon his return
to prison immediately thereafter had reinforced our view of
the matter.

4.(C) Although the U.S. Treasury recent public clarification
of the current sanctions against Belneftikim was not/not a
new sanction, Belarusian authorities had regarded it as such.
Now that the regime had broken its agreement to release
Kazulin, the United States would resume preparations for
intensified sanctions. At the same time, Kramer underscored
that the U.S. had stressed at every turn to Minsk that
engagement remained on the table if it made good on its
original offer to release the six. Conditions on the ground
were worsening, however. The United States was now faced
with a concerted Belarusian plan to constrain, downsize and
perhaps eventually force the closure of the U.S. Embassy in
Minsk. The choice was simply release Kazulin and improve
relations with the West, or keep him in jail at the expense
of improved relations.

Lithuania Calls for EU Solidarity with U.S.
--------------

5. Responding to the U.S. presentation, Lithuanian

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Undersecretary for Political Affairs Zygimantas Pavilionis
called upon EU Friends to consider having the EU demarche
Minsk on the forced recall of U.S. Ambassador as well as to
consider recalling their own ambassadors. He stressed the
need for solidarity with the United States. Other
delegations, including France, the UK, Sweden, Latvia,
Slovenia, Poland, and Germany, agreed to consider an EU
intervention with Minsk on harassment of American diplomats,
but deflected any debate in the Friends venue. DAS Kramer
thanked the group in advance for ensuring that the EU took up
the matter with urgency.

EU Officials Want More Engagement
--------------
6.(C) Offering the EU institutional perspective on
developments in Minsk, Helga Schmid, Policy Planning
Director, Council Secretariat and Hilde Hardemann Unit
Director for Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, DG RELEX
Commission, highlighted the importance of supporting and
strengthening civil society and the democratic opposition.
Although clearly uncomfortable with regime tactics against
the U.S. delegation and Belarusian political opposition, both
Schmid and Hardemann averred that diplomatic engagement,
including the opening of the new Commission Delegation in
Minsk on April 7 was warranted. They readily conceded that
U.S. and EU tactics were different but that our strategic
goals were the same.

Is Belarus Assuaging Moscow?
--------------
7.(C) Schmid asserted that the Russians might be behind the
continued imprisonment of Kazulin as well as the new
harassment of the US Embassy. At the Munich Werkunde
conference, Belarusian FM Martynov told her that Moscow had
been furious with Minsk's decision to invite OSCE/ODIHR to do
long-term monitoring of its September 2008 parliamentary
elections. Belarus was now scrambling to make up for its
error. In any case, Schmid said she was clear with
Belarusian DFM Voronetsky during his visit to Brussels March
7 on the steps that had to be taken to improve relations with
the West. She also signaled to Voronetsky that the EU would
not take new sanctions in the interim. Pavilionis
interrupted Schmid to question her mandate to make such a
statement on behalf of the EU. The two officials bantered
back and forth for a moment revealing clear tensions between
Germany, Council Secretariat (note: Schmid is German) and
Lithuania on the conduct of EU diplomacy toward Minsk.
Kramer, supported by the UK, pointed out
that the situation in Minsk had already changed for the worse
since the Schmid-Vorontsky meeting.

EU Sanctions Set for Renewal
--------------
8.(C) Renata Marmalaku, the Slovenian (Council Presidency)
COEST chair, reported that current EU sanctions would be
renewed without change on April 7. The EU would, however,
accompany the action with a political statement signaling a
willingness to review the sanctions if the situation were to
improve (read: Kazulin's release). The Council was already
considering what it might do in response to release of the
six prisoners. The UK, Sweden, and France openly rejected a
suggestion from Lithuania to remove Lukashenko from the EU
visa ban list first. Furthermore, Sweden and UK reps stated
that Lukashenko's should be the last name to be removed.

Germany: Softer Line and More Time
--------------
9.(C) German MFA rep Ernst Reichl argued that the EU should
not discuss its policy in front of the U.S. at the Friends
meeting. Lithuania had "overreacted and that its suggestions
were counterproductive." He claimed that "Belarus is
capitalizing on this" and "that we should make it clear to
Belarus that we have different tactics but the same
strategy." Germany did not want the release of the five (of
the six) prisoners to be received negatively by the West.
In the meantime, Germany would focus on what decision the EU
should take if and when Kazulin were released, including
level of contacts. Reichl further asserted that Kazulin
could not be released because of a lack of national amnesty
legislation: "Germany as a country of rule of law cannot tell
Belarus to disregard its own legislation." This assertion
was rejected out of hand by several others in the room,
including the United States.

10.(C) In response to the Lithuanian proposal that the EU
offer Minsk a deadline of April 7 for releasing Kazulin, the
German rep retorted that such a deadline was "not EU policy"
and instead suggested the Friends accept the prospect of
Kazulin's release after Belarusian Parliamentary elections in
September. Furthermore, Germany would support a
forward-leaning Council statement in April. Reichl was open
to the possibility that such a statement include language on
the treatment of the U.S. Embassy in Minsk. Lithuania

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countered that that wording in the EU statement would be too
little, too late; reiterated for third time the necessity of
a demarche.

France, Sweden and UK Try to Bridge the Gap
--------------
11.(C) French and British diplomats registered deep concern
about the mounting diplomatic crisis between Belarus and the
United States. They took up the Lithuanian call for
solidarity with the EU's "main partner" (UK) in Belarus, but
demurred on specific steps, pending EU internal
consultations. While stressing the importance of using
sanctions as political leverage, they also saw the need to
react positively to the release of the five other high
profile political prisoners. Several delegations, including
the French, Brits, and Poles doubted Lukashenko's sincerity
about releasing Kazulin or opening to the West.

12.(C) Angus Lapsley UKREP Polmincouns noted that since the
PSC had debated on Belarus on March 4, the situation had
deteriorated and was no longer "business as usual." While
the UK concurred with EU officials that the new Commission
delegation in Minsk should open as quickly as possible, the
timing was now problematic. Lapsley challenged Europeans to
consider the negative optic of EU increasing presence at the
same time the United States was forced by the regime to
reduce its own. If the situation continued to worsen, the EU
should consider adding, not removing names from the visa ban
list.

13.(C) The Swedish PSC Ambassador recalled that since the
last Friends meeting in November 2007, the United States had,
true to its word, increased sanctions slightly and that the
EU, similarly, had held the line on its own sanctions, but
had not taken further measures. He noted both good and bad
developments in Belarus since that time, but on the whole,
saw that the negative list had grown longer, including the
regime's harassment of students. Sweden urged the Friends
not to get stuck on any one incident, but to keep the focus
on the longer term goals. Finally, the Latvian rep stressed
that Lukashenko's paramount concern was regime survival, that
he would "play the Moscow card" and that the EU should not go
any further (with opening) than it had already done.

14.(U) This message has been cleared by DAS Kramer.
MURRAY
.