U.S. COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND RULE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000382

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL/FO, EUR, INL/AP, INL/PC, EUR/ERA;
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS;
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS;
USNATO FOR DEFENSE OPERATIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF POLITICAL
AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU
SUBJECT: U.S. COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND RULE OF
LAW IN AFGHANISTAN UPDATES SACEUR ON DRUG SITUATION IN
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS (INL) COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) U.S. Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Rule of Law
in Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, briefed
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR),General Bantz J.
Craddock March 6 on the drug situation in Afghanistan.
Schweich noted increased correlation between insecurity and
poppy cultivation, with provinces under greater government
control, including the poorest ones, making the most strides
in eliminating opium cultivation. SACEUR said allied
military support of counter-drug efforts "incidental to
military operations" had nearly reached the limits of current
authorizations; he was considering seeking additional
authorities to permit stand-alone interdiction operations,
saying North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members may
well be on board for such a change, although moving to direct
support for eradication remained a bridge too far. They
agreed that, while some progress has occurred on the
counter-drug front in various provinces, lack of political
will in Afghanistan remained the largest single hurdle. END
SUMMARY.

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POOREST PROVINCES POPPY-FREE
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2. (C) At the suggestion of UK counterparts, Ambassador
Schweich, accompanied by Office Director for Afghanistan and
Pakistan Programs in the Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL),Mission INL Counselor, and
INL Special Assistant, briefed SACEUR General Craddock March
6 on the status of opium cultivation, counter-drug
initiatives, and the relationship of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to counter-drug missions in
Afghanistan. Defense Counselor Paul Flaherty of the UK
Delegation to NATO also attended this meeting along with
SACEUR Military Advisor U.S. Colonel Patrick Warren and UK
Lieutenant Colonel Derek Hudson. Noting that UK colleagues
had suggested that he brief him on the latest drug situation
at this critical juncture in the Afghan growing season,
Schweich observed that the cultivation landscape had changed
since his previous briefing to SACEUR in early 2007. With
continued progress in Nangarhar and Badakshan in the east,
the poorest provinces now remained totally free of poppy
cultivation. Additionally, information uncovered during a
recent major raid of facilities linked to drug trafficker
Haji Bajcho contained lists of customers and suppliers,
including names of Taliban commanders, thereby demonstrating
explicit links between the Taliban and drug traffickers.

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LACK OF POLITICAL WILL IS BIGGEST OBSTACLE
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3. (C) Poppy cultivation continued to soar in Helmand
province, where wealthy landowners had converted farm lands
with access to irrigation and roads provided by the
international community to drug production. Eighty percent
of opium cultivation now involved fields that farmers had
switched from wheat or cotton production during the past few
years. This phenomenon reflected the lack of law enforcement
presence in the province. Myths persisted regarding drug
production in Afghanistan, and such myths perpetuated bad
policy. Drug production in Helmand mostly involved flat,
large fields owned by wealthy landowners near urban areas,
rather than poor farmers in remote mountainous regions.
SACEUR inquired about the role of poor sharecroppers.
Schweich acknowledged that some sharecroppers lacked advance

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credit to produce legitimate crops on their own fields and
resorted to working for meager wages on lands owned by the
wealthy; nonetheless, with irrigation providing the
opportunity to "multi-crop" and with easy and relatively
secure access to markets in the provincial center, it would
be hard to argue that sharecroppers in the poppy-rich central
districts of Helmand did not have legitimate alternatives.
SACEUR remarked that the flat lands would be "ideal"
candidates for aerial spraying, as had occurred successfully
in Colombia. Schweich noted that the USG had removed aerial
spraying as an option for eradication to promote allied
unity. Yet, Afghan leaders continued to allege disunity
among allies as an excuse for not doing more against drugs.
Lack of political will during the current election campaign
remained the leading obstacle. Politicians did not want to
crack down on drug traffickers, particularly among Pashtun
tribes, until after the elections, for fear of driving away
potential supporters. .

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NEARING LIMITS OF AUTHORITIES ON ANTI-DRUG SUPPORT
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4. (C) INL/AP Office Director Williams noted the importance
of integrating counter-narcotics efforts with other tasks.
He cited, for example, Task Force Bayonet in Nangarhar, where
military commanders vetted aid projects to ensure that they
did not inadvertently assist those who supported drug
cultivation and the insurgents. Similarly, a task force in
Helmand has begun to promote civil-military coordination
there. The UK has implemented outer perimeter security,
which SACEUR said was appropriate -- if done "incidental to
any military operation." The UK helped build a base for the
central Poppy Eradication Force and conducted medical
evacuations of wounded counter-drug personnel, even in one
instance during an ongoing fire fight. Williams expressed
hope that the Afghan Government would provide promised force
protection. Failing that, he expressed hope that the UK
would step forward to do so. Both he and Schweich praised
the publication of ISAF Standard Operating Procedure 503,
which provided clear guidelines on indirect military support
of counter-drug missions. SACEUR noted that he was "nearing
the limit" of his authorities in providing such support
"incidentally to military operations." He acknowledged that
national forces that did not want to provide this indirect
support would continue failing to do so. SACEUR remarked
that he would consider seeking "additional" authorities to
permit direct action against drug labs and other interdiction
targets -- removing the current burdensome requirement that
such operations be consequent to ongoing / pre-planned
counter-insurgency operations. Th UK representative noted
that UK forces had destroyed a drug laboratory incidental to
military operations and discovered sensitive equipment there,
including protective vests. He remarked on the importance of
follow-up investigations, such as identifying buyers and
suppliers of precursor chemicals, rather than merely
"torching" the labs.

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ENHANCING SECURITY IS KEY
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5. (C) Schweich noted progress on interdiction, including
prosecutions against 400 Afghan drug traffickers and the
continuing enhancement of the Afghan Government's ability to
prosecute high-value targets and complex networks. To date,
Afghanistan has extradited one kingpin to the U.S. and
surrendered another three persons who left voluntarily in
lieu of extradition. SACEUR lamented recent shrill
editorials about Afghanistan sliding downhill into a
"narco-state." He did not agree with this pessimistic
scenario. Schweich agreed with SACEUR, cautioning however
that some parts of the country remained vulnerable to sliding
into "narco-state" status. SACEUR said the key in the south

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would be improving security. The U.S. planned to send a
battalion into the south shortly to replace one that would
transfer to the east.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN
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6. (C) Schweich said the greatest deterrent to drug
cultivation involved convincing Afghan farmers that drug
cultivation violated the tenets of Islam. Through the
holding of 113 "shuras" in 17 provinces, the international
community has enlisted the help of local clerics to spread
this message. The ISAF public information campaign has also
boosted this message lately, in contrast to an incident the
previous year in which some military units had distributed
leaflets noting that the military did not do eradication.
Schweich also briefed SACEUR on the positive impact of the
Good Performers Initiative. Under this joint US-UK
initiative, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders
worked closely with provincial governors in implementing the
program under clearly enunciated guidelines. The Afghan
Government has set a goal of eradicating 50,000 hectares.
Although this objective seemed overly ambitious, Schweich
averred, falling short of this goal would generate greater
pressure and political will for the future. He noted that
counter-drug personnel could only conduct manual eradication
where they enjoyed adequate force protection. Without such
protection, however, eradication units were sometimes
diverted away from powerful narco-farmers' fields to those of
the poorest and least powerful. To serve as an effective
deterrent to planting drug crops, they needed to "interject
an element of risk" by destroying the fields of wealthy
landowners and deputy police chiefs, for example. According
to UNODC officials, the quantity of eradication has been too
low and the quality too poor (i.e., not going after the right
targets) to serve as deterrents to planting illicit crops.

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IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED UNITY
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7. (C) Schweich also noted increased funding for interdiction
and prosecution of high-value drug traffickers. Only a
fraction of U.S. funds will go towards short-term eradication
projects. He reiterated the importance of allied unity in
putting greater pressure on the Afghan Government to
demonstrate political will towards counter-drug efforts.
Otherwise, Afghan officials would continue to exploit
perceived disunity among allies. SACEUR noted alleged
interest by Iranian leaders in going after drug production,
which has caused serious abuse and addiction problems in
their country. He openly wondered whether Iran would take
stronger measures against blocking movement of weapons into
Afghanistan, if the international community committed, in
turn, to more aggressive efforts against drug smuggling from
Afghanistan into Iran. SACEUR closed the meeting by
expressing appreciation for the briefing. He noted that he
planned to use some of the information the following week
during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and office calls on Capitol Hill.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) Ambassador Schweich and SACEUR seemed to agree on the
current drug situation in Afghanistan, including possible
measures to enhance counter-drug efforts and the importance
of continuing along the path of promoting ever-closer
civil-military coordination in the field. SACEUR remained
actively engaged throughout the briefing, frequently asking
questions and interjecting his own observations.


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9. (U) Ambassador Schweich has cleared this telegram.

MURRAY
.